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SooChan Ahn
LEGITIMACY, FLEXIBILITY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This dissertation reassesses the importance of flexibility in ensuring the legitimacy of the
administrative state and argues how administrative law should accommodate the ever-growing
agency discretion without sacrificing the legitimacy of the agencies. Flexibility results from an
agency’s exercise of its interpretative power with statutory ambiguities and is the most
significant ingredient of the modern administrative state. However, flexibility does not mean
anything goes. There should be limits. The proper latitude of judicial review is the essential
device that makes the administrative state legitimate. From the perspective of a traditional
approach of U.S. administrative law, giving agencies flexibility evokes the image of an executive
unbounded. Per that principle, critics of the modern administrative state argue that congressional
delegation should not be overused because agency authority in the face of statutory authority is
very discretionary and too flexible. In the same vein, certain conservative Supreme Court
Justices advocate overruling the Chevron doctrine and instituting a narrow approach to the
nondelegation doctrine. This dissertation takes a contrary approach to agency discretion. Broad
agency discretion is a positive development and one which courts should honor as long as an
agency’s interpretation is within the statutory authority and not arbitrary or capricious. It
examines both agency deregulation and regulation. Utilizing agency deregulatory regimes, it
visualizes what aspect of agency policy judgment triggers the warning light that fuels legitimacy
concern. It shows that the over-reliance on nondelegation defeats the purpose of flexibility that
provides democratic accountability to our governance structures, giving courts redundant power
to reverse congressional legislature. It suggests that the fundamental gauge to evaluate the
legitimacy of agency decisions must be agency expertise anchored in the statutory ends.
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INTRODUCTION
Deregulation generally began in a big way in the late 70s and early 80s. Since 2005, the U.S.
courts have confronted interesting cases on their docket involving the Internet regulations of the
Federal Communication Commission (hereinafter “FCC”). 1 In those cases, the courts usually
considered the legitimacy of the agency’s regulations or deregulations and upheld them. None of
those cases went as far as the court decision in October 2019, when the United States Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia released its opinion related to the FCC’s most recent order2
repealing strict regulation of the Internet industry.3 This was a compelling case on the merits,
considering the importance of the Internet in this hyperlink society. It dealt with the conflicts
among the rights of consumers, an individual’s free speech, and the overall efficacy of the free
market in the regulation of the Internet. At the same time, however, from the perspective of
administrative law, the case also raised issues beyond the efficacy of this new regulatory approach;
it also fundamentally dealt with the need for and the limitations of judicial deference to agency
actions or interpretations. More fundamentally, the case calls into question whether a regulatory
change of this magnitude can be or should be accomplished as if this were just another deference
case. Was this an abuse of the nondelegation doctrine usually read into the constitution and limiting
the outer reaches of agency discretion? That is to say, is the administrative law enough to ensure
the constitutional democracy and democratic values inherent in a concept of legitimacy when the
law is changed so fundamentally? If not, are there particular limits when deregulation is involved?
At what point is it necessary for the legislature to step in?

1
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Comcast
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); U.S. Telecom Ass’n
v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
2
Restoring Internet Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Fed. 22, 2018) (to be codified to 47 C.F.R. pt.1; pt. 8; pt. 20).
3
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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From a historical perspective, three traditional perspectives can guide us—separation of powers
principle and approaches, the need for expanded agency power on occasion, and the free market,
or in effect, the private sector. These perspectives on regulatory questions, in particular, impart a
unique character into administrative law—especially when agency deregulation is involved. But
are there limits to the kind of change an agency alone can effectuate? Since modern administrative
law took hold in the New Deal and beyond, administrative agencies, often referred to as a ‘fourth
branch’ of government,4 have played significant policy and lawmaking roles. Agencies amassed
an ever-growing broad range of discretion to deal with extraordinary changing conditions since
the days of the New Deal, including for example, environmental issues, economic recessions or
depressions, and new technologies such as the Internet. It is undeniable that the regulations by
agencies have a more pragmatic and almost daily impact on the rights of the people than the
original statutes passed by the legislature long ago. Many of those statutes, especially those from
the New Deal, have seldom been updated or repealed. Agency-dominated rulemaking has been
taking on much more significance relative to traditional legislative lawmaking.5
The expanded power exercised by agencies is not, or was not intended, to be revolutionary in
nature, but rather a way of making incremental change and adapting the basic law passed by
Congress and reviewed by the Judicial Branch. As Justice Blackmun noted in Morton v. Ruiz, the
administrative agency has been required to formulate specific policy and to make agency rules to
fill the gaps that Congress left implicitly or explicitly in the legislation it has passed.6 This has
been a strong tradition of the U.S. administration. From the perspective of U.S. history, it is no
secret that Congress has used independent commissions (as a panacea) to deal with new issues on
4

JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 17 (1978); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN GLOBAL ERA 96 (1992).
5
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE STATE UNLAWFUL 31 (2014).
6
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
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the national horizon.7 Congress created more than a dozen major independent regulatory agencies
since 1887, delegating its authority to agencies in the name of ‘public interest.’8 The delegation to
independent agencies addresses the institutional deficiencies of Congress in the formulation and
administration of public policy.9 That is to say, the reliance on agencies was an ideal method to
deal with new national problems. As a result, the agencies have wide-ranging power to exercise
their discretion and interpret laws, amounting to legislative power in the practical sense.10 Also, a
traditional judicial approach to agency action—i.e., judicial deference on agency authority—
provided a legal environment conducive to extending agency power, ultimately creating the
modern administrative state.11
At the same time, there has been a long-standing tradition: a free market. There is an assumption
that the market remains unregulated unless there is some kind of market failure. Whether a
Democrat or a Republican, most presidents emphasize and pursue the law of supply and demand
operating unimpeded by government.12 This tide of tradition has given a significant effect on the
U.S. administration as a way of deregulation. There seems almost an unwritten rule, perhaps, that
the default position is no regulation or as little as is needed. This position has grown only stronger

7

See FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 5.
Id.
9
Id.
10
See HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 31.
11
See AMAN, supra note 4, at 22; See also JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION:
THE LOST ONE-HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 206 (2012).
12
One of the most famous speeches is the Inaugural address by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Here, President
Reagan said that “Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem,” emphasizing the
outgrowth of government beyond the consent of the governed. See Pubic Paper of Ronald Regan, Pub. Papers 12(1981); see also The President’s Weekly Address, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 00246 (April 16, 2016)
(discussing the importance of fair market value and competition, saying, “One of America’s greatest strengths is our
free market”).
8
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in the context of globalization.13 In this context, agency deregulation seems to be a paradox. This
is because deregulation refers to government efforts to repeal certain kinds of barriers which block
or control individual activities or participation with alternative regulation. The goal of deregulation
seems to be clear: to reduce government controls. That is, as the Reagan administration said, under
the deregulatory regime, the primary goal of deregulation might be to close down some agencies.14
At a glance, deregulation and the power of agency regulation might be located on opposite sides
of the menu in the modern administrative state. However, there seems to be a convergence in the
U.S., and agency deregulation ironically becomes the primary agenda for many agencies as they
come to grip with—among other things—the forces of globalization. Deregulation has become
one of the significant goals of agency rulemaking, as many examples attest.
The problem is that agency deregulation fosters a political arena for the rulemaking process
rather than just filling the role of congressional legislation. At times it is more like a new piece of
legislation than a qualification or interpretation of a pre-existing statute. One of the representative
examples of the kind of deregulation is the order of 2018, the focus of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
in October 2019, which shows the societal impact of deregulation and the legitimacy concerns
agency deregulations can raise.15 When does an agency’s deregulatory interpretation of a statute
become an amending process, if not a new statute entirely—going well beyond the bounds of
traditional administrative law?

13

Patrice C. Scatena, Deference to Discretion: Scalia’s Impact on Judicial Review of Agency Action in an Era of
Deregulation, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1987) (quoting Justice Scalia’s statement made at Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in an Era of Deregulation). There, Justice Scalia stated that
“There are vast tides in human history: the Age of the Industrial Revolution, the Age of Enlightenment. Ours
will doubtless go down as the Age of Deregulation in the history books of the future. It is a trend that has
been around for some time now . . . and the process raises some special problems of judicial review.”
14
See AMAN, supra note 4, at 1.
15
See Brian Fung, The FCC Just Voted to Repeal Its Net Neutrality Rules, in a Sweeping Act of Deregulation,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/14/the-fcc-is-expectedto-repeal-its-net-neutrality-rules-today-in-a-sweeping-act-of-deregulation/. (last visited April 11, 2021).

4

In November 2017, under the Internet Freedom Act, the Federal Communication Commission
explicitly declared the ending of the public-utility regulation of the Internet. Also, the Commission
repealed the significant principle—net neutrality—to encourage market competition in the Internet
industry. Specifically, after the FCC enacted the order of 2018, the case prompted such fierce
backlash from various legislative bodies—e.g., prompting Congressional review or states actions
to enact independent legislation.
Specifically, ever since the FCC decided to repeal the principle of net neutrality, there was an
effort to challenge the FCC’s regulatory action by Congress using the Congressional Review Act
(hereinafter “CRA”) procedure.16 In January 2018, the U.S. Senators introduced a joint resolution
under the Congressional Review Act.17 The resolution sought to overturn the FCC's new policy to
deregulate the Internet broadband industry.18 Then the Senate voted 52-47 to overrule the FCC
regulation of 2018. However, the House failed to achieve the goal. Even though CRA requires
over 218 signatures of majority Representatives to submit a discharge petition to force the vote
under the CRA, the signature requirement came up short.19 Before the House of Representatives
could enact a specific result, the Congressional term ended.

16

Molly E. Reynolds, How Congressional Politics Drive the Net Neutrality Debate, BROOKING INSTITUTION, (May
10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/05/10/how-congressional-politics-drive-the-net-neutralitydebate/. (last visited April 11, 2021).
17
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§801-808 (1996). CRA is a way to challenge agency rule. Under this act,
Congress can overturn specific agency actions. For this, Congress requests agencies reporting the issuance of rules to
Congress. Then, Congress enacts a CRA joint resolution of disapproval. If the joint resolution is passed by both houses
of Congress and signed by the president, the rule takes effect.
18
S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. §2 (as passed by Senate, May 16, 2018); see also Brian Fung, The Senate’s Push to
Overrule the FCC on Net Neutrality Now Has 50 Votes, Democrats Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/01/15/the-senates-push-to-overrule-the-fcc-on-netneutrality-now-has-50-votes-democrats-say/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.db23c5d4346d.
19
Jon Brodkin, Net Neutrality in Congress—Bill to Save Net Neutrality is 46 Votes Short in US House 172
Democrats Signed Petition to Force Vote, but They Need 218 Signatures, ARSTECHNICA (June 27, 2018),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/06/bill-to-save-net-neutrality-is-46-votes-short-in-us-house/.

5

Also, and of more significance, some states chose to oppose the FCC’s new policy; they enacted
legislation that explicitly reinstated the previous regime and pursued and implemented net
neutrality policy.20 For example, in September 2018, the California governor signed into law a bill
to restore net neutrality protections that the FCC repealed.21 Furthermore, attorneys general from
twenty-two states filed a protective petition for review against the FCC in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.22 Even though the District of Columbia court upheld the FCC Order of
2018, legal or social disputes are ongoing.23
Agency deregulation resurrects the debates over the legitimacy crisis of the modern
administrative state. This debate arises when deregulation is, in effect, a repeal of the statute
involved. At this point, where is the legislature? In Department of Transportation v. Association
of American Railroads, Justice Thomas describes the situation of modern administrative law as “a
strange place in our separation of powers jurisprudence.” 24 That is to say, it is obvious that
deregulation at the agency level is subject to the APA, but how far can it go? Nevertheless, in
reality, most market-style regulation has almost been upheld by reviewing courts. 25 As a
consequence, some argue that the modern administrative state is unconstitutional or unlawful;
under the current deferential review standard, the role of judicial review on agency rulemaking is

20

Heather Morton, Net Neutrality Legislation in States, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunicationsand-information-technology/net-neutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx.
21
California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018., CA S.B. 822.
22
Protective Petition for Review, State of New York, et al v. FCC, et al (No. 18-01013) (D.C. Cir. 2018).
23
David McCabe, Court Upholds Net Neutrality Repeal, With Some Caveats, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-broadband.html.
24
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 575 U.S. 43, 66 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
25
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1687 1689 (2002).
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to be a rubber-stamp for agency decisions—especially deregulatory ones—no matter how far they
may go.26
Criticisms of agency rulemaking power have been based on various grounds—i.e., separation
of powers, departure from judicial norms, lack of political accountability, or delegation of
powers—all culminating, it seems, in an attack on agency legitimacy.27 Fundamentally, the critics
question whether it is permissible for the modern administrative state to be so “leviathan,” with
both legislative and executive powers controlled by administrative agencies. These fundamental
constitutional concerns have usually been dealt with and justified under the banner of practical
needs – referring to a view of modern social problems as so complex that issues like regulation of
the environment, tax, antitrust, etc., require a high level of expertise. Congress thus saw the need
to delegate its role to the agency because of the growing difficulty of legislating statutes that
accurately reflect the rapidly changing society. This means that to overcome the crisis that modern
nations are facing efficiently, nations have become “de facto administrative states.” The rise of
modern administrative states thus led to the virtual collapse of the doctrine of separation of powers,
such as are inherent in delegations of legislative authority; no verbal formula can control what a
delegation will become or make judicial review viable—as even Justice Scalia seemed to recognize
in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.28 Legitimacy has come from procedure instead.
U.S. administrative law ensures individual rights throughout rulemaking, adjudicating procedural
legitimacy under the Due Process Clause and through the Administrative Procedure Act
(hereinafter “APA”).

26

See HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 286–98; see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1247 (1994).
27
See generally FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 15-90.
28
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001).
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This study will aim to explore ways to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the decisions we
make through administrative agencies. How best can we harmonize public values with
administrative efficiency in the course of agency deregulation, recognizing that some of these
decisions can go so far as to raise significant legitimacy concerns. In so doing, this study will
explore the statutory and constitutional limits of deregulation and implicitly regulation as well.
Thus, this thesis will focus on how we can ensure democratic values in the process of the initial
decision to deregulate public interest regulation, which leads to market competition and to do so
through the lens of legitimacy. To that end, this study will examine deregulation and regulation
generally and, specifically, how they have played out in the FCC’s regulatory regimes under U.S.
administrative law, particularly the ‘Restoring Internet Freedom’ order, issued by the FCC in 2018.
This thesis will approach the agency law issues from the scope of the following perspectives:
1) legislative failure; 2) separation of powers; 3) and the legitimacy of the modern administrative
state. Furthermore, this study considers two subordinated issues: a) the limitation of judicial
approaches to agency regulation; b) cost-benefit analysis, a basis on which some deregulation has
been driven and supported sometimes, almost exclusively. This thesis will not argue for or against
what should be regulated and what should be left to the market. Also, this thesis does not aim to
analyze the danger of deregulation or small size government.
The thesis of this study is that administrative agencies provide the necessary flexibility to
congressional statutes that allow them to adapt to new conditions and circumstances and, in the
process, enable our democracy to function effectively on a daily basis. This thesis will consist of
four chapters. Chapter I will address the conceptual, historical, and practical needs of agency
legitimacy, looking primarily at the role of administrative law. Based on this analysis, this thesis
will then examine two questions: 1) whether all agency deregulations should be subject to judicial

8

review like other types of agency regulation or whether some types of deregulation should be
subject to a more stringent review within the framework of administrative law; 2) how cost-benefit
analysis is sometimes employed by agencies, and when it is a significant rationale behind the
agency’s deregulation. Also, this chapter will outline the concept of legitimacy, examining the
theoretical debates on the legitimacy crisis of modern administrative law.
Chapter II will then focus on a deregulatory case study and address the structure of Internet
regulation structure, focusing on open Internet policy and free Internet policy. Based on the
analysis of the case study in this chapter, this chapter will examine the timing of regulatory and
deregulatory processes and whether administrative law conforms with the U.S. Constitution—the
separation of powers and Due Process. Based on this analysis, this study will draw on specific
societal needs and legal issues regarding deregulation in the context of administrative law.
Regarding the FCC order of 2018, this research will individually examine two issues: 1) legislative
failure and statutory interpretation related to the term of ‘public interest’; 2) the appropriate
standard of judicial review on the matter of agency’s deregulation for Internet marketization. From
these issues, this chapter will seek the need to govern agency law and then explore the ideal
regulatory protection system to ensure many social and welfare values.
Chapter III will then examine legitimacy and regulation more generally, especially in the
context of calls from some Justices for the use of a radically narrow form of the nondelegation
doctrine and a greatly diminished use of Chevron deference. This chapter will discuss the problems
of deregulation and new regulation as well from the perspective of the legitimacy of the
administrative state.
Chapter IV will conclude with some key lessons that can be learned from this thesis.
Specifically, this part will focus on the following questions: 1) the democratic legitimacy of agency
9

regulation and deregulation in a global era characterized by minimal Congressional involvement;
2) constitutional accountability regarding the agency regulation and deregulation.

10

CHAPTER I.
LEGITIMACY CONCERNS AND AGENCY DEREGULATION
Chapter I will discuss the essentials of legitimacy as it relates to agency actions of all types, but
especially as it relates to deregulation (as defined below and hereinafter referred to as “agency
deregulation”). This chapter will also provide specific examples of agency deregulation that raise
legitimacy concerns and will explain why this is so. Those cases will assist in creating a clear
picture of the legitimate concerns that come into view and to lay the basis for a more general
discussion about agency regulation as well.
To lay the foundation for this analysis, this chapter begins by discussing the meaning of
“legitimacy,” particularly as it relates to understanding why it is necessary for us to perceive
agency action as legitimate, not illegitimate. Part I discusses the concept of legitimacy and its
importance, then introduces the debate as to the legitimacy of administrative action. Part I
advocates for understanding the essentials of legitimacy on the presence or absence of certain
factors associated with legitimate government action, such as congressional authorization and
reasonable exercise of agency discretion. The chapter then proceeds to introduce the nature of
agency deregulation. Part II explores the nature of deregulation and explains its purpose. Finally,
Part III identifies the legitimacy concerns associated with agency deregulation.
PART I.
What Legitimizes the Era of Deregulation
This study of the administrative state’s legitimacy focuses on seemingly ever-expanding agency
authority. The questions that administrative law scholars most typically attempt to answer are: (1)
What is the purpose of administrative law? (2) Within the scope of constitutionality, what do we

11

mean by legitimacy? And (3) What legitimizes the administrative state? These questions concern
whether the modern administrative law is in alignment with the U.S. Constitution—e.g., does it
preserve the separation of powers, and, if administrative law is not “constitutional,” what are the
proper means to secure the constitutionality or accountability of administrative law? Also, this
constitutional concern requires discussing the modern administrative law method of determining
whether the means used to fill the gap between the ideal and the real are constitutional.
A. Defining Legitimacy
The immediate problem a scholar faces is that legitimacy is too broad a concept to define in a
single sentence. That is, the legitimacy of the modern administrative state cannot be characterized
by just one trait.29
One way to understand legitimacy is to question whether a government body acted according
to the applicable statutes and whether it followed proper procedures. U.S. courts largely espouse
this view in determining whether individuals received appropriate procedures—i.e., whether an
agency afforded individuals sufficient process in making its decisions.30 Suppose one understands
legitimacy to refer solely to whether an agency acted in a way consistent with statutory and
procedural due process. In that case, one may conclude that all deregulation is de facto legitimate,
so long as it follows the specific and well-established processes outlined in the APA—e.g., notice
and comment.31

29

Rather, some scholars explain legitimacy broadly with some characteristics such as rights, democratic
responsiveness or accountability, or competence and technical expertise. See Eduardo Jordão & Susan RoseAckerman, Judicial Review of Executive Policymaking in Advanced Democracies: Beyond Rights Review, 66 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2014).
30
See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
31
See, e.g., Evelyn R. Sinaiko, Due Process Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CAL. L. REV.
886, 892 (1975) (stating that:
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Alternatively, one can focus on the agency’s compliance with governing statutes—that is,
whether the administrative action is consistent with the underlying organic statute, enabling act,
or the APA. Under this concept of legitimacy, agency action might become illegitimate if, for
example, the agency did not publish the proposed rule in the Federal Register in a timely manner,32
the agency acted beyond its statutory mandate33 or is otherwise not in accordance with the law.34
However, this concept of legitimacy is not as comprehensive or as definitive as it may initially
appear because agencies are afforded substantial deference in their interpretation of statutes,
including the organic statute the agency enforces.35 In other words, the agency has a good deal of
power in defining what is and is not “lawful” in the context in which the statutes apply. Thus, the
agency action might be legitimate if the agency exercises its interpretive responsibilities
reasonably and in a manner acceptable to a court. It is almost as if legitimacy is presumed here
when the reason given by the agency for its actions is coherent and consistent.
Legitimacy can also be defined as being synonymous with political or democratic
accountability. Notwithstanding the strict definition of separation of power, it is no secret that the
executive branch, where most administrative agencies reside, today has a wide range of power to
exercise its discretion and interpret laws, amounting to what sometimes appears to be legislative
power in the practical sense in some cases.36 Some scholars have long argued that despite such
imperfect adherence to the separation of powers under the Constitution, the administrative state is

“With few exceptions there has been no . . . expanded application of procedural due process to agency
rulemaking. Courts have continued to adhere to traditional position that, in agency rulemaking
proceedings, due process does not require even minimal rights of participation.”).
32
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966).
33
JARED P. COLE, CONG. RES. SERV. R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY
ACTION 9 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf.
34
5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(D) (1966).
35
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
36
ERICK POSENER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 103-6
(2010); see also Jerry L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW
131, 139 (1997).
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nonetheless legitimate because the meaning of separation of powers is transferred into the
separation of function. 37 Certain features of the modern administrative law, such as agency
discretion and judicial deference, have developed as responses, for example, to the need to regulate
new technologies flexibly.

38

According to Professor Mashaw, author of Creating the

Administrative Constitution, executive discretion with regard to agency rulemaking power, for
example, has appropriately filled in the gaps in congressional legislation.39 That is to say, when a
new technology is emerging, agency discretion and agency rulemaking are essential in the context
of the practical needs at hand and due to the Congress’s limited ability to effectively deal with the
new technology and other new changes in a very timely way in most circumstances.40 Mashaw
describes three “overlapping systems of accountability”: (1) for elected officials, political
accountability; (2) within the administrative hierarchy, supervisory accountability; and (3) judicial
accountability.41 According to Mashaw, these forms of accountability allow for control of the
powers exercised by the modern administrative state while establishing its legitimacy.42 Under this
construction, agency action is legitimate so long as it is subject to sufficient review by other
political mechanisms, such as judicial reviews, elections, or superseding legislation.
Yet another aspect of legitimacy focuses on whether the agency action sufficiently protects
individuals’ substantive rights. Put simply: is the agency action fair? To answer the question,
Joanna Grisinger, author of The Unwieldy American State, takes a historical approach that explores
what legitimacy is in the American administrative state has been. In the U.S. legal framework, the
APA has developed as the key element of the modern administrative structure by regulating the
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entirety of the agencies’ functions, such as rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement. 43 The
purpose of the APA was to ensure that Constitutional principles, particularly due process, apply
and to protect individual rights from potential bias in agency conduct. 44 The APA highlights
standards of legitimacy for the U.S. administrative state: fairness 45 and judicial review of
adjudication.46 To ensure fairness, the APA provides the unified procedures that would induce
transparency and harmonized interests among the related parties.47 In sum, the administrative state
is legitimate because the APA comes into play to separate functions within its provisions,
mirroring the Constitution.
The above definitions of legitimacy are likely all correct. Legitimacy may just be an amalgam
of procedural and substantive fairness, judicial review, accountability to the public, transparency,
and general lawfulness. However, the central matter is how to design administrative law processes
depending on societal circumstances at various points in time. The role of law is not fixed but is
flexible enough to shift positions incrementally as necessary to reflect the current societal
environment and the changing needs of current problems. In this context, legitimacy will be
viewed as a spectrum in the context of social needs and legal transitions.48 Therefore, for this
research, the term “legitimacy” is best understood as de jure authority that allows administrative
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agencies pursuant to the respective agency laws, to justify the moral and democratic permission
from the public necessary for it to utilize its coercive powers.49
B. Importance of Legitimacy
Fundamentally, people obey the law because it is justifiable. When people can understand that
an accountable and collective governance underlies the law, the law is justifiable, and its binding
force ought to be recognized.50 From the perspective of a government’s power, legitimacy is the
essential requirement to justify the law. Of course, the legitimacy of a government cannot entirely
explain why a rule or a law is binding on the people. Nevertheless, legitimacy evidentially helps
to enable people to acknowledge the government’s authority and admit their obligations to comply.
That is to say, disobedience would be justified if the government’s power or authority to act in the
way it does was not legitimate.
With this in mind, it is undeniable that securing legitimacy is the central matter of an
administrative state. Fundamentally, power is being exercised, and it must be constitutional but
also transparent and democratic. That is, the legitimacy of the administrative state makes agencies
retain significant public support. Even if legitimacy does not mean that the law would benefit from
unanimous consent from the people, the legitimacy of the administrative state guarantees at least
three things: institutional efficiency, effectiveness, and morally justified authority. 51 Based on
institutional efficiency, agencies occupy an indispensable position in the constitutional scheme.
Through such a position, an agency’s decision or action retains the inherent capacity to attract
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obedience and respect.52 In sum, the administrative state’s legitimacy is the bedrock of the legal
validity that makes and enables people to obey the law.
To provide the premise of legal validity, the task of administrative law is to generate legitimacy
in its institutional design. Specifically, from the perspective of administrative law, the institutional
design is concerned with the nature of administrative agencies. That is, U.S. administrative law
has acknowledged and adjusted itself to legitimacy primarily by focusing on agency law; the law
made by an agency is obviously substantive law. Legitimacy is established when agency law is
reasonably stable, not immediately reflecting every change in the political tide. 53 However,
substantive agency law is and must be inherently more disposable and flexible than congressional
legislation; thus, an agency has the discretion to change its regulations to adapt, for example, to a
new wave of environmental changes.54 Therefore, the model of administrative law needs to shape
the principle of the rule of law to prevent rapid shifts in agency law or policy without proper
congressional act, which can raise statutory and constitutional problems.55 But it must also be
responsive to the moment within its broad legislative mandates.
Administrative law is thus required to adapt and flexibly transform its organizational model to
make federal agencies achieve the legal validity of their decisions along with their political,
regulatory goals or circumstances. 56 For instance, traditional administrative law adopted
“transmission-belt theory” as a model of conventional administrative law.57 That is, the traditional
model looked to the agency’s role as a “transmission” belt that advances congressional will without
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subtraction from its overall goals and purposes. The traditional model of administrative law thus
sets forth two standards of legitimacy. The first one is substantive legitimacy. That is, the
legislature may authorize the imposition of sanctions on private individuals through the legislation
that controls agency action.58 The second standard is procedural legitimacy. Agencies must follow
the decisional procedures and both guarantee and comply with specific procedural devices—e.g.,
hearing processes. 59 These thereby ensure accountability for the legality of administrative
decisions under traditional administrative law.
Congress has created more than a dozen major independent regulatory agencies since 1877,
and, of course, there are many executive agencies as well; thus, agencies have a broad range of
authority to enact regulations for which the agency can specify the goal of the law.60 Since modern
administrative law took hold in the New Deal era, agencies have exercised an ever-growing broad
range of discretion to deal with extraordinary new conditions.61 Extending agency discretion is a
pragmatic solution in light of the reality that Congress itself cannot react to each of the societal
issues and resolve them in a timely manner. Therefore, statutes frequently have latent ambiguities,
requiring agencies tasked with giving the statutes’ effect to interpret them so as to fill in those
gaps.62
The expanded power exercised by agencies is not, or was not intended to be, revolutionary in
nature but a way of making incremental change and adapting the fundamental law passed by
Congress understanding it would be reviewed by the Judicial Branch. With societal change and
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the need for extended agency discretion, Congress has delegated its authority to agencies broadly,
often only under the guise of “public interest.”63 The resulting vague and ambiguous statutes cause
significant threats and question the transmission model of traditional administrative law. To deal
with practical needs and requirements, modern administrative law has embraced and developed
the “expertise-based” model of administrative law. That is, modern administrative law also relies
on the ability of agencies’ independent and disinterested expertise to secure legitimacy.64 The
agencies’ exercise of judgment based on their knowledge and expertise is to be a device that infuses
constitutionality and accountability into the institutional design of the administrative state.
It is fair to ask, at this point, to what extent and how does agency expertise also play a role in
legitimacy? First of all, an agency’s expertise is a device that links elected representatives to
independent agencies from the perspective of democracy. The paradigm of broad delegation in a
New Deal era calls into question whether the administrative process is inconsistent with the value
of separation of powers. Under the origin of the U.S. Constitution, Congress alone has the lawmaking power “in both good and bad times.”65 The Constitution forbids Congress to simply give
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away its legislative power to any other body in the government.66 Therefore, Congress shall not
assign its law-making authority to another government branch, public entity, or private actor
without following the nondelegation doctrine.67 Congressional standards are necessary, and these
are often referred to as intelligible principles formulated by Congress to guide the use of agency
discretion.
Under the modern administrative state, and given the need agencies often have to solve current
problems, Congress plays a role as a compass that instructs and points out the direction of policy
and political ideas that need to be taken; agencies are, in effect, Congress’s “front-line agents,”
and they have a broad range of authority to enact regulations for which the agency can specify the
ends of the law.68 Furthermore, Congress in effect seems to confer de facto legislative power to
the agency with the force of law. At this point, the emphasis on expertise extends a broader
conception of representation, which can be labeled as “thin democracy.” 69 Theoretically, this
means that under the representative democracy, elected representatives delegate authority to
accountable agency experts who have the proper knowledge and ability to deal with often
unexpected or anticipated problems. Agency expertise means they have the kinds of technical
know-how and experience to deal with such issues. Moreover, from the perspective of judicial
review, courts are not part of the political branch of the government, with the requirement to ensure
political accountability, but rather provide review to be sure the expert agency has, in fact, done
its job.70
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Secondly, agency expertise is, thus, a fundamental reason why agency policy choices and
statutory determinations should be reviewed deferentially. As for agency discretion, courts have
developed restrained approaches to judicial approach with various doctrines of deference. The
primary rationale for deferring to agencies’ actions is that agencies have the appropriate level of
expertise to decide fundamental questions of policy more efficiently and appropriately than any
other bodies in the government, including elected institutions of the government.71 Also, there
might be skepticism related to the ability of judges in the context of political decisions or
rulemakings. In other words, unelected judges inherently cannot make policy choices with
expertise in the areas usually in question.
Recognizing the premise of the pragmatic need for agencies to implement their regulations
flexibly following fundamental congressional intent, the agency expertise is a significant factor
that legitimizes that agency power.72 The reason is that agency expertise is the ultimate criterion
why a court gives “controlling weight,” not substituting a judge’s own view unless the agency’s
view is arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent with enabling acts. 73 Thus, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court held that an agency interpretation must be
given “controlling weight” unless it is clearly erroneous, thereby requiring courts to defer to
agency decisions.74
On the other hand, agency expertise also plays a significant role in controlling and limiting
agency discretion while determining the scope of an agency’s authority or its jurisdiction. Not only
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is process involved, but substance is as well. Most of all, agency expertise serves to distinguish
the scope of authority. As mentioned above, the judicial deference is standing on a premise: the
agency is a substantive expert with superior administrative knowledge, experience, and expertise
that can “account [for] the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive law-making power to
the agency.”75 This means that deference to agency regulation assumes that the agency is the only
one with authority with its stringent expertise, according to the explicit delegation by Congress.
And an agency that interprets an ambiguity must be specialized in that field and as such is given a
great deal of leeway.
There are, of course, some limitations. King v. Burwell is a case in point. We will see this in
chapter III in depth. It illustrates that deference is due to an agency regulation but only when the
agency involved deserves it. In that case, the IRS had promulgated a rule allowing tax credits for
health insurance purchased from federally created exchanges, even though the statute said credits
shall be permitted for “insurance purchased from Exchanges created by the states.”76 There the
Supreme Court concluded that the IRS is not specialized in crafting health insurance, so the IRS
should not be interpreting the statute.77 Instead, the Court reached its conclusion because in this
case, there seemed to have been an obvious mistake of omission made by Congress. To interpret
that the IRS had this power would literally fly in the face of the overall purposes of a 1700-1800
page statute. The Court rejected the ability of the IRS to interpret this regulation in such a context
in this way. It reasoned that the IRS regulation affects the price and availability of health insurance
for millions of people; the core of the statutory scheme requires an agency to have substantive
knowledge and understanding related to the “economic and political significance” of that
75
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regulation and to health policy as expressed in that statute.78 That did not exist here and the Court
needed to step in. The expertise model simply did not work in this context.
From another angle, agency expertise is a significant source to determine whether an agency is
a responsible agent of Congress, not only to ensure procedural legitimacy but also to determine if
the agency goal is a substantive and acceptable one.79 In response to agency discretion, the D.C.
Circuit Court has gradually produced a different approach through a series of cases involving
arbitrary and capricious review.80 Under the arbitrary and capricious review, courts may often
require an agency to take a hard look at the facts and issues before promulgating its regulation.
That is, the “hard look” might not be a tool to find only a “clear error of judgment.”81 Instead, the
arbitrary and capricious review allows an agency decision to stand so long as there is a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made”—i.e., there must be “reasoned
analysis.”82 The reasoning behind the agency decision thus depends on the faith of the notion of
expertise because an agency’s ability to be persuasive in its decision-making process is a measure
of its legitimacy.83 Therefore, through the arbitrary and capricious review, hard-look doctrine
inevitably and implicitly allows a court to take a look at agency rationality rather than to check
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whether the agency takes a hard look at a problem.84 And this allowance provides for a substantive
component to the process of judicial review. That is, courts have a duty to intervene not only “in
case of procedural inadequacies” but also to identify substantive problems if the agency fails to
consider appropriately important aspects of the issue at hand.85
C. Some Scholars Assert that the Administrative State is Not Legitimate
Before proceeding further with this line of discussion, it is essential to acknowledge that the
legitimacy of the administrative state is not a foregone conclusion. There is significant debate
about whether administrative agencies are, for the most part, constitutional and legitimate or
whether they are often likely to be unlawful and tyrannical.
As a critical response against the analysis mentioned above, in Department of Transportation v.
Association of American Railroads, Justice Thomas describes that the situation of the modern
administrative law is “a strange place in our separation of powers jurisprudence.” 86 That is to say,
he questioned whether modern administrative law is pursuing the meaning and purpose of the
Constitution—specifically regarding separation of power. Specifically, Justice Thomas took a
formalist view, emphasizing the original meaning of the Constitution and stating that “the
Government may create generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the proper
exercise of legislative power.”87
In the same vein, Philip Hamburger, author of Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, points out that
the modern administrative state has features similar to the prerogative powers of the King—
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executive agencies have the authority to interpret statutes and issue rules and are given judicial
deference. 88 Hamburger describes that modern administrative law, specifically the rulemaking
processes of the agency, and its interpretive and judicial powers have the same features of extralegal power. Additionally, Gary Lawson, author of the article “The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State,” describes that the extension of agency authority, from a textualist
perspective, might lead to a crisis of democracy or encroachment of the independent judiciary.
Lawson claims that modern administrative law collapses the traditional separation of powers:
delegations of legislative authority and the combination of functions. 89 As Montesquieu and
Madison feared, the accumulation of powers could lead to the abuse of powers.90 Therefore, each
independent organ exercises its powers within its particular sphere. Indeed, it was in order to
prevent this abuse of power that the Founding Fathers divided the governmental powers into three
separate categories—legislative power, executive power, and judicial power. 91 Under such a
framework, there should be some constitutional means to resist one branch’s encroachments into
another branch’s power. We shall return to some of these critiques in Chapter III.
PART II.
The Characteristics of Agency Deregulation
Agency deregulation comes in different forms, and it can serve multiple purposes. The term
“agency deregulation” is understood differently depending on the purposes for which agencies use
this term. However, agency deregulation generally is a means for a government to realize the
88
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political or economic purpose or aspiration of its statutory goals by using the market or market
actors while also furthering competition and efficiency with free market values. Thus, agency
deregulation often refers to government efforts to repeal certain kinds of barriers that block or
control individual activities or participation with alternative regulation. Agency deregulation, as
used in this study, refers to any agency decision that reduces or removes and shifts the
governmental power or influence on individual activity by substituting for the command and
control regulations previously in place with regulations primarily typified by market principles
and market techniques.
A. Agency Deregulation is a Form of Regulation, Not Anti-Regulation
Considering the purpose of curtailing governmental impediments to private economic activity,
deregulation

could

be

conceptualized

as

non-regulation.

This

view

conceptualizes

regulation/deregulation based on whether the government exercises control. However, such a view
is only half right.
Overall, deregulation is not anti-regulation but a different type of regulation that uses the market
as a tool of regulation. 92 Contrary to the above view, what distinguishes regulation from
deregulation is the actor that will be implementing the policy; viewing the issue in light of the
government policy or program, the end goal may be achieved whether the government acts itself
(regulates) or relies on private actors (deregulates).93 In sum, regulation or deregulation is not a
matter of all or nothing. It is a matter of what kind of regulation there is, and of how the government
is involved in building up the rule of a market industry.94 The APA also explicitly categorizes
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deregulation as a form of agency rulemaking. The APA defines rulemaking as the “agency process
for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”95 Therefore, when necessary, agencies can use a
rulemaking process for accomplishing their deregulatory regime by amending or repealing a rule
and usually replacing it with something more attuned to market values. In other words, the APA
does not distinguish between ordinary regulation and the repeal of a rule as far as processes are
concerned. Therefore, the same procedures and the same standard of judicial review might be
applied to both regulation and repeal. For example, in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al., the U.S. Supreme Court held that agency
deregulation should be examined under the same standard of judicial review—i.e., arbitrary and
capricious standard—as it used to review the promulgation of a rule.96 Therefore, deregulation
must satisfy the same procedural requirements as regulation. At the same time, it is hard to say
that deregulation is simply the same as ordinary regulation.97
After all, an agency replaces the prior governmental policy of regulating a particular sector with
a new agency policy that highlights the absence of a certain kind of command-control regulation.98
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Also, rescission is not necessarily only anti-regulation; it can be a different type of regulation, one
that uses the market as a tool of regulation.99 In this context, agency deregulation is an avenue for
substituting command and control regulation with something thought to be more efficient and
effective for the changed circumstances that now exist. But the agency has to give reasons that
explain how the deregulatory regime does this. That is, agency deregulation at the agency level is
not merely an act of rescinding old rules, but rather an act of changing the entire paradigm under
which the government now seeks to carry out its political-economic purposes and aspirations
through a new form of regulation we can also call deregulation.100 Therefore, agency deregulation
refers to a policy to reduce/remove and shift some aspects of governmental power or influence to
actions more determined by market forces and values. This is not for ideological reasons but to
achieve legitimate agency policy goals.
In this context and among the various forms of agency actions, this study first deals primarily
with deregulatory action at the agency level that revokes or repeals the primary rule in favor of
providing for more market-style competition. To that end, this study focuses on the agency rules
that serve “force and effect” of law, just as legislative rules do.101 Therefore, this study analyzes
agency deregulatory actions not just as recessions but also as legislative rules required to follow
the notice and comment rulemaking procedure under the APA.
B. Cost-Efficiency Motivates Deregulation
The United States is one of the prime examples of countries that frequently emphasize the
efficacy of the free market. Whether democrat or republican, most presidents pursue policies based
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on the law of supply and demand that operates unimpeded by the government. This tide of tradition
has significantly affected the U.S. administrations’ preference for deregulation. There seems to
exist an unwritten rule, perhaps, that large parts of the market must remain unregulated unless
there is some market failure; the default position is no regulation or as little as is needed. Pursuing
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) under the New Public Management (NPM) method,102 agencies are
required to evaluate their future actions by comparing the action to the status quo and balancing a
set of relevant cost related factors.103
Fiscal shortfalls are one of the most significant impetuses of deregulation.104 Agencies strive to
avoid a fiscal deficit and induce efficiency in political management; deregulation is often viewed
as the easiest way to deal with these issues. In the 1980s, for example, the Reagan administration
viewed deregulation as the principal way by which it could reduce the size of the federal
government, aiming to help to balance budget deficits. 105 That is, the Reagan administration
believed that deregulation, including privatization, would cut costs and find more efficient ways
to supply high-quality goods and services. To that end, President Reagan introduced a specific
requirement for agencies—the so-called Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)—through his
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Executive Order No. 12,291.106 RIA requires an agency to determine that the potential benefit of
the regulation outweighs the expected costs before taking administrative action. That is, a
deregulatory policy at the agency level must first go through CBA and justify the agency’s
decision.
Deregulation is theoretically one of the options that a government can choose if the CBA
suggests delegating the public role to the market. After employing the CBA, an agency determines
whether or not to regulate or whether a more efficient alternative is available.107 This analysis has
become more common since the government has reached the limit of its ability and resources after
pursuing a model of the welfare state.108 This has been the trend following executive orders109
issued by the Reagan, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, which all ordered
agencies to rely on CBA.110 Additionally, Congress has enacted numerous statutes that require
agencies to perform their functions based on cost-benefit analyses.111 Although executive orders
and statutes may differ, CBA is fundamentally a comprehensive and predictable approach.112
Other than ensuring cost efficiency, the agency must present evidentiary proof to justify the
regulation involved. In other words, the agency is required to explain why the agency tries to enact
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the regulation as the expert in that field and to do so expressly and reasonably. CBA is a device
for agencies to establish regulatory priorities and identify these priorities to affected groups by
evaluating relevant factors.113 This aspect of CBA plays an evidentiary role that creates regulatory
transparency by informing interested parties of the reasons behind agency decisions.
C. Marketization and Political Influence; Lack of Response
Mechanism in Administrative Law
America’s ideal, at least under modern administrative law, is that agency regulation be a valueneutral outcome that reflects the democratic will from Congress and excludes political influence.114
Therefore, courts have treated agencies as experts rather than “policy” makers, and deferred to
their expert judgments regarding how best to implement congressional goals. In this vein, the
deregulatory decisions by agencies should fall totally within the agency’s expertise, even if it is a
different type of regulation that uses the market as a regulatory regime.
In reality, unlike the ideal, agency deregulation can also be understood as caused by more
stringent political influence outside the ideal framework of modern administrative law. Such
changes motivated more by ideology than logical policy goals stemming from governing statutes
can raise alarm and legitimacy questions. This is the reality because an agency’s changed view of
the regulatory standards in play is too deeply related to “the election of a new President” from the
other political party, rather than the new means to pursue Congressional goals.115 The Trump
administration might be an extreme representative example of this and the tide of deregulation that
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followed. 116 Presidential nominee and eventually president, Donald Trump, maintained a loud
voice in favor of all kinds of deregulation. When he was the Republican presidential nominee, he
said that up to 70 percent of federal regulation could be repealed, specifically blaming environment
and safety regulations as unduly restricting businesses.117 In the same vein, on January 20, 2017,
White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus issued a memorandum directing agency heads to
“temporarily postpone [the] effective dates for 60 days” of regulations that had been promulgated
by President Obama’s administration but had not yet taken effect.118 Moreover, President Trump
issued executive orders that directed agencies to review existing regulations and to identify at least
two current regulations to be repealed before promulgating a new regulation.119 As a result, these
political influences led agencies to undo previous regulations or delay their implementation not on
the basis of carrying out congressional goals but those solely of the executive. Some of these
deregulatory efforts seemingly sought to nullify the statutes then in place rather than taking care
that the laws are faithfully enforced, as Article II requires.120
Of course, it is possible to think that the changes in view that take place with new
administrations may reflect the will of one administration’s politically responsible members who
are fully supported by the public. Judge Wald points out in Sierra Club v. Costle that the informal
rulemaking process is not a “rarified technocratic process.” Thus, it is hard to believe that Congress
intends for agency rulemaking to proceed unaffected by the influence of presidential powers or
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other political considerations. 121 In fact, the Circuit held that the president derived his or her
authority to control and supervise executive policymaking from the Constitution; the practical
realities of federal regulating apparatus necessitate centralized control.122 And as agencies regulate
matters of public interest, “[o]ur form of government could not function effectively or rationally
if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief Executive.”123
But some forms of deregulation are far more political and aim to replace Congressional statutes
without the necessary democratic actions of legislative repeal.
However, at least under modern administrative law, the president’s influence on agencies does
not mean that his or her political preference or influence should be determinative or legitimized.
The president’s influence should not automatically take preference, even if it is permissible to
some degree, or if the political influence implicitly or explicitly can reach out to the agency
rulemaking process. The president has the constitutional duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed; he or she does not have the authority to rewrite laws. As Justice Scalia
describes in FCC v. Fox Television, agency regulation is an outcome that is sheltered not from
Congress but from the president. 124 Also, fundamentally and obviously, presidential oversight
cannot be used to further complete “subservience to congressional direction.”125
According to the recently elected political party, the president’s political preferences sometimes
force courts to face a dilemma between technocratic rationality/expertise and selecting public
values. Although unelected judges inherently cannot make policy choices with expertise in the
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field in question, even in cases of deregulation courts can evaluate and balance the competing
political interests at play.126 As a result, judges explicitly or implicitly need to reconcile political
interests even if courts are not part of the political branch in government, which is required to
ensure the appropriate political accountability of the other branches of government.127
PART III.
Agency Deregulation and a New Crisis of Legitimacy
What legitimizes the era of deregulation, especially when agency deregulation can be so
substantial and when does it go too far? Agencies, in general, have had a broad range of discretion
to deal with extraordinary conditions—environmental issues, economic depression, or new
technology—since the emergence of modern administrative law in the New Deal. Thus, recent
agency law can occasionally have a more practical impact on the individual and society than laws
passed by the legislature a long time ago, which can often seem static by comparison. Agencies
can provide an ability to change and evolve in light of new circumstances, which adds a great deal
of power to the executive branch to exercise and secure the efficiency benefits of the bureaucracy
without ignoring the basic goals of Congress.
However, agency law also must maintain its durability and provide for its accountability with a
reasonable rationale for its interpretive choices, even though agency law is capable of being quite
responsive to the politics and regulatory needs of the moment; flexibility is its nature and is
necessary to achieve such goals. Thus, U.S. administrative law seeks a way to balance between
the agencies’ drives to be maximally responsive to the demands of the times—e.g., cost-
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efficiency128—and the protection of public values—e.g., its ability to remain faithful to the terms
of its enabling act that was democratically passed by Congress and signed by the president.
By the same token, the agency has the authority to change its own rules, repealing some and
revising others. This kind of change requires reassessing agency policy and often reinterpreting an
agency’s own enabling legislation. Thus, it is undeniable that agency deregulation is generally
legitimate as long as it can satisfy these demands. However, it calls into question whether current
administrative law is enough to ensure legitimacy when it comes to agency action that arguably
defies the very purpose of the statute being interpreted. Even if deregulation, like regulation in
general, also follows the specific processes set forth under the APA,129 there remains another major
issue that must be considered: is administrative law lawful?130 In other words, agency deregulation
that ignores Congress can resurrect legitimate concerns about the modern administrative state. The
concerns arise because, at some point, it seems that modern administrative law is inadequate to
govern agency deregulation when it is so extensive and transformative as to reject the very goals
of the statute being interpreted. That is, agency deregulation at this point appears as a deregulatory
regime that has such profoundly negative effects the usual protections of administrative law—
process and links to Congressional statutes—seem inadequate. Deregulation often delegates
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significant government power and function to the market. Moreover, the agency’s decision to use
the market is totally within its expertise and powers. But, the agency decision to deregulate could
also be contrary to the legislative intent of Congress, which created the agency for affirmative
regulation, not for the delegation of agency power given by Congress to private market actors. In
such cases, it may be the case that a statute has outlived its usefulness, but that fundamental
decision can take effect only when Congress acts, not just the president and an agency. Thus, this
kind of deregulation raises the risk of undermining constitutional accountability due to a lack of
constitutional constraints—the limit of judicial review and the lack of oversight by Congress.
These problems highlight a crisis of legitimacy. In this context, any proper answer on how to
govern deregulation should be cognizant of the factors that render the administrative state
legitimate and what makes it illegitimate. Deregulation is a prime example of the need for the use
of and the limits of flexibility.
To ensure individual rights, it is necessary to recognize that the separation of powers is one of
the most essential and fundamental values of the U.S. constitutional structure. As such, an
administrative state must abide by the separation of powers and other constitutional safeguards of
individual rights in order to be legitimate. Defining separation of powers strictly, the Constitution
divides the governmental power into three separate and distinct categories—legislative power,
executive power, and judicial power. The process of how a bill becomes law illustrates how the
three branches function together. A bill originates in the House and goes to the Senate. If it passes
both the House and Senate, it can finally be signed into law by the president. The power exercised
here—the “formulation of generally applicable rules of private conduct”—is the legislative power.
131
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regulations of general applicability. Article II of the Constitution states that the Executive shall
take care that the law is faithfully executed—it does not authorize the Executive branch to create
new laws or, as in the context of some deregulation, try to repeal Congressional laws by executive
fiat.132
A. Four Principal Concerns
Partly due to the characteristic of agency deregulation highlighted above, some concerns have
risen regarding the deregulatory regime.
First, the deregulatory regime calls into question whether the agency is effectively fulfilling its
statutory duties. One reason to deregulate is that the agency decides to try something new—to
achieve its goals in a new way. But another reason to deregulate is for the agency to do nothing or
put nothing in its place because the Executive has decided the law in place should not be used at
all. In this case, one of the main concerns is that while the statutes may support something new,
including market techniques, that an agency may devise and put in its place, this is not the same
as a form of deregulation that is more like the repeal of a statute rather than its creative
implementation. Indeed, if a certain power is not delegated to the agency, it cannot be justified
through executive statutory interpretation. For example, 47 U.S.C. section 203(a) requires
common carriers under the Act to file tariffs with the FCC. 133 At the same time, the statute
provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown,
modify any requirements made by or under the authority of this section.”134 The FCC introduced a
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de-tariffing policy for all nondominant long-distance carriers, using its modification authority
under the Communication Act.135 The FCC’s new policy allowed the Commission to assert the
right to modify the requirement under the Act and gave the Commission the authority to make
fundamental changes. The Commission additionally claimed that the fundamental purpose of the
Commission’s decision was to promote efficient telephone service. Although the former filing
requirement had some positive effects—e.g., preventing price discrimination and unfair
practices—that requirement negated free-market competition and acted as an artificial barrier to
maintain a monopoly over the long-distance service. However, in MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Court held that, although the agency devised a regime
that might have been better than the old one, the agency could not construct a regime that went
beyond the one that Congress had established.136 In other words, because the FCC effectively
introduced a whole new regime that in effect rejected regulation in favor of free-market
competition, the Commission went beyond its statutory authority and modified the statute without
the requisite legislation to do so.137
Regarding congressional intent, the cost-efficiency that this approach might produce masked
the primary goal of the legislation all in the name of market values, as if the agency could create a
whole new regulatory regime that Congress does not intend. Even if the agency proclaims specific
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and affordable facts and reasons for marketizing so completely, such analysis does not give the
agency the substantive power to do so.138
In August 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter “EPA”) proposed
reconsideration amendments to certain a new source performance standard (NSPA). 139 This
deregulatory amendment would remove provisions of the NSPA’s methane-specific requirements
applicable to the source in the production and processing segment. 140 The EPA justified the
revocation by explaining that even though the amendment might increase methane emissions by
350,000-370,000 short tons, the amendment would also yield twenty-three million dollars over the
2019-2025 time frame. The EPA further said that this was expected to be a deregulatory action
under the Executive Order No. 13,771.141
However, justifying agency deregulation solely under the cost-benefit analysis can jeopardize
public norms and unduly elevate the importance of market values over the values of the statute
involved. In the case of the agency policy judgment described above, the analysis by the EPA
focused on the cost or the harm directly avoided by this regulatory action. Under a cost-benefit
analysis more in tune with the statute involved, the EPA’s decision is likely to be legitimate.142
Relying on the CBA itself does not in and of itself result in a matter of illegitimacy. Instead, if
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CBA is the only device to justify the agency’s deregulatory regime, and that approach does not
undermine the statutory duties that the agency must pursue, the agency’s explanation may be
reasonable. Still, agency deregulation can raise questions relevant for this and all other
deregulation cases: (1) whether the EPA’s decision to deregulate fulfills the legislative purpose of
the underlying legislation involved; and furthermore, (2) whether the decision to abdicate control
to the market conflicts with Congress’s decision to rely more heavily on the EPA’s expertise, or
whether Congress intended to rely on EPA’s judgment ultimately to decide what the market’s
efficacy might be in controlling industries that affect the environment.
Still another but related question regarding an agency decision to shift from a regulatory to a
deregulatory regime involves the ability of the agency to explain why this is necessary and why it
is a good approach. In 1977, in a landmark ruling on this issue, the Department of Transportation
(DOT) revoked its rule requiring automobile manufacturers to install “passive restraints” of
airbags or automatic seatbelts. Initially, a rule issued by the DOT, pursuant to the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,143 required seatbelts to be installed in all automobiles.144
However, it proved that the rule was inefficient because few people fastened their seatbelts. The
DOT subsequently amended the rule and required manufacturers to install passive restraints—
passenger-protection systems to deploy automatically without any action on the passenger’s
part.145 Manufacturers could choose and install either airbags or automatic seatbelts. However, in
response to the change in economic circumstances, especially the depression of the automobile
industry, the DOT decided to repeal the requirement. The DOT’s decision was based on having
reassessed the CBA on the passive restraint rule. Specifically, the agency suggested two
143
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considerations. First, in reality, over 99 percent of manufacturers chose to comply by using the
seatbelt, not the airbags.146 Therefore, it was impossible to achieve the initial assumption on the
lifesaving potential of airbags. Second, the seat belts’ detachability feature undermined the DOT’s
earlier projection of safety benefits from the passive restraint rule, because it was impossible to
predict how many car owners would detach their seatbelts.147 Instead, the DOT merely rationalized
its decision by saying that the estimated cost to enforce the requirement would be approximately
one billion dollars at the time. Thus, the DOT concluded that it would not be reasonable to impose
compliance costs without any significant likelihood of safety benefits.
However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in State Farm, the agency did not suggest any
significant considerations covering whether or not airbag technology might be utilized as an
alternative option. At the same time, it reached the decision to modify the regulatory requirement.
148

That is, an agency decision stands so long as there is a “rational connection between the facts

found and the choice made.”149 However, according to the fact described above, the only reason
the DOT ignored the possibility of compliance through airbags was that the manufacturers did not
use the option. On the other hand, to achieve the Act’s goal, the DOT’s first rule provided two
options—airbags or automatic seatbelts. Therefore, if the agency tried to describe the faults of
detachable seatbelts, it would be logical to examine and address the possibility of installing airbags
and whether or not the alternative way can achieve the objectives of the Act. Moreover, the DOT
did not even consider the possibility of revoking it. In this context, the Court said the DOT’s
explanation did not justify its choice because there are no findings and no analysis that might

146

Id. at 38.
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 48.
147

41

justify and support the agency experts’ discretion and decisions.150 This kind of a recission or
deregulation could not, therefore, stand.
Switching to a deregulatory regime raises the most serious of concerns when the agency takes
action to deregulate that is disingenuous in that the agency tries to hide the fact that the real intent
to repeal or delay a former rule is because the agency and the executive branch wish permanently
to undo the underlying legislation involved. Notably, for example, when an agency delays a rule
for excessive periods of time unusually and unreasonably, that alone might and should call into
question whether the agency is, in fact, engaging in deregulation for reasons unconnected to the
statutory goals of Congress.151
The EPA’s Accidental Chemical Release Prevention Rule serves as an excellent example of
such delay tactics that occurred in the Trump administration. On January 13, 2017, the EPA altered
the requirements of its accident prevention program, adding analysis of safer technology and
alternatives. 152 However, following a change of administration, the EPA announced it was
delaying the effective date of the final rule thrice. Less than two weeks after promulgating the rule,
On January 26, 2017, the EPA published a Delay Rule that postponed the final rule’s effective date
by one week—March 21, 2017.153 Then, the EPA announced a ninety-day delay of the effective
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date, further delaying the Rule’s implementation to June 19, 2017.154 Lastly, on June 14, 2017, the
effective date was delayed again until February 19, 2019.155
After the D.C. Circuit vacated the Delay Rule by finding that the agency lacked authority to
stay the final rule on May 30, 2018, the EPA proposed amendments to rescind almost all the
requirements added to the accident prevention provisions program embodied in the Accidental
Chemical Release Prevention Rule that the EPA promulgated in 2017.156 On December 19, 2019,
the EPA finalized the rescission of the Accidental Chemical Release Prevention Rule and set it
effective on the same date.157
It is evident that an agency has the authority to delay or stay the effective date of its final rule
for a reason. Delaying or staying a rule in a substantive agency action may, for example, allow
agencies time to conduct a comprehensive review of objections or to reconsider some significant
compliance issues within the scope of the congressional intent of their statutes. However, from at
least two aspects, the Accidental Chemical Release Prevention Rule case raises legitimacy
concerns. If the delays stretch out over an unordinary period, it may circumvent the performance
of statutory duties specifically delegated to the agency by Congress. That is, delays might be
masquerading as a kind of repeal, seeking an injunction to stay the ineffectiveness of the final rule
and not just more time to fix it. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals described in Clean Air

154

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further
Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 13968 (Mar. 16, 2017). On March 13th, 2017, EPA administrator Scott Pruitt
announced he would convene a proceeding to reconsider the rule. In response to the final rule, on February 28th, 2017,
an interest group (known as the RMP Coalition) submitted a petition requesting a stay pending reconsideration and
judicial review.
155
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further
Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27133 (June 14, 2017).
156
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 83 Fed.
Reg. 24850 (May 30, 2018).
157
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 84 Fed.
Reg. 69834 (Dec. 19, 2019).

43

Council v. Pruitt, the agency must meet the statutory requirements158 of the stays or delays if the
action is up for reconsideration. They cannot let them pend indefinitely. Also, as noted above,
agencies must provide permissible reasons for their reconsideration. If the agency uses the delay
or stay solely as a means to undermine the rule, that might be an illegitimate agency action.
Otherwise, the decision to impose the stay is arbitrary and capricious.159 In other words, even if
the agency decides to enact the delay or the stay, it must be for reasons within the authority that
Congress delegates.
Additionally, delays or stays can raise legitimacy concerns from the perspective of procedural
legitimacy. This is especially true if devices such as stays or rule delays gradually become vehicles
for bypassing rulemaking processes and engaging in what is, in fact, de facto rule rescissions.
Thus, the agency action might eventually replace the actual rulemaking processes required to
create new or amended rules.
Lastly, greatly reducing or even eliminating an agency rule’s enforcement gives rise to
legitimacy concerns. Reducing enforcement can become a vehicle for de facto rule rescissions. A
government can contribute to repealing former regulations by reducing the federal workforce or
significantly cutting the enforcement budget, even though the rules now effectively no longer in
play remain on the books. 160 For example, under the Trump administration, the number of
individuals in the federal workforce continuously dropped and fell back to Reagan-era levels.161
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This meant that that the EPA could not meet its responsibility under enabling acts, such as the
Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, because the EPA did not have the resources or ability to
inspect or to enforce the rules promulgated in those fields. In sum, by reducing the federal funds
and/or workforces and by not following the procedural process that governs rule recessions, the
government could, for all practical purposes, deregulate agency regulations.
B. Existing Legal Structures Are Insufficient to Ensure Legitimacy
It is possible to think of two existing ways to ensure that agency deregulation is legitimate, but
neither is likely to be sufficient. The first is state action. A state legislature, duly elected by the
people, can reverse agency deregulation by re-enacting a regulation as a state statute. For example,
California re-enacted net neutrality against the FCC’s policy judgment to deregulate the Internet
industry.162 State action, however, is, for the most part, ineffective because there are fifty states,
potentially resulting in fifty differing laws.163 If net neutrality (or similar regulation) were left to
the states, dozens of inconsistent laws could arise. A corporation may need to act very differently
in one state than in another state, resulting in inefficiency.
Furthermore, from a different aspect, state action cannot be a proper solution to secure
legitimacy due to the state’s limited capacity, especially if deregulation has occurred in a specific
field in which unified regulation is necessary, or the policy comes with a huge budget. For
example, the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense, and the EPA
proposed a rule, Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) on February 14,
2019.164 Under the proposed rule, the agencies redefined the term ‘Navigable Waters’ to clarify
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the federal authority under the Clean Water Act, narrowing down the scope of the navigable water
that is subject to the Act.165 Deregulation, in this case, narrowed down federal jurisdiction and left
many miles of streams and acres of wetlands under the states’ supervision.166 Here, it could be
possible that even if the federal government did not regulate many of the nation’s streams and
wetlands, states could enact legislation independently.167 However, this is not the case; regulating
the nation’s streams and wetlands is not a matter of local or state provenance but a nationwide
issue.168 Also, many states may decide not to take specific actions due to the limited budget and
capability to enforce or to investigate state legislation.169
Alternatively, another way to ensure legitimate agency deregulation, although also insufficient,
is by leaving the oversight of deregulation to Congress. That is, Congress could pass a statute
amending its own statute and reversing it, thereby legitimizing deregulation by ensuring that
elected officials review agency action. Additionally, pursuant to the Congressional Review Act,
Congress has passed a joint resolution repealing a specific agency policy, as mentioned above.
However, such approaches are usually inefficient for numerous reasons. First, they ignore the real
legislative gridlock that plagues contemporary congressional sessions.170 Congress may not be
able to act on deregulation because of obstruction and the partisan split that exists. Moreover, even
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if Congress could act, the sheer amount of time it takes to enact such amendments would make the
process unwieldy. The FCC, for example, voted to repeal net neutrality in 2017, and the FCC’s
vote became official in February 2018, while a net neutrality bill was just heading into Congress
as of February 2019.171 The traditional legislative process can and often does take years, making
it ineffective in the modern world. As a further example showing how congressional oversight can
be inefficient regarding net neutrality, the FCC enacted its regulation in 2016, and the D.C. Circuit
Court confirmed that the FCC regulation was lawful. But there had already been some legislative
efforts before that which had failed.172 Thus, neither the state nor the federal legislative bodies
were capable of efficiently overseeing agency deregulation.
C. The Resurrection of Legitimacy Concerns
A preference for deregulation seems to have dominated governance for many years, especially
since the Reagan years beginning in 1984. Also, considering that the executive branch has had
broad authority over practical issues including interpreting laws, agency deregulation could be a
legitimate way to fill the gap between congressional legislation and reality after the New Deal era.
However, whenever a government implements major reforms—e.g., deregulation by way of
outsourcing—the issue of legitimacy returns again. That is, utilizing only agency authority to
deregulate resurrects the debates surrounding the legitimacy crisis of the modern administrative
state.
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This might be because modern administrative law is inadequate to govern agency deregulation,
particularly when the agency deregulation is so extensive and transformative as to require new
legislative action. Specifically, in terms of agency discretion and judicial deference, as Justice
Thomas said in Baldwin v. United States, it could also be that the historical or practical justification
for deferring to federal agencies has now disappeared.173 Thus, It is illegal. Justice Thomas argues
that giving judicial [Chevron] deference to federal agencies is unconstitutional “[B]ecause [the
foundation of judicial deference] is in serious tension with the Constitution, the APA, and over
100 years of judicial decisions.”174
However, as mentioned before, the essentials of legitimacy do not consist of one moment in
time or one action but must be viewed as on a spectrum. Reflecting changes in societal
circumstances, that spectrum has also incrementally changed. This means that one aspect, like a
strict separation of power, is not the only standard of gauging constitutionality or legitimate
administrative action. Also, practically speaking, new technologies or environmental issues
continue to emerge. Therefore, the focus must be on reforming existing agency regulatory
structures and restoring the role of Congress.
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CHAPTER II.
IDENTIFYING WHEN AND HOW LEGITIMACY ISSUES ARISE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE—
A CASE STUDY
Chapter I examined the broad meaning and significance of legitimacy issues in modern
administrative law. The thesis of this study is that administrative law generally and democracy in
particular require that agencies be flexible and creative in the ways that they respond to change
and new problems and issues. Yet, flexibility does not mean anything goes. Agency action must
be legitimate. But how do we know when that is the case and when it is not? What factors or
warning signals should alert us to the possibility of legitimacy concerns? What then needs to be
done? This chapter will discuss these issues and, in so doing, rely heavily on examples from the
FCC as it struggled to deal with deregulation and re-regulation of the Internet.
As described in Chapter I, the modern administrative state usually concerns the efficacy of
governance.175 Considering this, administrative agencies usually can add necessary flexibility to
governance, especially when it comes to how congressional statutes are implemented and
applied.176 In other words, Congress in effect delegates a kind of de facto legislative power to the
agency so that it can then act with the force of law. 177 Still, the language Congress uses is
necessarily ambiguous, mainly when applied to new problems and new factual contexts not likely
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to have been foreseen when Congress passed the original statute.178 No statute that applies to
activity in the future can capture all circumstances, foreseen and unforeseen.179
Statutory ambiguity creates room for agency discretion.180 Within the boundary of the room
authorized by the enabling act, agencies exercise the authorized power to establish their policy
judgments.181 And the exercise of agency discretion allows avoiding “the ossification of large
portions of the statutory law.”182 One need not mobilize 535 legislators every time one desires to
change the form of a new interpretation of the statute involved.183 In short, with the efficacy of
governance that agency rulemaking flexibility can provide, Congress leaves open many major
questions of policy by using relatively ambiguous delegation clauses in statutes. Important changes
of regulatory policy often thus occur through statutory interpretation by the agency. Enhanced
governmental efficacy in this sense by providing for flexibility, however, need not be the prime
value nor the only value, especially when they are changing or even scaling back from policies
they previously relied upon. They need to explain themselves. Agency laws must maintain their
durability and ensure their interpretive accountability with a reasonable rationale for proposed
policy changes or new statutory interpretations, even though agency laws can be and may appear
to be quite responsive to the politics and regulatory needs of the moment.184 Stated differently, an
agency cannot rely on the flexibility to remove a benefit or to change its regulatory stance as if the
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values of the prior policy had not existed in the first place.185 Still, just because one approach has
been in place does not mean it cannot or should not be changed.
In this light, defining legitimacy of agency law is to draw a proper line between flexibility and
durability or responsiveness and consistency, over time. Between flexibility and durability, or
responsiveness and consistency, the concept of legitimacy plays an important role, especially when
determining whether deregulatory changes could or should be accepted or rejected by courts. A
court’s discretion to rule on such matters is an opportunity for it to engage in a form of judicial
deference. Under modern administrative law, judicial deference is like permission issued by courts
that allows agencies—not courts—to establish their own policies and interpret their own enabling
acts. Agencies are allowed to choose a path that takes them to a new regulatory regime or
deregulatory regime at their discretion as long as the agency action does not transgress the statutory
authority that Congress has delegated to it and sufficiently explains itself.186
With this in mind, this chapter now raises this basic question: Despite such needed and
recognized agency discretion, at what stage of statutory interpretation might significant suspicions
be raised that agency reforms, especially deregulatory reforms, that may seek to reject, almost
outright, all previous regulatory approaches in favor of the free market, no longer represent
discretion but open a chasm between legality and legitimacy?187 In other words, what are and what
should be the limits to such kind of change?
Toward the goal of answering this question, this chapter undertakes a case study of agency
deregulation ultimately so we can visualize what we can call the warning lights that embody the
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legitimacy concerns previously set forth in Chapter I, Part III.B. Specifically, this chapter will
examine the Internet regulatory regimes released by the FCC, particularly in its 2018 Order and
the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision in Mozilla Corp. v. FCC as a representative example of agency
deregulation, its purposes and its limits.188
The basic issue reviewed by the D.C. Circuit can be summarized as follows: Did the FCC
lawfully reclassify broadband Internet as “information services,” repealing a 2015 FCC Order
classifying it as “telecommunications services,” thereby subjecting the Internet service providers
to fewer regulations? In a 107-page opinion, the court answered partially in the affirmative—the
FCC’s decision was within its authority to reclassify broadband Internet—but struck down other
portions of the 2018 Order and remanded the rest for further consideration in light of several
factors.
Despite the detailed opinion in Mozilla, which is explained more fully below,189 the intense
debate this kind of change provoked between marketization and public utility regulation rages on
and has not diminished.190 President Trump and the FCC Chairman Ajit Pai described the court’s
ruling in favor of marketization over public utility regulation as a massive victory that affirmed
the legitimacy of the agency decision. On the other hand, dissenting Democratic FCC
Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel noted that the court’s decision showed only that “the agency
also got it wrong on the law.”191 Additionally, she pointed out that the court ruling in fact “[t]ook
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the agency to task for disregarding its duty to consider how its decision threatens public safety,
Lifeline service, and broadband infrastructure”192—the factors the D.C. Circuit remanded to the
FCC for further consideration.
These comments also suggest what criteria we should consider in the context of legitimacy on
agency deregulation more generally. For purposes of this thesis, we also might ask, included in the
fundamental criteria considered here, whether the agency and the regulation it produced is entitled
to flexibility or should remain rigidly the same as before.
The Internet might be the most important invention of the twentieth century. Most technical
issues are deeply related to today’s nationwide economic infrastructure as historical economic
regulations dealt with fundamental historical changes in transportation like the steamship or the
railroad industries.193 Therefore, the Internet industry might be the field where we likely take a
federal agency’s expertise (and resulting judicial deference 194 ) for granted and leave such
complicated and complex matters only to agency policymaking power.195 Pursuant to the kind of
statutes passed during the New Deal, agencies historically have had substantial leeway to decide
on and formulate new policies; this is because they statutorily received broad discretion from
Congress to carry out what they determined “public interest” or “necessity” required.196 For the
most part, courts eventually deferred to the use and application of agency expertise in such
contexts.197 Almost all these actions involved changes in or extensions of existing regulations.
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However, as Commissioner Rosenworcel well explained, the deregulatory regime calls into
question whether the agency is appropriately fulfilling its statutory duties. 198 Indeed, some
deregulation may be driven and supported almost exclusively by cost-efficiency concerns. Yet,
these concerns are narrowly conceived at the expense of unaccounted for public values
encompassed in the statutes that should govern these processes and outcomes. In short, a broad
delegation of power in the language of public interest under a New Deal statute does not mean that
agency can ignore the values pursued by the prior policy. But under some approaches to
deregulation, public values sometimes seem to be treated as if they are no longer on the book.199
From the perspective of the criteria of flexibility and durability, but in light of the motivation
to pursue flexibility, other and more specific criteria should include whether the agency exercised
its expertise neutrally within the permissible scope of the authority that Congress initially
delegated. Considering the importance of the Internet in the hyperlinked society,200 maybe it is
natural that the Internet’s regulatory approach becomes a polycentric matter. After his election,
President Trump voiced a strong preference for deregulation almost across the board and
introduced a deeply deregulatory philosophy designed to guide most if not all agencies. 201
However, going from regulation to deregulation is not as easy as it may sound and necessarily
must vary from case to case. It is not as simple as flipping a coin. This wholesale attempt to
establish a new regulatory regime, known as deregulation, often has been the subject of social,
political, and judicial disputes, more frequently during the Trump administration than any other
previous administration.
198
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As some ultimate touchstones, then, what criteria have the courts applied to secure legitimacy
in agency policymaking in such contexts? The D.C. Court of Appeals’ ruling opinion in Mozilla
Corp fits the legality concept within the expertise-based model of modern administrative law.202
For even if a new regulatory regime is substantively suspect for some policy reasons, courts will
evaluate and likely pronounce the new policy as a legitimate choice because it falls within the
agency’s overall powers and is jurisdictionally proper, as long as that decision does not go beyond
the statutory limits Congress establishes.203 However, the judicial standard to be applied here does
not mean there might not be significant warning signals to take account of along the way, even if
the standard is ultimately upheld. As we shall see, some of these pressure points keep interacting
with the agency’s policy judgments. Sometimes, Congress fails to suggest limits that are truly too
ambiguous; thus, the ambiguity is not enough to determine whether Congress has really intended
to treat the agency’s decision as one a court then has to defer to.204 Or, on the other hand, as Justice
Rehnquist points out in his dissent in State Farm, the president’s, and thus the agency’s, opinion
is deeply related to the changed view of the agency’s stance on a substantive matter brought on by
a change in administrations.205 This chapter will explain the current legal framework, including
the standards for affording deference to agency action, and then illustrate how certain warning
signs should guide courts in reviewing agency deregulatory policies.
To lay the foundation for this analysis, Part I of Chapter II begins with a case study, first
reviewing the legislative structure of the FCC enabling acts and regulatory approaches taken when
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the Internet is in issue. Those regulatory regimes and holdings are directly involved in classifying
the status of Internet service companies, namely, Broadband Internet Access Services (BIAS),
under the FCC enabling acts—the Communication Act 1934 and the Telecommunication Act
1996.
Part I also examines the cases affecting the FCC regulatory schemes on the Internet industry
and those directly involved in how to classify the status of Internet service companies, especially
BIAS. The FCC has frequently changed its stance on the Internet industry. For instance, the
commission once evaluated Internet service as a commercial market but at some point, attempted
to regulate Internet service as a public utility similar to radio broadcasting, cable television, or
satellite. As we shall see, the U.S. courts had those attempts on their dockets since 2005. In many
of those cases, the courts considered the legitimacy of the commission’s regulation. They directly
dealt with the issue of agency jurisdiction—i.e., Did they even have jurisdiction to consider them?
Thus, the courts consistently examined whether the various levels of deference given to the
agencies are appropriate or permissible. This thesis will advocate for confirming the legitimacy of
court efforts to control and adapt agency discretion under the expertise-based model of the modern
administrative law, even or especially when deregulation is involved.
Part II articulates what criteria are involved when courts consider the legitimacy of agency
deregulation. It is evident that the processes of agency deregulation involve what appear to be
standard statutory interpretations by the agency, even in a deregulatory context. Therefore, a
detailed case study of Internet deregulation cases is appropriate to illustrate the criteria fused by
courts for determining the legitimacy of agency regulation. The example we examine here is
Mozilla Corp., the most recent court decision related to the Internet regulation. This case illustrates
the scrutiny courts apply when determining the legitimacy of an agency decision to deregulate. In
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Mozilla Corp., the Court of Appeals routinely relied on caselaw espousing deference to federal
agencies—e.g., the “Chevron framework” and “arbitrary and capricious” review—and deferred to
the agency’s interpretation of its enabling legislation. However, the court also remanded some
portion of agency regulation.
Finally, Part III of the chapter will explicitly highlight the warning signals indicating that we
may need to suspect the legitimacy of the agency’s decision. That is, even if an agency decision is
permissible and when, in fact, the court said it is not arbitrary and capricious, the warning signals
may still identify legitimacy concerns associated with some agency deregulation. The purpose of
this part is not to find or point out flaws within the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. Rather, this thesis
will advocate for confirming the legitimacy of courts’ efforts to control and adapt agency discretion
under the expertise-based model of modern administrative law, even or especially when
deregulation is involved. Through reviewing the application of principles of administrative law,
this part will ask whether an agency action may ultimately be illegitimate even if it follows the
existing processes.
Also, Part III does not suggest specific definitions or a whole new standard of legitimacy related
to agency deregulation. Rather, the initial question in this part is: At what point does or should the
deregulatory context under consideration affect how traditional deference doctrines such as
Chevron should apply? In this context, Part III will visualize the warning signals indicating when
a decision is or is not permissible and when, in fact, it is arbitrary and capricious and must be
overturned, as in our discussion of Mozilla Corp. in Part II. That is, based on the issues outlined
in Part I and II, Part III will articulate what and how we reach the point that calls into question the
legitimacy of constitutional democracy and democratic values inherent in the concept of
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administrative law. Then this part will ask whether the legitimacy must be overturned in our
example of Mozilla Corp. from Part II.
PART I.
Regulatory Background
A. Overview of the Path to Light-Touch Policy or to Net Neutrality Policy
Before beginning this part, it is important to overview of the FCC regulatory regime the
structure of the Internet industry.
Figure 1. Internet Value Chain206

As in other industries, the structure of the Internet industry is constituted by producer, provider,
and consumer. Specifically, there are six chains for the Internet service—i.e., ‘contents producer,’
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‘online service,’ ‘enabling technology and service,’ ‘connectivity,’ ‘user interface,’ ‘consumer.’
Broadly, the chain between online services to connectivity would be Internet service. Also, the
companies who provide online service or enabling technology service are online platform
operators. For example, suppose that a consumer is trying to buy an e-book file from Amazon or
to watch a movie via Netflix. For this, the consumer needs to use his or her device like a personal
computer or smartphone. Also, the consumer needs to connect the device to the Internet Service
Providers (hereinafter “ISPs”) who run the physical infrastructure of the Internet network (socalled backbone). Then, using ISPs service, the consumer can access Amazon or Netflix and then
make payment through enabling technology service. In sum, in the Internet industry, the online
platform operator plays a role as a marketplace, like Costco or Walmart. Moreover, the ISPs
correspond to the carrier like UPS or FedEx. Therefore, whenever consumers try to click and
access specific information on the Internet, such as video clips, movies, or even news articles,
which are constituted with divided packets, the ISPs translate each packet to individual devices
sequentially piece by piece.
Regarding the Internet industry, the FCC has two options on the book—light-touch policy (free
Internet policy) and heavy-handed utility-style regulation policy (open Internet policy.)
A light-touch policy or free Internet policy refers to a market-oriented approach that relies on
private more federal regulation. Inducing light-touch policy, in turn, means that the FCC prefers
to use a deregulatory policy in the Internet industry. In the 2002 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed
Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, the FCC induced the market-oriented
approach, emphasizing the importance of promoting investment and competition to boost
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developing advanced technology and spreading out the Internet network.207 Under the light-touch
policy, the FCC said that “broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment
that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market.”208
Heavy-handed (or public) utility-style regulation, or net-neutrality policy (known as open
Internet policy), refers to a regulatory framework that imposes legal obligations of
“nondiscrimination, transparency and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level
competitive playing field among content providers.” 209 That is, ‘heavy-handed utility-style
regulation’ or ‘open Internet policy’ will trigger common carrier obligation under the
Communication Acts as we will see soon.210 The goal of this approach is to fix the market failure
by preventing BIAS from being a gatekeeper to block or control the online platform market.
The core issue between the two options is whether Internet service providers have obligations
of open access requirement as a common carrier under the Communication Acts. In the early stage
of the Internet industry, the answer was simple. At the early stage, Internet service was not very
different from a landline telephone or fax machine (so-called dial-up ISPs.) Therefore, it was a
telecommunication service.
However, the policy judgment is far from simple due to the development of technology and the
change of the Internet industry. Specifically, the emerging business model of the Broadband
Internet Access Service compounds the legal issues.211 BIAS refers to high-speed transmission
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technologies that allow users to access Internet services. BIAS plays a role as ISPs generally did.212
This high-speed Internet service can be provided over different platforms such as Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL), cable modem, fiber, wireless, or satellite.213 But it also offers a wide range
of services running its platform application service.
The problem is, functionally, BIAS has the integrated functional components of
information services and telecommunication services such as the DNS (Domain Name System)
and caching. 214 In other words, initially ISPs were carriers who just translated packets of data from
content providers to customers. But, unlike traditional dial-up ISPs or landline telephone services,
BIAS provides two-way Internet services that allow users to access private emailing service, data
storage, backup services, geolocation-based advertising, and instant messaging services.215
B. Ambiguity of The Communication Acts216
A fundamental rationale and at times a pressure point that allows, if not compels and pushes the
FCC to change its regulatory regime is the ambiguity of the key statutory terms involved. In the
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caching to store DNS resource records, which avoids redundancy when attempting to access a web page and therefore
decreases DNS lookup latency. If a machine has recently visited the page it wants to access, the cache can supply the
IP address of its web server, completing the website request before the lookup has to query the DNS server.
215
Mozilla Corp., 940 F.3d at 22.
216
In this study, Communication Acts refers to the both the Communication Act of 1934 and the
Telecommunication Act of 1996.
213

61

case of the statutory ambiguity, the core issues are generally whether an agency has the basic
jurisdiction to carry out the tasks at issue for its purported beneficiaries—that is to say, is the FCC
the right place to deal with such communications issues? And if so, what authority does it have
under the statute?
Congress has conferred general and broad jurisdiction to the FCC that authorizes its governance
of the Internet industry. The Internet regulatory regime involves two parts of Congressional
legislation: (1) the Communication Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),
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and (2) the

Telecommunication Act of 1996 (the “1996 Act”),218 which, in fact, amended the Communication
Act of 1934. The unique feature of these two statutes is the dichotomy of goals that they establish
under this legislative structure. As a reaction against the kinds of market failures in 1934
responsible for the Great Depression, Congress enacted the 1934 Act to prevent the formation of
monopolistic markets, which would result in low incentives or high barriers for market entry of
additional or alternative communications providers and slash incentives for innovation. 219 To
achieve its goal, Congress imposed the power to govern the communications industry (primarily
radio communication at the time)220 to a particular independent agency—the FCC. Congress then
prescribed vague standards as limits for this independent agency’s actions, directed it to act in the
interest of the general public, and set it loose to govern communications technologies.221 Thus,
pursuant to the statutory delegation made by Congress, the Commission must serve and operate its
policy to promote the public interest, typically fixing the market failure—e.g., by ensuring
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nondiscrimination, reasonable charges, and furthering the national defense222—and securing an
effective execution of this policy by centralizing this authority in the FCC.223 Of course, no one
heard of the Internet in 1934, but relative to such communication, as yet unforeseen, the 1934 Act
introduced the legal term of “common carrier” on which the Commission has the authority to
impose certain obligations and responsibilities. If the Commission decided that a specific type of
communication service—e.g., cable tv or radio broadcast service—was a common carrier under
the public interest standard, that service had obligations to maintain the specific policies of the
FCC, such as setting rates that did not discriminate, as well as make reasonable charges, and further
the national defense.
Many years later, in 1996, as a response to widely spreading high-speed telecommunication
technologies, Congress enacted the 1996 Act, adding the value of market liberalism, which
facilitated a focus on competition and deregulation as well.224 Specifically, the 1996 Act required
the Commission to seek to promote marketization in light of the diversity of media voices, thereby
encouraging market competition and technological progress and promoting the public interests,
needs and desires.225
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Consequently, under the title of advanced telecommunications incentives, 226 Section 706
directed that the FCC and state commissions have jurisdiction over telecommunication services to
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary
and secondary schools and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the
public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications
market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infra-structure
investment.227
Additionally, the Communication Acts allowed the Commission to:
perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.228
In sum, these two pieces of legislation combined to make it clear that the whole of the legislation
known as the Communication Acts imposes on the FCC statutory duties to regulate while
promoting the openness of the communication service in the name of the public interest. Moreover,
to achieve these statutory ends, Congress allowed the FCC a wide range of discretion to govern
the emerging Internet communication industry, using specific types of means. That is, the FCC
might promote competition and reduce regulation for new telecommunication technologies by
providing for a free Internet. In addition, the FCC also secured open access for a diversity of
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Internet content and applications, preventing market failure with a commitment to an open
Internet.229
However, Congress did not limit its regulatory options to only two regimes. Instead, under
section 160, the Commission also had the authority to forbear from imposing the common carrier
obligation of Title II regulations under specific but vague criteria for forbearance230—e.g., “just
and reasonable,” “necessary for the protection of consumers,” and “consistent with the public
interest.”231 That is to say, even if the Commission decided to regulate a certain technology as a
common carrier, the Commission still had room enough to consider and reflect upon the realities
of the Internet industry.232 Arguably, they could forbear.
The other aspect of statutory ambiguity involved how best to categorize a certain service as
having or not having the obligation of providing open access as a common carrier. Specifically,
under the market approach but still within the scope of the public interest, the 1996 Act introduced
two labels in the communication industry: “telecommunication services” and “information
services.”233 A new group of services, “information services” of Title I, which are separate from

229

Generally, net neutrality is composed by three rules—No blocking, no throttling, and no paid prioritization. See
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the telecommunication services, permit the technology to provide its service under only minimal
regulations.234 Considering these vague terms of categories and their practical needs, the FCC
needed to interpret the intent of the Communication Acts and decide how to govern the Internet.
The Commission needed to determine the public standards on the Internet—i.e., whether Internet
service is located within the public standard under the 1934 Communication Act or the view of the
1996 Telecommunication Act. Specifically, the Commission had to determine from the perspective
of the legal issue of statutory interpretation, 1) how to interpret the terms of the Communication
Acts concerning Internet service, and 2) which technology or industry should be involved within
the scope of a “common carrier” in the context of the public interest.
Depending on the FCC’s decision, the legal status of a certain Internet business could be located
in totally different dimensions. Suppose a wire transfer business is classified as a
telecommunication service; that technology is required to take the common carrier requirements
of Title II.235 This means that the service providers need to operate their business policy under the
weighty responsibility of the public interest, such as nondiscrimination, reasonable charges, and
national defense.236 On the other hand, if the service is classified as an information service, it does
not have those responsibilities. That is, under Title I of the Act, information services are exempt

management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications
service.”).
234
See, e.g., In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802 (2002).
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from the common carrier status. The Communication Acts themselves do not provide any clear
indication or standard to distinguish between these two types of services. The absence of a clear
definition is likely to be by design because telecommunication technologies and business models
are historically dynamic.
C. Judicial Review on the FCC’s Policy Judgment
The second pressure point, which is rooted to the first one is vagueness and thus how to
enunciate the latitude of the agency’s discretion. Statutory ambiguity is a significant pressure point
that invites the agency to fill the gap using its subject-matter expertise. Here, the judicial standard
involved plays a role that requires agencies to suggest a rational explanation to justify the
legitimacy on their decision. This is an ongoing requirement providing administrative safeguards
or administrative standards so as to avoid any undue breadth of executive or agency authority.237
The change of regulatory regimes between 2002 and 2018 well demonstrates the tension
between flexibility of agency interpretations and the need for change and the durability required
by judicial review.238 Within about fifteen years, the agency’s interpretation and classification of
BIAS had changed three times. That is, as indicated above, through a different statutory
interpretation, the FCC chose the path of marketization over a public utility-style regulatory
regime. On the other hand, setting aside the matter of the legal status of BIAS, the FCC
promulgated regulations for imposing public utility-style legal obligation (so-called net neutrality
principle) on BIAS in 2005 and 2010, maintaining its version of a free market regulatory regime.
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In 2002, after BIAS emerged as one of the significant platforms in the Internet market, the FCC
classified cable modem services (BIAS over cable facility) as an “information service,”239 and as
such, it was not subject to public utility-style mandates under Title II of the 1996 Act.240 The
fundamental reason for this was to boost the development of advanced technology and the spread
of the Internet network.
However, in 2004, former FCC Chairman Powell announced his criticism of BIAS regulation,
recognizing the value of keeping Internet Openness. 241 Then, the FCC also released a policy
statement with four principles to encourage and promote the open and interconnected nature of the
public Internet.242 That is, the FCC declared, in that policy statement, that the Commission has
general jurisdiction for overseeing the high-speed Internet industry and enforcing the “national
Internet policy.”243 Then, the policy statement addressed four principles, one of which contained
an Internet provider’s regulatory obligation—net neutrality.244 In short, the Commission tried to
impose common carrier responsibility to BIAS, emphasizing the importance of ensuring a neutral
and open Internet environment and maintaining its policy to classify BIAS as information
services.245 Through this policy statement, the FCC changed its policy from a market-oriented
approach to one that imposed regulation. The reason for the change was that significant cases
showed a real threat to openness on the Internet from ISPs’ business contacts—blocking end-users
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from accessing certain types of applications or degrading the Internet speed (traffic).246 And then,
considering the practical issues and the real threat to openness, the FCC issued in 2008 an order to
enforce an injunction on Comcast’s wrongful conduct that interfered with connections of peer-topeer (P2P) applications, downgrading Internet traffic.247
The key here is whether the FCC has legitimate authority to regulate the ISP’s management
practice. As mentioned earlier,248 the Communication Acts keep silent about the Commission’s
specific and express authority over BIAS’s practice. Therefore, the Commission sought
enforcement by insisting it has “ancillary authority” to perform any acts if those acts may be
necessary under section 154 that provides broad grounds for the agency’s action. 249 However, in
Comcast Corp v. FCC, the court said that the Commission could not insist on using its authority
for imposing regulatory obligations on BIAS’s practice by relying on ancillary authority. 250 There,
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the court noted that the federal agency’s discretion is not unrestrained authority.251 Rather, an
agency’s ancillary authority may only be exercised if the agency shows that the proposed action
actually is reasonably ancillary to the agency’s discharge of its statutory responsibility.252 The FCC
failed to show the reasonable ground for the exercise of ancillary authority vis-à-vis Comcast’s
management practice. The court said, even if the Commission relied on the provisions of the
Communication Acts, none of them could support the FCC’s exercise of ancillary authority,
explaining that the provisions FCC relied upon were merely “congressional statements of
policy.” 253 The courts noted that policy statements alone do not justify the agency’s policy
judgment based on ancillary authority. 254 Thus, the court ruled that the regulations were not
“reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities.”255
In 2010, the FCC responded to the court’s ruling in Comcast by issuing another order adapting
net neutrality principles—transparency, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination. 256 In the 2010
Order, the Commission relied on different legal grounds—section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act 1996—which give the Commission statutory mandate to bring into effective action on the
Internet market industry. 257 Additionally, the FCC said that net neutrality is an essential rule
to preserve as an “indispensable platform” industry and civic life by maintaining the Internet as an
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necessity to take actions to “accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment
and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market”).
252

70

open platform.

258

Despite the lack of congressional provisions which explicitly confine this

principle, the FCC describes the necessity to induce the net neutrality policy considering consumer
right to access information and fair market competition.
Regarding the FCC’s reasoning, the D.C. Court of Appeals adapted section 706 that grants the
Commission the power to regulate BIAS’s network management practice. However, the D.C.
Court denied giving deference to this statutory interpretation because imposing a net neutrality
obligation is inconsistent with the statutory structure that Congress enacted into law.259 In other
words, imposing regulatory responsibility on BIAS as a common carrier violates the
Communication Acts because doing so in that manner is inconsistent with the structure—
distinguishing telecommunication service and information service—of the law that Congress
enacted. Therefore, as the D.C. Court held, even if section 706(b) of the Telecommunication Act
grants the FCC affirmative authority to govern broadband providers, imposing net neutrality rules
fall outside the scope of its authority as long as the Commission classifies BIAS as information
services, not telecommunication services.260
D. Politics, Political Influence, and Political Preference
To determine the legitimacy of the agency’s decision, the fundamental linchpin must be
congressional intent. In other words, no matter how serious the problem an administrative agency
seeks to address, the agency’s policy judgment must be a reasonable means consistent with the
ends of statutes that Congress bestowed into law.261 If this is not the case only Congress can pass
the new law the agency cannot.
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However, there is genuine ambiguity in some cases, and the statutory goal is not clear enough,
even within Congress. Furthermore, while the congressional intent is difficult to discern, the
political preference and direction from the president sometimes inappropriately occupies or seeks
to substitute and take the place of congressional intent, thereby affecting the agency’s regulatory
goals and actions. While a statutory goal is not clear, political interest in and influence over an
issue raise the question of whether Congress, in fact, precluded the agency from regulating a
certain problem.262 This adds pressure on Congress and leaves that body wondering whether it
should do something; the agency does not, under such circumstances, have the power to regulate
without more from Congress.
Regulating the Internet is, thus, not merely a matter of agency rulemaking. Considering the legal
or practical impact and the importance of the Internet, the change may have to come from
Congress. However, the matter of imposing specific responsibility has been unresolved in
Congress. Since 2006, various bills had been proposed.263 Some of them contained aspects of net
neutrality, while others fully reflected net neutrality. All the attempts failed to pass. The failure of
congressional legislation shows that the legislative process is a different ball game than agency
regulation. Regarding the matter of net neutrality, Congress might be unable to enact the principle
with legislation because of a partisan split. Democrats support the issue of net neutrality, and
Republicans generally oppose the matter of imposing specific networks for many of the same
reasons supported by anti-network neutrality groups outside Congress.
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On the other hand, Congress might be too vulnerable when it comes to lobbying by selfinterested members of the industry. As noted by Professor Reich, author of Saving Capitalism, the
corporation’s monetary power gives tremendous leverage to interest groups and giant corporations.
The power of deep pockets allows corporations to smoothly and efficiently influence the public
policy decision in a way that gives them advantages in the market system. 264 And given the
vulnerable nature of Congress, it is not difficult to try to find strong incentives for imposing
regulatory obligations on BIAS elsewhere. The lobbyists opposed to network neutrality include
Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, and representatives from the U.S. Telecom Association. 265 These
interest groups have been listed as the top spenders on lobbying in and contributing to both D.C.
and certain states each year.266 Ironically, former FCC chairman Powell, who originated the net
neutrality principle into the policy statement in 2005, became a chairman of the lobbying group
known as the National Cable Telecommunications Association. The political influence from the
interest group is well reflected in the argument of opposing network neutrality regulation in
Congress. Specifically, the opponent argues that the public utility-style regulation will stifle
investment in broadband technologies; thus, it will have negative effects on managing data,
expanding the infrastructure, and improving the Internet environment. 267 Those arguments
encourage market-style competition and are exactly reflected by the Republicans and the 2018
FCC Order that repealed the net neutrality principles, as we will see in Part II in this chapter.
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Unlike Congress, a more decisive influence on the Internet regulatory approach often can be
found in the president’s regulatory agenda and preferences. Indeed, the 2016 Order and the 2018
Order are the results of the political will of two different presidents. Beginning in November 2014,
President Obama asked the FCC to reform the rules to observe BIAS.268 In the “Statement by the
President on Net Neutrality,” Obama explicitly suggested that the FCC must reclassify BIAS under
Title II of the Telecommunications Act.269 He also mentioned the bright-line rules (net-neutrality
principle)—e.g., no blocking, no throttling, increased transparency, and no explicitly paid
prioritization.270 Afterward, the FCC made a step forward to impose net neutrality rules on ISPs,
releasing the 2016 Order. Here, the FCC changed its stance on BIAS and reclassified BIAS as one
of the telecommunication services under Title II of the 1996 Act with the net neutrality principle.271
The FCC also established the bright-line rules of net neutrality that President Obama mentioned
in his speech.272 That is, consumers have a right to access all destinations on the Internet (no
blocking). Also, ISPs must not intently degrade Internet speed or traffic based on the source,
destination, or content (no throttling). Finally, ISPs must manage the network not to benefit
contents, applications, services, or devices (no paid prioritization).
However, the election of President Trump after President Obama brought on a major change in
the Commission’s stance on Internet regulation. Net neutrality under the Obama administration
was one of the biggest targets the Trump administration aimed at to impose a deregulatory regime
against what it thought to be the burdensome and inefficient barrier of government regulation.273
Even before his election, Trump was outspoken about his political opposition to public utility-style
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regulation, tweeting and criticizing the FCC Order and Obama’s statement.274 Trump asserted that
requiring the independent agency to induce specific regulations following the previous president’s
preference was a “top-down power grab.”275 He also criticized net neutrality as an unfair doctrine
that only undermines conservative media.276 Afterward, the FCC seemingly followed the new
president’s preference and released the 2018 Order, repealing net neutrality.
A president’s strong influence is always a possibility with effects on an agency’s policymaking
and its conclusions in certain areas. For example, Joe Biden, who was the Democrat presidential
nominee for the 2020 election and now is president of the United States, outlined his plan to restore
the net neutrality regulatory regime, which was directly repealed by the 2018 Order, in a task force
document. Biden’s plan mentions that “the Internet is not optional: It is a vital tool for participating
in the economy, and all Americans need access to high-speed, affordable broadband service.” 277
The plan also explicitly announced it would restore
“the FCC’s clear authority to take strong enforcement action against broadband
providers who violate net neutrality principles through blocking, throttling, paid
prioritization, or other measures that create artificial scarcity and raise consumer
prices.”278
Unlike the previous cases from 2002 to 2010 described above, in U.S. Telecom Association. v.
FCC, 279 political influence and unclear congressional intent were explicitly revealed as pressure
points when the Commission changed its policy and reclassified high-speed Internet service as a
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telecommunication service under the regulation of “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet
of 2015.”280 Specifically, in a U.S. Telecom Association petition for rehearing en banc, Judge
Brown and Judge—now Justice—Kavanaugh opined that reclassifying BIAS to impose a net
neutrality obligation runs afoul of a “major rules [questions]” doctrine because the order is lying
outside the scope of the authority Congress delegated in the statutes under question.281 In short,
two judges’ dissenting opinions commonly point out that the FCC order could not be justified due
to a violation of the separation of powers principles.282
Judge Kavanaugh first noted that the net neutrality rule was a “consequential regulation” that
affected every single beneficiary involved in the Internet market, transforming the Internet
environment by interfering with the private actors’ practice. Based on this assumption, Judge
Kavanaugh struck down the net neutrality rule, holding it is unlawful because Congress did not
clearly authorize the Commission to issue the rule.283 In sum, whereas congressional intent is not
clear, the Commission wishes to induce a new regime of vast “economic and political
significance.” 284 Regarding unclear intent, Judge Kavanaugh mentioned the legislative history
related to the Internet. He said that Congress has proposed many approaches to the problems
involving net neutrality, but Congress has never enacted net neutrality legislation. Furthermore,
there is no solid evidence that Congress clearly delegated to the FCC the specific authority to
impose such statutory mandates related to common-carrier obligations on ISPs.
Kavanaugh’s opinion established the necessity of using separation of powers principles as an
interpretative canon that will operate “as a vital check on expansive and aggressive assertions of
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executive authority.”285 He pointed out that even if the Chevron doctrine were to allow an agency
to interpret a statute by relying on statutory ambiguity, only relying on statutory ambiguity does
not guarantee that agencies have untrimmed power to issue major rules.286 Rather, an agency
cannot exercise expansive regulatory authority to address significant social issues or regulate
major economic activities by relying on an ambiguous grant of authority; such exercise of power
is only appropriate when clearly authorized by Congress.287 From the perspective of the separation
of powers, Judge Kavanaugh emphasized that the federal agencies do not have free-standing
authority to issue binding legal rules in such cases. Agencies’ authority is legitimate only when it
is consistent with a grant of authority provided directly by Congress.288
Judge Brown agreed with Judge Kavanaugh on the point of the major question or major issue
doctrine, saying that the FCC’s order lacks congressional authority. 289 Judge Brown also
mentioned that although statutory ambiguity grants agencies freedom to regulate on a matter, the
freedom is “shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of the question presented.”290 That is,
the scope of agency authority must be determined by whether the agency is regulating on a major
question with deep economic or political significance, or whether the agency is regulating an
interstitial matter.291 Then, if the agency regulates the important subject, an implicit authorization
by Congress is insufficient because Congress would leave “those important subjects” to itself.292
In other words, you cannot assume they were delegated.
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Additionally, Judge Brown criticized the process the FCC used to re-regulate as a violation of
the separation of powers principles. As mentioned above, while the FCC issued its order of 2015
introducing net neutrality by changing its stance on statutory interpretation, the Obama
administration intervened. Regarding this, Judge Brown noted that the constitutional duty for the
president is to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. And those laws need to come from
Congress, not the president nor the private sector behind the scenes. The Constitution does not
grant the president the power to enact laws, repeal, suspend, or rewrite laws as Congress duly
enacted.293 The president’s political preferences alone cannot cause a different result than that
embodied in an independent agency’s regulation—the president’s will cannot change the law—
the president’s duty is to be “faithful” to existing law.294
PART II.
Mozilla Corp. v. FCC: Drawing a Line Between Legitimacy and Illegitimacy
All of these issues arose again, most recently in Mozilla Corp., the most recent appellate court
decision related to Internet regulation. But here, the Court of Appeals did not invent a new
standard. Rather, this case well illustrates the scrutiny that courts apply when determining the
legitimacy of an agency decision to deregulate—otherwise known as reasonableness review in
which courts examine an agency’s explanations for the regulatory conclusions in dispute. That is,
in terms of judicial review and legitimacy of agency action, administrative reasoning is the bedrock
of the legitimacy of an agency decision. It allows courts to invalidate an agency decision or to give
deference to it if the agency’s action is within its statute and provides a rational explanation for its
regulatory conclusions. Therefore, reasonableness review is generally the device courts use to raise
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some important questions: whether the agency a) addressed the relevant criteria under the
governing statute; b) engaged in sufficient factfinding to reach its decision; c) made a decision that
can be explained in terms of the statutory goals of the statutes involved. Based on these agency
explanations, courts examine whether the agency interpretation and the conclusion adhere to the
statutory ends. Here, mainly, Chevron deference applies to an agency construction of a statute
through rulemaking in terms of reasonableness review in the subject of the agency statutory
interpretation.295 Under Chevron, two essential elements or steps are required: 1) ambiguity in the
statute or regulation under review; and 2) a reasonable interpretation of that ambiguity.
Specifically, the first question focuses on law and whether Congress has unambiguously decided
the precise legal issue in question and if not, was the agency’s interpretation reasonable. An agency
could and should fill in the gap of the legislation to implement a specific policy if there is statutory
ambiguity in the statute that it administers. Then, the next question is whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable—i.e., whether the agency’s construction of the statute is permissible.
After first determining that interpretation of the statutory term is necessary, the court will address
the second step. Did the agency address the issue in a reasonable way? And if a policy question is
in issue, the same approach is used: Did the agency resolve the ambiguities in a reasonable way?
As long as the agency’s explanations are reasonable, the court then affirms the agency regulation
as being not only reasonable but legitimate as well.
With this in mind, in Mozilla Corp., the Court of Appeals routinely relied on caselaw espousing
deference to federal agencies—e.g., the “Chevron framework” and “arbitrary and capricious”
review—and deferred to the agency’s interpretation of its enabling legislation.296 However, the
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court also remanded some portions of the agency regulation. It is evident, however, that the
processes of agency deregulation involved what appear to be standard statutory interpretations by
the agency, even in a deregulatory context.
When an agency decides to deregulate some of its initial policy judgments, there are at least
two categories of rationales that can be successful in such contexts: (1) when the regulation being
revised by the agency lessens the regulatory demands it previously required, but it is justified on
the grounds that a more market-oriented approach actually helps achieve the statutory goals
mandated by Congress more effectively than when the regulation was in place. Conditions, for
example, may have changed, necessitating a different or less regulatory approach to achieve the
same policy goals; or (2) the agency may have concluded that what they first recommended simply
was not as effective as they had hoped and was no longer necessary in its original formulation. A
different approach and rationale for solving the problems Congress sought solutions for are then
suggested.
In addition, an agency may conclude that a return to a pure market approach is best because
competition at present operates as a better regulator than actual agency intervention. For example,
natural gas pipelines may have once been natural monopolies because consumers had only one
choice from whom to buy their natural gas. To avoid monopoly prices, rate regulation may have
been necessary. Over time, however, various other pipeline companies may have crossed the
territory that was once served by only one company and a buyer then had sufficient choice to know
it could receive the gas at a market price. Here the regulation reverts to the market price because
competition prevents the very problem that market intervention was designed to correct—
monopolistic prices. Again, a decision by the agency to equate the regulatory price with the market
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price is justifiable deregulation because a pure market approach was the goal in the first place, and
now it may work.
Such changes are “permissible” under Chevron deference if the agency reasonably believes
even a deregulatory change will work and can give reasons to support their new, deregulatory
approach. The key here is that the deregulation involved is thought to advance the regulatory goals
of the statute involved. In this sense, the deregulation involved is simply another form of
regulation. We call it deregulation because now there is less regulation than before or less costly
regulation—but it is still regulation under Chevron. In fact, this describes the regulatory changes
that occurred in the Chevron case itself.
A. FCC’s Assertions in Restoring Internet Freedom 2018 Order
In the 2018 Order, the FCC reversed its previous regulatory regime—open Internet—and
returned to a so-called light-touch approach on the Internet industry. The fundamental reason the
agency described that a return to Title I classification was correct is because they believed it was
crucial to facilitate and encourage investment and innovation in the Internet industry by removing
so-called burdensome regulation. Also, it helps to eliminate regulatory uncertainty; thus, it reduces
compliance costs.297 But these arguments are not a new approach or explanation. Instead, as we
saw before, the argument or explanation in the 2018 Order is almost identical with its prior policy
of the Declaratory Ruling in 2003. Also, in the 2018 Order, the FCC deeply relied on the Supreme
Court’s ruling in National Cable & Telecommunication Association v. Brand X Internet Service298
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that upheld the deregulatory regime in 2002. Regarding its policy judgment, the FCC suggests
three reasons, that reclassifying the BIAS as information service was acceptable in the 2018 order.
First, the FCC describes that the purpose of the 1996 Act is to promote certain legislative
goals—increase competition and reduce regulation. Regarding this, the FCC argues that when
Congress introduces a new category—information service that is distinguished from
telecommunication service—in the 1996 Act, congressional intent is to relocate the legal status of
Internet service outside of the scope of the traditional regulatory definition as a common carrier.299
With this in mind, the FCC noted that its more market-oriented approach actually fit the structure
of the Communication Act. Thus, it helped to achieve statutory goals. However, what the FCC
described as its regulation here poorly fits the legislative structure and congressional intent because
those provisions fundamentally assume that all telecommunication services are only telephone
service, not other advanced communication technologies or technology businesses.300
Also, the FCC says that “the 2018 Order [deregulation] simply returns to that prior approach.”301
Specifically, in 2018 Order, the Commission explains that from 2003, the Commission had
consistently maintained its policy and statutory interpretation on BIAS, emphasizing the
importance of investment and competition in the Internet market.302 In this light, the 2018 Order
evaluates the prior policy of the 2015 Order. The prior Order, the FCC contends, goes beyond the
boundary of a reasonable interpretation on the Communication Act, nullifying the category of
information services and ignoring today’s Internet market reality.303 The reason is that the stance
on telecommunications services in the 2015 Order was broad beyond belief, which justified the
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FCC’s reading of the statute and the classification decision.304 Furthermore, it points out the public
utility-style approach on the Internet industry is not based on the agency’s expertise but largely
influenced by the president’s will.305
Second, from the perspective of public policy, the FCC notes in that order that competition is a
better regulator than actual agency intervention. Thus, the FCC concludes that a light-touch
regulatory regime will encourage competition by stimulating investment and innovation,
furthering the goal of the public interest under the Communication Acts by “making BIAS
available to all Americans and benefiting the entire Internet ecosystem.”306 Regarding this, the
2018 Order suggests two arguments in terms of market investment and market failure. As to the
investment, the Commission mentions that after introducing public utility-style regulation in the
2015 Order, the budgets of Internet service companies show that many of the ISPs reduced
investment in network facilities. That is, the records demonstrate that this kind of regulation does
not increase investment because it is burdensome and creates uncertainty, as much in the
economics literature suggests.307 Moreover, in the 2018 Order, the FCC points out that even though
the 2015 Order promulgated a bright-line rule—no blocking, no throttling, no discrimination—as
means for regulating the Internet industry, how to implement those standards remained uncertain.
And the FCC believes that those naïve ideas only increase regulatory uncertainty in the market and
increased uncertainty results in lost market capitalization.308
In response to the concern about the imperfection of the Internet market, those against openness
of the Internet appear strong to the FCC in comparison to those who ignore the cost of public-
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utility regulation.309 The FCC notes that historically, the Internet has developed and flourished
under free-market principles. On the other hand, in the FCC’s view in the 2018 Order, the market
failure,310 which the 2015 Order purported to prevent, is standing on hypothetical cases and not
actual harm.311 Furthermore, even if there are some cases such as blocking or throttling,312 the FCC
in the 2018 Order stated that pre-existing legal regimes under the Federal Trade Commission’s
authority—particularly, consumer protection and competition laws—appropriately address such
threats without regulations. That is, even though ISPs engage in specific conduct which might
threaten Internet openness, there are already proper tools to protect consumers from unfair and
deceptive activities.313
Based on these analyses, and from the perspective of legal arguments in the 2018 Order, the
FCC interprets the meaning of the terms offering and capability. Here, the FCC’s arguments deeply
rely on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brand X.314 Regarding this, the 2018 Order provides
that information processing components of BIAS should be understood as ones of indispensable
functionality of broadband Internet access service. 315 In other words, DNS and caching are
representative examples of the integrated information processing capabilities of BIAS. And using
DNS, the user can navigate the Internet by typing the linguistic language like an advertised name.
Therefore, ordinary consumers inevitably rely upon the DNS functionality to use high-speed
Internet service. Moreover, as for the function of caching, the function enables the user to enjoy
rapid retrieval and extensive information.316 In sum, the 2018 Order explains that the information
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processing components features on BIAS show that it offers information service that allows the
consumers to enjoy the ability to store and retrieve information via BIAS.
Furthermore, the Commission says it is not reasonable to determine that the integrated feature
denies the status of BIAS as an information service in the context of plain meaning and common
sense. The reason the Commission insisted this is that even though those functions are not
necessary to be a part of broadband Internet service, the broadband Internet access services are
already offering them as part of its service to consumers today.317 And practically, consumers
already recognize that they are paying for more functionalities beyond mere transmission
(telecommunication service). 318 Therefore, on the grounds that the plain meaning reflects the
reality, the broadband service has the capacity or potential ability to offer activities—e.g.,
“generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications” 319 —which is well within the scope of information
services.320
B. What Aspects Make the Policy Judgment Legitimate?
The D.C. Court of Appeals began its review of statutory interpretation under the Chevron
framework. Under the Chevron framework, fundamentally, the role of judicial review is to ensure
whether a change to a new policy is a reasonable choice that is within the authority delegated to
the agency by the relevant statute involved. In other words, the primary standard is whether an
agency regulates within the confines of its delegation from Congress. But Chevron does not require
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the court to determine whether the agency’s decision is a wise policy. 321 Rather, a court asks
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable—that is, an example of reasoned decisionmaking.
Regarding the FCC’s interpretations, one might think that the threshold question is whether the
deregulatory regime under the 2018 Order is within the authority that Congress delegates. That is,
in the context of Chevron Step One, the primary issue should be related to a precise issue of the
existence of ambiguity; a court should then decide whether the agency decision is entitled to the
judicial deference. From this perspective, the possible opinion is that there is no statutory
ambiguity or agency interpretation that is beyond a permissible interpretation.322 For example, in
2002, as for the matter of the classification by the FCC, the Ninth Circuit explicitly denied the
agency interpretation which classified the broadband cable service as information service. Instead,
even though the court did not suggest the proper classification of the broadband cable Internet
service, in light of the integrated functional component, the court concluded that cable broadband
service was part of telecommunications service and part information service, rejecting to give
deference to the agency’s statutory interpretation.323 Does anything go? However, the D.C. Court
of Appeals did not directly consider this threshold question. Rather the court proceeded and
focused on Step Two: whether the statutory interpretation of offering and capacity was reasonable.
That is, the court simply assumed that classifying Internet service under the Communication Acts
satisfied the requirements of agency authority by virtue of the textual ambiguity of the terms—
offering and capacity—as the Supreme Court did in previous cases, including Brand X.324
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As to the reasonableness at Chevron Step Two, petitioners raised objections that the
Commission’s determination to classify broadband as an information service was, in fact,
unreasonable because that interpretation was established on the facts that ignore the reality of the
Internet environment.325 But, the court declined to review the facts. Rather, the courts noted that
pursuant to classification of BIAS, the reasonableness question was based on the fact of how the
Internet works. And the factfinding matter about whether the products at issue are functionally
integrated or functionally separated is entirely a function of agency expertise, quoting the Supreme
Court opinion in Brand X:
Brand X said that “[t]he entire question is whether the products here are functionally
integrated (like the components of a car) or functionally separate (like pets and leashes)
. . . . Chevron leaves [that question] to the Commission to resolve in the first
instance.”326
Considering these aspects, Mozilla holds that reclassifying BIAS an information service based on
the functionalities of DNS and caching is a legitimate and permissible policy choice. But even if
the agency action is permissible under the Chevron framework, that decision might still be
arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
First, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the D.C. Court of Appeals reviewed the
petitioner’s objections related to the benefit of the deregulatory regime, specifically, the
petitioners’ challenges of whether the agency’s explanation is rational. The petitioners insisted that
the determination to reclassify BIAS in the 2018 Order is not a reasonable policy judgment because
the FCC lacked a satisfactory explanation between the relevant data and its conclusion.327 The
petitioners specifically pointed out that in the 2018 Order, the FCC emphasizes the benefit of a
325
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deregulatory regime or a market-oriented approach on the Internet industry, focusing on the effects
on investment and the substantive evidence the Commission provided. However, the petitioners
challenged that the Commission itself provided a variety of this data or evidence and relied on
unreasonable studies or opinions which reflected or used disputable methodology from the
perspective of scholarly attention and thus, cannot prevail.328 In this light, the petitioner opined
that the Commission’s anticipation in the 2018 Order on the Internet market industry was
unreasonable because many of the records, economic predictions, or academic studies that the
Commission suggested turned out to be unreliable.
Regarding this, the court mentioned that anticipation is unreasonable because many records,
economic predictions, or academic studies that the Commission suggested turn out to be
unreliable.329 Regarding this objection, the court explicitly mentioned that “our posture in arbitrary
and capricious review is deferential.”330 Therefore, even if the agency must review the relevant
data and state rational explanations, especially the connection between the factfinding and its
choice, it does not mean that the court requires it to examine whether the choice is the best one.
Rather, the explanation that the new agency policy judgment is permissible under the statute, and
that the agency believes it to be better, is enough.331 And in the case of policy determinations
involving evaluating complex market conditions, courts routinely and properly permit that
determination to be made by administrative agencies as well, deferring to the agency’s expertise.332
According to the scrutiny mentioned above, the court here describes that the agency suggests
the economic benefits under the new regime will yield a dynamic industry built on technological
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development by rolling back the “public utility-style regulation.”333 Also, to justify the light-touch
regulation it imposes, the agency provides significant arguments. It also relies on the longrecognized principle that regulatory burdens discourage regulated entities from investing in their
businesses due to an uncertain market environment. The court also admits that evidence—
particularly the data and analysis of scholarly articles—may or may not have some methodological
disputes. However, the court said, “[Judges] do not sit as a panel of referees on economics but as
a panel of generalist judges to defer to a reasonable agency decision.” And again, the court
emphasizes, “Predictions regarding the actions of regulated entities are precisely the type of policy
judgments.”334
Furthermore, in general, agencies are required to provide rational explanations for a change in
their position. That is, an agency cannot change the prior policy sub silentio. The new regime
might not disregard the values that the prior policy protects as long as it is necessary to protect the
values that are still on the books. In this context, petitioners argue that the 2018 Order ignores the
values that the prior stance pursues by simply saying the prior policing failed to govern the Internet
industry properly in the first place or it was an unnecessary burden on the regulated entities.
Specifically, petitioners insisted that the Commission said in the 2018 Order that public utilitystyle regulation is a solution to prevent a handful of incidents that might affect Internet openness.
However, the Commission downplays the examples the 2015 Order referenced—e.g., throttling or
blocking—such as when an ISP intently interferes with a peer-to-peer networking protocol and
blocks the access or downgrades Internet speed.335 Rather, the Commission describes that the prior
stance is not “worth the possible benefits”336 when considering the significant cost of public utility
333
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regulation. Also, the instances mentioned above have happened in very rare cases because the
Commission finds that “ISPs have strong incentives to preserve Internet openness.” In other words,
what the Title II Order was trying to prevent did not require heavy-handed regulatory measures.
Instead, it supposed it could be mitigated at a lower cost by the transparency requirements in the
2018 Order and existing legal measures under consumer protection and antitrust law.337
However, petitioners emphasize that historically, ever since the FCC introduced a market-style
regulatory regime in 2003, the FCC kept trying to impose specific regulatory obligations on ISPs.
And the reason why the FCC began to consider some concerns that resulted is that there were
significant cases that showed a real threat to openness on the Internet from ISPs’ business
activities—such as blocking end-users from accessing certain types of applications or degrading
the Internet speed (or traffic).338 Regarding this, the court admits that the Commission’s conclusion
was nonetheless reasonable because the Commission securitized the prior rules in detail.
Specifically, the court said, the Commission properly applied a different but reasonable method to
change its view related to balancing of the relevant incentives, not just ignoring the values under
prior policing.339 As a result, the court affirmed that the Commission gave a rational explanation
for changing its policy.340
It is interesting that the court points out that relying on antitrust law or consumer protection to
prevent certain harm by ISPs is “not a model of agency decision-making,” saying that “the
Commission barely survives on that issue.”341 This is because the Commission presumed that
antitrust law and consumer protection law are more proper vehicles to regulate the Internet industry
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than ex-ante regulation. However, it does not provide any specific rational reason or analysis that
those legal measures are enough to be a substitute for public utility-style regulation. However, the
court said that it could not confirm that the agency failed to address or consider an important fact
or mandated aspect of the statute.342
C. What Criteria Make the Policy Judgment Illegitimate?
From the perspective of the arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA, the Court of Appeals
explicitly noted that the FCC disregarded its duty to address important and mandated
considerations—namely, public health and safety. 343 This means that, as we saw, even if the
agency has broad authority to regulate, deregulate or re-regulate, some of the public values that
come into play can be tools to control and limit the latitude of agency discretion. And in the case
of the 2018 Order, the Court of Appeals recognized public health and safety as a standard to control
an agency deregulatory regime as well.
Regarding public safety, the governmental petitioners challenged that the 2018 Order failed to
consider the FCC’s requirements that the enabling act requires—“an important aspect of the
problem”—during the rulemaking process. 344 That is, under the Communication Acts, the FCC
has the responsibility to promote safety through the use of wire and radio communications.345 With
this in mind, many of those who commented in the rulemaking process, especially the public safety
officials, explained that the 2018 Order technically grants BIAS the ability to prioritize Internet
traffic in favor of their management policy. The problem with this, as the petitioners point out, is
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that BIAS’s authority could cause serious issues for the public alert system. For example,
responses to crises deeply rely on a web-based public alert system, and the core value of that
system is to ensure coordination for contributors by access to the Internet on nondiscriminatory
terms without any interference from extrinsic factors. However, as Verizon’s conduct in the Santa
Clara County case showed,346 under the new regime, it is possible for BIAS to demand payment
for top-rate speed; consequently, it could cause specific peril to the first responders and the public
during a crisis.347 The court also admitted this objection noted by Santa Clara County because
BIAS’s discriminatory practices created a risk of irreparable harm, such as blocking and throttling
during a public safety emergency.348 However, the FCC’s regulation did not reflect these aspects
when it promulgated the new Order. In this context, the Court of Appeals simply ordered the
agency to review some aspects of its rules, including public safety implications.
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PART III.
What Will Trigger Legitimacy Warning Lights?349
The D.C. Court of Appeals’ ruling opinion in Mozilla Corp combines the legality concept within
the expertise-based model of modern administrative law.350 In fact, as we saw in Mozilla, even if
a new regulatory regime is substantively suspect for some policy reasons, courts will evaluate the
new policy as a legitimate choice because it falls within the agency’s overall powers and is
jurisdictionally proper. 351 Agencies achieve their flexibility by showing that their proposed
interpretation of the statute is well within their powers and the statute’s authority under which they
operate. Their resolution was reasonable and, thus, permissible. This ensures agencies are able to
be flexible and to keep their governing laws both up to date and durable at the same time. In this
context, it is evident that an agency takes a policy decision legitimately as long as a court finds the
issue in question was part of the overall legislative powers delegated to the agency. Thus, the
agency may later change its mind and reach a different policy conclusion, as long as it is within
the agency’s legal authority. An agency can look at individual circumstances in a new light and
change its policies when it feels it is necessary to do so.
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However, within this framework, some warning signals may alert us that there are some limits
to the flexibility and durability of the laws that agencies make. The deferential judicial standard
ultimately to be applied does not mean that there might not be significant warning signals along
the way, even if the agency policies are ultimately upheld. Not all deregulation is justified, for
example, if the changes seem to be more about repealing or amending the statute involved, not
merely trying to make it work better with new techniques or react to new circumstances. Instead,
with some policy choice changes, the result that an agency is trying to achieve can and should raise
doubts about the legitimacy of the action in certain contexts. Those doubts are raised if the
deregulatory action proposed, for example, is not within an agency’s authority. This often is
because the deregulatory action in question seems tantamount to a rejection of the controlling
statute and more like a repeal of the law rather than a new or more effective way to enforce it. In
such cases, the law is, in effect, unhinged from any normal judicial reading of the statute and the
realities involved, even if the courts were to adopt the agency deregulatory regime as a reasonable
policy. 352 Only Congress can repeal a law, not an agency.
Specifically, suppose an agency’s statutory interpretations go too far and are really more about
repeal than deregulation. The judicial limiting process should begin with a close look at the
rationale used for the new interpretation. And some warning signals may appear: Is the change, in
fact, reasonable? That is, warning signs will blink or turn into a red light when the agency
deregulation at issue cannot be rationally supported or understood in terms of the statute’s goals,
and in fact, results in a chasm between the legitimacy of that interpretation and the legality of the
agency regulation in the context of the agency’s statute.
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Furthermore, at some point, agency deregulation triggers warning signals in different stages
because some deregulatory policy changes may be so far removed from what the statute seemed
to intend and the problems it sought to correct. A statute may be read to authorize some
deregulation but not total withdrawal and rejection as, for example, some of the Trump
administration’s environmental deregulatory policies did. When a new statute or none at all is the
option, that judgment becomes a decision for Congress to make—not the agency. In such
circumstances, such determinations go beyond policy and become questions of law, raising issues
concerning the ultra vires use of agency power—that is, the goals of the agency are outside of the
authority of their statutory powers.
Nevertheless, even if the agency decision is lawful from the perspective of jurisdiction—i.e.,
the right agency is considering the questions raised—that alone does not mean the agency has the
statutory power to make that decision. Moreover, even if they did, it still leaves the question
whether the resulting agency policy change was reasonable and thus permissible. By the same
token, the 2018 FCC Order and the judicial standard applied to it can also raise more fundamental
concerns that the deregulation it involves may essentially disregard Congress’s statutory goals and
represent an attempt to, in effect, repeal or substantially amend the actual statute that authorized
the original regulatory policies in the first place. How do we know when this is likely to happen
and result in rejection?
The following sections will look at three categories of changes that may involve warning signals
to different degrees and ultimately raise significant legitimacy concerns. These warning signs will
appear when deference to agency expertise is in order, but the exercise of discretion under review
violates the law itself or alters or ignores the statute’s underlying constitutionality.
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A. The Proposed Deregulatory Regime Is Not Intended to Advance the Statute,
Rather It Is Only Ideological
Chevron comes into play when the policy judgment chosen by an agency does not satisfy
Chevron Step Two because it is unreasonable. The problem here is that the market-style approach
chosen in some deregulatory regimes may be selected more for ideological reasons rather than a
reasonable attempt to try to lower costs or regulate more efficiently. Deregulatory policy changes
are “permissible” under Chevron not just because the agency reasonably believes this to be true
and can give reasons to support their new deregulatory approach but because, as the D.C. Court of
Appeal described in Mozilla, the market-oriented approach is simply justified on the ground of an
ideological assumption: Deregulation should be favored because free markets are more efficient
than regulated markets and because “economic benefits under the new regime [deregulation] will
yield a dynamic industry built on technological development by rolling back the ‘public utilitystyle regulation.’ 353 Is this what the statute says or what the purely political aspirations of an
administration desire?
It is hard to determine this line because deregulation, along with its economic assumptions, can
also be seen as just another form of regulation by market means. The deregulation involved is
simply another form of regulation and may be more effective. We call it deregulation because there
is now less regulation than before. It may now be a less costly regulation too, but it is still an
agency regulatory action for Chevron’s purposes and the deference that allows the agency to act
like this. In fact, this describes the regulatory changes to which the Chevron court itself was
responding when the doctrine was created.354 From the perspective of the agency deregulation’s
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legitimacy, there is a presumption that such action is legal or legitimate. Return to the 2018 Order.
That regulation is based on a market-oriented approach to the issues at hand. As a form of public
interest regulation, the 2018 Order is justified, in theory, because a more market-oriented approach
can help achieve the statutory goals mandated by Congress and do so more effectively than when
the original regulations were in place. The reasoning is simple and straightforward: Conditions
(market or technology) may have changed, necessitating a different or less regulatory approach to
achieve the same or perhaps better policy goals. In other words, the agency has concluded that
what they first recommended (a regulatory regime) was not as effective as they had hoped or was
equated with failing to govern in the first place. Therefore, agency deregulation is necessary
because regulation is no longer necessary as it was in its original formulation; the deregulation
involved is thought to advance the statute’s regulatory goals even more effectively.
However, a warning signal will begin to blink when an agency decision is based solely on a
belief or preference for a market-oriented approach because the agency or president strongly seems
to prefer markets over regulation, no matter what. This, then, becomes more about market ideology
and less about policy, reasons, and logical outcomes. More precisely, the market-oriented
approach’s warning signal is likely to materialize when a policy preference using a market-oriented
approach is justified within the Chevron framework simply because it shifts to the market and does
not explain this shift in relation to the statute’s language and underlying goals. Therefore, one
reason for a warning signal is when agencies spontaneously assume that a market-oriented
approach is reasonable or permissible, no matter what the regulatory alternatives are. And a court
too easily decides that that decision is entitled to Chevron deference. It is as if a reasonable belief
exists that a more market-oriented approach fundamentally coincides with Chevron’s default
principle that defers to almost all agency regulatory choices.
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But under Chevron, to the extent there is such a default principle, it would assume that the
policy change under review increases the benefits of an agency’s deregulation for all involved
while decreasing the overall costs. In other words, it is essential to understand the agency
interpretations as reasonable from a broad cost-benefit perspective—the benefits for all the
regulation must be worth the costs of less regulation substantively speaking. Courts have
emphasized the necessity of the cost of compliance for the reasonable resolution of statutory
ambiguity, balancing “the advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions.”355 Therefore,
as the Supreme Court did in Michigan v EPA, the courts will examine whether the agency
appropriately prevents undue burdens on the purported beneficiaries. At the same time, they need
to decide the reasonableness of the agency interpretation. The default principle accepting the
reasonableness of an agency’s policy and the market-oriented approach that underlies it are based
on the same understanding that regulatory burdens discourage all regulated entities and should not
be excessive.
Regarding a cost-benefit perspective on agency statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has
thus raised an important question of whether a particular form of regulation may be ignoring a
burden being placed on the purported beneficiaries.356 But that question is particularly relevant not
for a way of market-oriented regulation—which usually reduces costs on some of the regulated—
but for regulation to impose specific regulatory obligations on the regulated parties. In other words,
under a judicial cost-benefit standard, an agency’s belief of a market-oriented approach almost fits
too easily when assessing only whether the agency deregulatory change places any new burdens
on the regulated.357 Thus, the current judicial approach grants agencies in such situations broad-
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based judicial deference, primarily when an agency’s decision to deregulate is explained as a form
of public interest regulation, but one using a market-oriented approach as a mere tool.358 And
warning bells seem not to begin to sound until it appears the agency is unreasonably exercising its
powers and the market as an end in itself.
B. The Statue Does Not Include a Delegation of Power to Do Nothing
In the 2018 Order, the FCC emphasizes that competition is fierce in the Internet market;
conversely, concerns for market failure—monopoly—were very tiny or none. To pursue the
policy, the Commission construed the Communication Acts, classifying BIAS as information
services. The FCC’s interpretation believes that a pure market approach is always best because
competition operates as a better regulator than actual agency intervention.
Yet, that assumption is incapable of justifying a general legal presumption in favor of
deregulation because such a presumption conflicts with congressional intent. In other words, such
agency interpretation leads to substantial legal changes in outcomes that only Congress may do
and not the agency.
Chevron is rooted in a fundamental presumption: When Congress left ambiguity in a statute,
that ambiguity would be resolved by the agency rather than the courts.359 Chevron thus provides a
bright-line rule Congress can rely upon in legislating: Should a statute prove ambiguous, such
ambiguity will be resolved by administrative agencies rather than the courts, so long as the
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interpretation is within the bounds of reason. 360 In sum, the Chevron doctrine allocates
policymaking power to the agency’s choice of what kind of power to exercise.361
Under these circumstances, the agency, of course, has the power and discretion to deregulate in
a specific area. But Chevron is not a magic wand that defers to all unfettered agency authority.
Rather, it leaves room for the judicial branch to decide on the validity of an agency’s reasons.362
And the fundamental criteria to determine the validity is obviously the congressional intent. That
is, if the agency acted through “an implausible reading of the statute,” that agency decision was
not entitled to deference because it transgressed the authority delegated by Congress. 363 For
example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp., Justice Scalia—who was an avid deregulator under
most circumstances—had to conclude that the FCC’s interpretation of the statutory term ‘modify’
as a way of justifying the wholesale substitution of the market for the statutory scheme in place
went too far.364 ‘Modify’ did not mean abandon—it implied change but not repeal.365 Therefore,
even if the reason-giving by the agency justifies the policy for the market, at some point, the result
must become questionable. It is because no matter what the agency tried to establish as its regime,
the result of the market approach in such a case could transform the initial ends of the statute
involved, the belief could be pretextual, and agency deregulation could simply be an attempt to
undo a statute. Or that result technically leads to revocation of the congressional legislation without
congressional compromise.
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In this context, the warning signals turn red because the agency’s statutory interpretation
violates or transgresses the specific path that Congress mandated be taken through the statute
involved. The 2018 Order is an instance when this signal is appropriate—i.e., the agency’s
statutory interpretation that leads to a substantial legal outcome, transforming the ultimate ends of
the statute involved—at two aspects. As mentioned earlier,366 in the 2018 Order, the Commission
redefined “Internet access services” as an “information service” regardless of whether such service
also provided telecommunication functions or other ‘integrated’ features. Through such
deregulation, the Commission can effectively leave nothing within the confines of
“telecommunications service,” nearly repealing a congressional statute. 367 In other words, that
interpretation in the 2018 Order transfers the value of the Communication Acts without any action
by Congress, nullifying one of the statute’s significant silos.368 Specifically, Judge Millett, in his
concurring opinion, points out that Congress enacts the governing statute, providing that agency’s
decision should be determined consistent with the public interest to promote competitive market
condition. Toward this legislative goal, the Acts already opened the path for the flexibility of the
Commission’s policy judgment that the agency can “forbear from applying common carrier
regulations [public utility-style regulation].”369 On the other hand, the Commission’s statutory
interpretation distorts the ends of the Acts as a deregulatory regime. And the result of what the
agency tried to achieve required that the agency rescind its congressional legislation just as if this
were a congressional decision to repeal legislation.
Furthermore, in the 2018 Order, the FCC suggests specific remedies—antitrust and consumer
protection laws—as alternative regulatory means to pursue the goal of the Communication Acts,
366
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saying that those remedies are enough for consumers to have means to take remedial action against
the potential BIAS’s behavior inconsistent with the statutory value of open Internet. 370
Consequently, under the 2018 Order, the Commission seemingly re-delegates its authority to
govern the issues of national telecommunication policy to the Department of Justice or the Federal
Trade Commission.371 Before examining whether the delegation is lawful or not, it might be clear
that the FCC is trying to transform the goal of the Communication Acts from ex-ante regulatory
regime actions to ex-post ones. In other words, Congress established the FCC and gave it a wide
range of discretion to respond to the telecommunication technology and broadcasting issues on the
forecast, relying on the agency expertise. The 2018 Order replaced the congressional intent with
the Commission’s view that the legal remedies will limit or prevent the BIAS’s conduct in
undesirable practices as part of a broader regulatory and economic framework.372
C. Is It Too Big To Delegate?
Keeping the flexibility of agency laws in mind, another possible warning signal will begin to
light up in terms of agency expertise and congressional delegation—whether we can be confident
that Congress has intended to delegate agencies even if the legislation generally empowers great
flexibility.373
In general, when the application of the statute to the facts at hand may have seemed accurate
but the issue being considered and decided by the agency was too big a question and most likely
never intended to be delegated to them, the policy is struck down as ultra vires as well. The reason
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for this concern is rooted in the lack of a clear statement from Congress whether the major issue
is within the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction. It may seem that the statute gives the agency
discretion as written but not applied, because the decision is too big to think that only the agency
could do it on its own. As we saw in Part I, the Communication Acts aptly illustrate the matter of
great flexibility of agency legislative power that Congress gives. Under the Acts, it is clear that
Congress has delegated to the FCC the authority to interpret a statute. And based on the reasoning
to prove the connection between factfinding and the choice, the FCC has unbridled power to
impose or remove regulatory responsibility on the purported beneficiaries of the statute.374 The
ambiguity of statutory terms, of course, can be construed as Congress’s intention to provide
agencies the general authority they need to govern. However, it does not automatically guarantee
that they also have the authority to ignore or, in effect, repeal that authority whenever they wish.
Therefore, in some cases, it is questionable whether Congress truly delegated the authority to just
one agency to take such a step, even if that agency is the expert that Congress relies on.375
With this in mind, one who takes the view of the major question doctrine will understand that
imposing net neutrality regulation under the Communication Acts is illegitimate because it is a
major issue that Congress might not delegate as Justice Kavanaugh might contend.376 Moreover,
in this view, the suspicion that agency expertise is politicized is also one “danger signal” that
requires courts to take a ‘hard-look’ when examining the justification of agency decision.377 As a
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reminder, agency regulation’s flexibility is an efficient way to respond to realities, especially
technology like the Internet.378 But this understanding is based on a concrete and fundamental
proposition: agency regulation is a value-neutral outcome of agencies’ expertise and agencies
derive the democratic will their decisions represent from Congress, not from undue and ever
changing political influence.379 When the transformation or change being asked of an agency is so
great that it cannot realistically be accomplished by just an agency, it may be a major question that
only Congress can answer.
But in a deregulatory context, the warning signal also involves a question of how great the
change will be if an agency does not use its authority. For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
U.S. Supreme Court confronts the opposite issue—what if an agency denies its jurisdiction or it
insists that it does not have enough expertise to regulate greenhouse gases? Or what if an agency
says that to do nothing is better? The EPA entered an order denying a rulemaking petition that
required the agency to impose greenhouse gas limitations to prevent climate change. Here, the
agency gave two reasons for its decision. First, the agency said that greenhouse gases could not be
“air pollutants” within the meaning of the statute it governs.380 That is, in the EPA’s view, the
Clean Air Act (CAA) does not explicitly authorize or require the EPA to issue mandatory
regulations addressing climate change issues.381 In addition, from the perspective of legislative
history, the agency argues that the initial congressional intent under the CAA is to protect local air
pollutants, not the worldwide atmosphere. In this context, later, when Congress had a chance to
reflect the elements of greenhouse gas in the Act to bestow responsibility to set carbon dioxide
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emission standards to the EPA for addressed global climate change, those trials did not pass.
Rather, there is no doubt that imposing emission limitations on greenhouse gases has very
economical and political significance. Therefore, the EPA concluded that climate change was so
important; thus, it does not insist on its authority unless Congress explicitly confers to that agency
with specific instruction.382 Furthermore, the EPA argues that even if the agency has the authority
to establish regulatory standards related to greenhouse gas emission, it does not have supportive
scientific proof that controlling greenhouse gas will prevent climate change.383 Also, the EPA
added its political stance on regulating greenhouse gas, saying that regulating by the private sector
will be more efficient than the federal regulation. Here, the Supreme Court said that the EPA is an
expert agency who was charged with making specific policies with its expertise.384 That is, unlike
in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court imposed specific limitations on the agency,
forcing it to use its authority.385
Return to the 2018 Order. In the case of the 2018 Order, the FCC insisted that the Supreme
Court already adopted the reasonableness of its market-oriented approach in Brand X.386 And the
deregulatory regime is a more efficient way to increase the competition and investment in the
Internet industry.
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However, as Judge Millet points out in Mozilla Corp., the Internet market environment has
changed dramatically. The statute of BIAS, which is mainly subject to the Internet regulations, is
totally different from the time when the FCC induced the market-oriented approach which the
Supreme Court adopted in Brand X.387 And that change stimulates Congress to consider that the
agency regulation disregards specific public values or underestimates benefits to all of the
regulated beneficiaries, including consumers. In sum, those attempts mean that there could be other
aspects of specific interests or benefits the statute needs to support. Furthermore, even if those
attempts failed, a number of bills and the legislative history—i.e., congressional attempts to impose
such restrictions—could be counted as a valid warning signal. The fundamental reason is that
Congress recognizes the necessity to do something, revealing the change of its understanding of
the agency’s discretion. As we saw in Part I in this chapter, in terms of agency deregulation, it
might be easier to see this warning signal of the legitimacy concern involved due to the nature of
the legislation process. A number of bills show well that the legislation process was different from
the administrative rulemaking process. In other words, Congress’s failure to embody specific
regulations cannot be equated with a legislative determination that “there is nothing to do.” Instead,
it is plausible that legislators have specific concerns—i.e., the regulatory regime established by an
agency might not reflect the change that occurred in the industrial environment.
In light of public values, the Internet does not remain as just a technology for people to get
information or communicate. The Internet is an indispensable medium, serving as a place for
political, commercial, and social activities. Moreover, the Internet is the foundation of high
technology from autonomous vehicles to artificial intelligence and even refrigerators. The
resolution in 2016 from the United Nations Human Rights Council well indicates that Internet
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availability has profoundly impacted lives around the world. Additionally, in the Covid-19
pandemic, using the Internet has become an essential way to keep safe and maintain businesses
and daily life. Even judicial procedures such as hearings, etc., are often held on the Internet. It is
almost impossible for people to imagine their daily life without using Internet services. Given such
great socio-economic significance of the Internet and Internet availability to people, is it
reasonable to think that Congress totally delegates the matter of the Internet, allowing the FCC to
deregulate the Internet, which has so much economic and political impact?
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CHAPTER III.
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND DEREGULATION
The discussion up to this point is mainly about how administrative law deals with the legality
and the legitimacy of an agency’s policymaking powers. As we have seen thus far, if the agency
policy at issue is within the agency’s legal authority and is created with the proper procedures, it
is likely to be legitimate. The concept of legitimacy refers to the fundamental justification for
people to obey agency regulation; indeed, legitimacy encompasses a basic belief in legality as
integral to democracy.388 This is because legitimacy involves both the substance and the process
by which agency policies are created.389
The Chevron doctrine is relevant here in that “Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens
through which to view the legality of [agency’s interpreting power].”390 As the Supreme Court
noted in Chevron, a court’s role is to inquire into whether the agency’s specific interpretation of
the statute at issue is within the range of specific and reasonable possibilities an agency may choose
appropriately to pursue the statute’s ends.391 Under the ultra vires principle, the role of courts is to
police the boundaries stipulated by Congress. 392 This includes the policies at issue and their
substantive legality as well—that is, whether the decision is within the agency’s statutory
authority—and is not ultra vires—and thus represents the legislature’s intent.393
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However, in extraordinary cases, courts may hesitate to conclude that the agency’s policy
judgment at issue is legitimate even if the decision standing alone appears to be a reasonable
outcome, given the usual tests applied by the reasonableness standard.394 Furthermore, even if the
agency’s decision is entitled to judicial deference, we must look for other warning signals that may
raise legitimacy concerns. The warning signals indicate that the current legal lens does not work
properly against the pressure points—statutory ambiguity, inconsistent political stance, and
political influence. Instead, it can tempt agencies to exercise their delegated authority in a selfaggrandized manner or with self-interest far exceeding the scope of authority Congress may have
actually sought to delegate to the agencies.395 This extraordinary case may refer to issues that are
too big to be resolved in reliance on the agency’s expertise. Some decisions may be too big or too
important for an agency to decide independently without further clarification and Congress's
authority. There are some outer limits to the need for agency flexibility, such as when a question
arises as to when a traditional Chevron analysis implies that an agency itself can prohibit tobacco
use (a decision up to that point even Congress had feared to make).
In response to the legitimacy concern, some conservative justices and scholars396 have opined
on the necessity to limit extended agency power. In particular, Justice Thomas asserted his changed
understanding of modern administrative law in Baldwin, saying that Chevron is
unconstitutional. 397 He noted that the agency’s interpretation stands on the legal fiction that
statutory ambiguity assumes an implicit delegation by Congress to agencies.398 This assumption
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has been justified by the unique historical necessity of deferring to federal agencies. However, in
his eyes, the historical justification for Chevron no longer exists. Instead, he now believes that
Chevron failed to control agency discretion, creating a legitimacy crisis because of its
inconsistency with the separation of powers principle.399 In terms of the flexibility and legitimacy
of the modern administrative state, Justice Thomas’s argument underlies the notion that the legal
fiction for justifying statutory ambiguity tends to expand agency discretion. Such expansive
agency discretion is fundamental to Justice Thomas’s concerns with legitimacy in the context of
Chevron. In other words, even if historically and practically the flexibility of the agency’s
policymaking power has been justified, now flexibility is the root cause of the problem; thus,
flexibility should be removed to prevent the severe tension from becoming a recurring legitimacy
concern.
In the same vein, Justice Gorsuch insists that Chevron raises an important question of a court’s
role in terms of statutory interpretation. Agency interpretive authority is often the result of
unconstitutional delegation, and Chevron requires judges to defer to an agency’s interpretation of
statutory ambiguity when other reasons dictate that they should not.400 In this context, to correct
this illegitimate situation, and in the process control the administrative state’s overall growth,
Gorsuch emphasizes the importance of independent judicial judgment to constrain agency
discretion.401
Suppose such unbounded agency discretion is the fundamental reason that causes agency
lawmaking legitimacy concerns. Is it best to deal with this by drastically cutting back on agency
discretion and flexibility? Regarding this question, Professors Hamburger and Lawson both might
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answer “Yes.” In particular, Professor Hamburger described most agencies’ interpretative power
as being extralegal. He corrects this by advocating a very narrow approach to the legislature’s
ability to delegate any legislative power not exercised by the legislature itself. In modern
administrative law, that power has been justified on the ground of judicial deference to the agency,
but he sees this as a power above the law.402 Stated differently, in Hamburger’s view, ever-growing
agency discretion, especially agency interpretative authority spawned by what he would term as
unconstitutional delegations, leads the modern administrative state to a situation of the rule above
the law; in other words, in his view, the entire modern administrative state is unconstitutional.403
However, this thesis rejects such narrow analyses and will not follow those arguments. In
contrast to Professor Hamburger, I do not view the flexibility exercised by agencies as optional.
Rather, in an expertise-based system, Congress’s delegation is not a unique or an exceptional
phenomenon anymore. Stated differently, at issue is how to ensure bureaucratic flexibility,
efficiency, and democratic values through the proper legal lens. 404 Therefore, the legitimacy
concern is how to alter, not destroy, the legal lens appropriate to controlling agency discretion.
With this in mind, this chapter will turn to the question, Must Chevron fail? If so, how should
agency law replace it? Do the alternative perspectives responding to agency laws’ flexibility
supply proper legal lens, displacing Chevron? To seek the answer, this chapter has a two-fold
purpose: 1) to suggest a proper understanding of the rationale behind Chevron, focusing on the
meaning of ambiguity, and 2) to demonstrate alternative perspectives on Chevron. The arguments
responding to alternative perspectives mainly criticize Chevron deference. They do not only focus
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on Chevron but also broadly argue the illegitimacy problem in the context of the flexibility of
modern administrative law. Specifically, this chapter will argue that some of the arguments
suggested by such critics and echoed by some of the Supreme Court Justices embody aggressive
attempts to enforce the nondelegation doctrine in ways that will not restore the legitimacy of
modern administration and should, therefore, be rejected. Such alternative perspectives on the part
of those justices will not only make the administrative process less efficient but make it risk and
unworkable by increasing legal uncertainty.
Part I begins with two main issues—statutory ambiguity and the major issue question. These
have become the central antipode between Chevron and critics. Specifically, Part I begins with a
brief overview of the rationale behind the Chevron framework. Based on this brief overview, this
part will demonstrate the Supreme Court’s current approaches to determine the existence of
ambiguity. Statutory ambiguity is a threshold question that triggers the Chevron framework. That
is, if the agency decision is entitled to Chevron deference, the precondition on that determination
is the existence of statutory ambiguity in the matter at hand. 405 And the significance of that
ambiguity effectively and legally justifies the flexibility we find in the modern administrative state.
It is not my purpose here to examine whether the Court’s approach on statutory ambiguity in a
particular case is right or wrong. Instead, this analysis will suggest proper criteria to review the
Chevron critics on this point more generally, as we shall see in Part II. As stated above, Justice
Thomas mentioned that the legal fictions behind Chevron could not be justified anymore. In this
context, reviewing the Chevron framework is essential to examining the Chevron critics—i.e.,
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whether the critics’ arguments against Chevron and agency discretion are standing on the right
inflection. Stated differently, does Chevron deprive the courts’ role, and if not, why?
Part II examines the Chevron critics. This part will begin by reviewing the most provocative of
the arguments holding that the flexibility of agency laws makes the administrative state
unconstitutional and unlawful. In particular, in this section, I will analyze and critique Professor
Hamburger’s argument in constitutional and regulatory contexts. The most traditional charge
against Chevron is the nondelegation doctrine, rooted in the separation of powers principle that
underlies the U.S. tripartite system of government.406 Even though the reasons or views they are
relying on are somewhat different, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch share a kind of skepticism
regarding an agency’s interpretation of a statute based on nondelegation doctrine in agreement
with their argument.
Next, this part will examine the nondelegation doctrine in light of the role of judicial review.
Specifically, under the nondelegation doctrine, the goal of the conservative justices’ opinion is that
courts must interpret statutes independently—that interpreting statutes inevitably requires courts
to resolve statutory ambiguity.407 That is, the fundamental goal is to retrieve judicial power and,
in the process, to diminish federal agencies’ power. In Part II, this study will explicitly examine
the reasoning of those justices as well.
Also, this part explains specific ways for courts to diminish the federal agency’s authority as a
significant remedy to stop, in their view, unconstitutional delegations. In particular, the
nondelegation doctrine now operates almost exclusively through an interpretive method that
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avoids serious constitutional questions. 408 We call it the major question doctrine. That is, the
nondelegation doctrine manifests itself as a new canon of statutory interpretation. In other words,
if we set aside the question of whether Congress has the constitutional power to delegate its
legislative powers to agencies, there are alternative ways a court can narrow broad delegations of
legislative power without seriously damaging agency flexibility in the long run.
Based on the analysis, Part III thus examines the inference of Chevron critics. Specifically, this
part will demonstrate the reason why nondelegation doctrine is not the appropriate alternative lens
to control agency discretion. In this light, this part will examine whether the critics’ constitutional
argument is reasonable and whether the Chevron critics are standing on a proper understanding of
the Chevron framework. Lastly, this part will explore the reason why the nondelegation doctrine
should not be the main legal lens to control the flexibility of agency law.
PART I.
The Rationale Behind the Chevron Framework
As a general rule, agencies play such a major policymaking role because they are best equipped
to make the technical decisions that underlie such issues. The courts are generally not equipped to
decide the reasonableness of such economic and political matters; moreover, Congress is usually
unwilling to make such assessments legislatively.409 An agency experienced in administering its
own statute is usually better equipped than any of the other branches—a court or even Congress—
to know how best to fill the gaps in the statute, consider alternative interpretations, exercise
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consistency of political judgment in tune with congressional intent, and consider the consequences
of various outcomes for the public.410
In this context, under Chevron deference, an agency seeking to change a particular regulatory
framework would determine its own policy; that policy is based on its interpretation of what is
usually the ambiguous statutory term that governs. Such a decision would be subject to highly
deferential review under Chevron. Stated differently, agencies have a wide range of discretion to
establish their policy related to significant issues, which Congress intentionally left open and still
charges them with considering in light of changing realities.411
A. Legal Fictions to Justify Implied Delegation
Chevron is based on the idea that statutory ambiguity calls for an implicit delegation of
interpretive power from Congress to agencies. Nevertheless, how can we be sure? Functionally,
under many circumstances, no one person and no single legal doctrine can be certain of evaluating
congressional intent correctly. Congress, in some cases, might intend specific results or
application, but in other cases, Congress may not give specific direction regarding how to apply
its legislation. Moreover, it is possible that Congress itself might not anticipate a certain situation
or circumstance at the beginning of enacting legislation. But to function, government should keep
running.
Under these circumstances, to justify the implicit delegation, the Chevron framework is
established on two legal fictions in terms of flexibility and durability. From a practical perspective,
the first legal fiction is that no one can foresee all possible changes and realities for a statute’s
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applications. Therefore, legislation inherently contains ambiguities and gaps between the ideal
application of the statute and reality. In this context, Chevron assumes that the existence of
statutory ambiguity opens up a room of policy discretion delegated to agencies by Congress.412
Agencies, in turn, exercise their power to resolve statutory ambiguities within the confines of
reasonableness. This practical fiction aims to bring some clarity and certainty to judicial review of
agency questions of law. It also encourages an agency to make policy judgments by accurately
reflecting the reality of government and adequately serving public needs, preventing ossification
of congressional legislation.413
At the same time, in a democratic perspective, Chevron requires a judge to answer an important
question in terms of congressional intent: Would a reasonable congressperson intend for the courts
to defer to an agency’s interpretation of statutory ambiguity or did that member not intend to
delegate the power to resolve statutory ambiguities to the agency?414 That is, Chevron still requires
courts to use their final authority on issues of statutory construction. 415 But Chevron also
emphasizes the common law role of the courts in an age of statutes. That is, courts should depart
from the traditional role that courts must play as ultimate guardians of a fundamental constitutional
right.416 Instead, it should leave the critical task of deciding the policy matter to the legislatures.
Therefore, under Chevron, the courts must give controlling weight to the agency’s
interpretation, not imposing its own construction. Still, the judge should ask whether, given the
statutory ends and circumstances, Congress would likely have wanted judicial deference in a
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situation.417 The legal fiction invites a judge, requiring a role as the judge who polices ultra vires
decisions by agencies (concerning a matter that Congress either intended to decide itself or
delegate to the agencies) to determine policy judgment under judicial deference.418
B. Troublesome Ambiguity and Major Issue
Based on the legal fiction, the moving mechanism of the Chevron framework is clear: whether
a (hypothetical) reasonable Congress member would want a judge to give deference to an agency’s
view on statutory ambiguity.419 However, Chevron does not suggest how ambiguous the ambiguity
must be under Chevron to give controlling weight to the agency view.
Courts might find the ambiguity from the textual source. In K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc, Justice
Kennedy suggested a criterion to determine statutory ambiguity from linguistic ambiguity: whether
“the language of the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous” without considering any reference,
legislative history or something else.420 That is, the textual ambiguity approach emphasizes two
aspects: 1) the term of a statute at issue can be interpreted differently within a range of permissible
interpretations; 2) the agency can lawfully choose among the possibilities of different
interpretations. In the past, Justice Thomas also affirmed this approach in Brand X, saying,
A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room
for agency discretion.421

417

See BREYER, supra note 179, at 106.
Id. at 107.
419
See Sunstein, supra note 413, at 198.
420
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293 n.4 (1988).
421
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982 (emphasis added).
418

117

According to this exegesis of ambiguity, even if a court previously defines or construes the
meaning of a statute differently, that phrase remains ambiguous because the same phrase can give
room to the agency to choose a different policy option.422
The textual ambiguity approach can be understood from two perspectives. In light of the goal
of flexibility, courts focus more on the practical point that from a democratic standpoint, the
ambiguity approach (allowing more flexibility) prevents ossification of the statutes.

423

Furthermore, logically, the two perspectives artificially distinguish questions that converge toward
one: “Is the agency’s interpretation within the permissible range of readings?”424 Therefore, the
Chevron doctrine guarantees the agency maximum judicial deference. Suppose that a phrase in a
statute may give a varying interpretation of political options such as X, Y, Z, and that a reasonable
person is persuaded of those options. The ambiguity of that phrase will trigger the Chevron
deference. Stated differently, Chevron will be a tool to ensure the widest range of flexibility for
agencies to use the discretion that Congress bestowed.
However, the traditional approach arguably causes some concern among some, especially if it
results in the growth of agency power.425 If ambiguity exists only because of the various possible
interpretations, it makes it easy for Chevron to stimulate the growing power of the administrative
state.426 Step One in the Chevron test gives the sole power to courts to determine whether Congress
very explicitly specifies the “the precise question” at issue in its legislation. When combined with
the Court’s downplaying of the importance of legislative history, this leaves, by design or default,
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ambiguity in most cases.427 Clearly, using a “mood” phrase like “in the public interest” does not
provide the kind of specificity that would enable courts to limit the agency’s power to determine
Congress’s power and (accordingly) to regulate.428 Moreover, in the absence of clear indications
to the contrary, an agency’s interpretation is given controlling weight unless the interpretation
exceeds the limits of what is permissible.429 In other words, almost any textual ambiguity will
trigger the Chevron doctrine. Then, at least, theoretically and linguistically, more than one possible
meaning a reasonable person could interpret means that those options are permissible. This leads
to the result that the agency’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference. Therefore, Chevron
deference is unbridled if the agency’s view is justified whenever a reasonable person can be
persuaded of more than one interpretation.
Moreover, from another doctrinal perspective, the approach reliant on textual ambiguity makes
Chevron’s approach in Step One virtually meaningless. In other words, the textual approach
misguides when categorizing the statutory provisions between two classes of agency
interpretation. The first class of interpretation is the “big,” which defines the agency jurisdiction.430
The second class is the “small,” which replaces reviewing a de novo question of law, needing to
be addressed by an agency’s interpretation of each particular ambiguity.431
In some delegation contexts, and unlike traditional Chevron analysis of statutory and policy
ambiguity, the Court has often declared that Congress does not delegate certain legislative
authority to agencies even if the statute contains textual ambiguity. That is, the Court has offered
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different approaches to determining the existence of ambiguity in delegation contexts, saying that
the existence of [textual] ambiguity alone does not warrant the conclusion that Congress wants
courts to defer to agency’s interpretations in certain contexts.432 At least two contexts or examples
come to mind. Congress may, in fact, have made an obvious error in drafting or its words are now
being interpreted to cover contexts that are far beyond what the statute was concerned with. This
goes beyond not being able to foresee new situations to an interpretation that seemingly enlarges
the power of the agency in unforeseen ways.
King v. Burwell is an excellent example that shows the first category noted above—a pure
drafting mistake on the part of Congress. Under the Affordable Care Act, Congress reformed the
health insurance system, requiring individuals to buy health insurance coverage or, if they do not,
to make a payment to the IRS. To minimize the adverse selection, Congress adopted two reforms—
establishing an Exchange and a tax credit. The Act requires each state to establish an Exchange as
a market where people can shop for insurance. Each state can run its Exchange in one of two
ways—American Health Benefit Exchange for State (State-based Exchange) or the Secretary of
Health and Human Service (Federally-facilitated Exchange). Also, as an incentive, it gives a tax
credit that will be applied directly when individuals are required to buy insurance through an
Exchange. Specifically, the Act said that the tax credits should be allowed for insurances
purchased through an Exchange established by the states.433
Then, IRS promulgated a rule, addressing that tax credit is available for insurance purchases on
both marketplaces, federally created Exchange and State-based Exchange. The IRS’s policy
judgment on the range of Exchange is key to expanding the pool of individuals for insurance by
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including healthy individuals, thereby expanding the risk pool, spreading the cost among more
individuals, and making insurance more affordable. Therefore, the IRS’s interpretation is a
possible interpretation and a permissible one in the context of congressional intent.434 On the other
hand, that interpretation technically crafts health insurance policy that will determine the scope of
individuals who have an obligation to purchase insurance under the Act. In King, petitioners, who
live in a state which adopts the Federally-facilitated Exchange, did not want to purchase health
insurance. In their view, they would not have responsibility for the Act because, under the Act, the
Exchange operated by the Federal government is not eligible to receive the tax credit. Also, they
would spend more than eight percent of their income without the tax credit when buying insurance.
However, the IRS’s interpretation made them responsible as individuals to buy insurance or pay
the penalty to the IRS.
Regarding this, the Fourth Circuit viewed that the statute was ambiguous and subject to at least
two different interpretations; therefore, they could not definitively say that Congress limited the
tax credits to individuals living in states with State-based Exchanges. 435 Meanwhile, the D.C.
Court of Appeals vacated the IRS Rule in a different case before that court, holding that the Act
“unambiguously restricts” the tax credits to State-based Exchanges.436 These lower court rulings
are based on the textual standard to determine the existence of ambiguity.
At the Supreme Court, in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts declared that the phrase
“an Exchange established by the State” was ambiguous.437 Yet simultaneously, the Court denied
giving Chevron deference because the credit determination would have affected the health
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insurance of millions of people and billions of dollars.438 One possible understanding of this ruling
is that the existence of ambiguity in the [implicit delegation from Congress] should be examined
in light of the context and structure of the remainder of the statutory scheme. In other words, textual
ambiguity itself is not the only standard to prove the implicit delegation from Congress.
For example, in King, the phrase may be limited in its reach to State-based Exchanges because
it is evident that the Secretary of Health and Human Services is not a state.439 However, the Court
said that as for the ambiguity, it is also a reasonable interpretation that the phrase refers to all
‘Exchanges’—both state and federal, considering the purposes of the tax credits. 440 That is,
Congress instituted the tax credit as a significant reform to narrow down the adverse decision and
broaden the health insurance pool. But if the Act treats State-based and Federally-facilitated
Exchanges differently and if tax credits are available only on State-based Exchanges, only one
type of Exchange would help make the insurance policy more affordable by providing billions of
dollars to the states’ citizens.441 And this is not Congressional intent under the Act. Furthermore,
Chief Justice Roberts describes the courts’ role under Chevron, saying that the role of courts is to
respect the legislature’s task and “take care not to undo what it has done.”442 Therefore, a fair
reading of legislation could occur not only through textual analysis but also through a fair
understanding of the whole regulatory scheme or legislative plan.443
From a democratic perspective, the Court asked whether Congress would have delegated the
authority to decide the health insurance policy to the agency. Regarding this, Chief Justice Roberts
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emphasizes a fundamental aspect of legitimacy—the agency’s expertise. He notes that while tax
credit availability is a core matter on the new health insurance policy, the IRS does not have agency
expertise in crafting health insurance.444 In this context, he said that Congress would not have
delegated this question of economic and political significance.445 That is, the IRS should not be
interpreting the statute because of the possibility of disqualifying an agency due to lack of express
delegation combined with significant effect and subject matter arguably beyond agency control.
From the perspective of traditional Chevron analysis, the Court’s ruling in King is one of the
important ‘major question’ exceptions to Chevron deference. This is because the Court refuses to
give judicial deference to the agency’s policy judgment even though the Court can recognize the
ambiguity involved. In the syllabus to the King v. Burwell opinion, the Reporter of Decisions
describes Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion as rejecting, or not applying, Chevron because the issue
involved major questions: “Chevron does not provide the appropriate framework here.”446
On the other hand, several scholars categorize the Court’s efforts as Chevron Step Zero or the
Major Question doctrine as a new statutory canon rooted in the nondelegation doctrine.447 This is
because it seems to enable courts to reassert the judiciary’s supremacy in the process of statutory
interpretation448 by discouraging delegation from Congress. Some commentaries analyze major
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issues as creating a significant exception with regard to when the Court should examine issues
under the Chevron framework at all.449
However, these arguments obfuscate the scope of Chevron Step One. Specifically, they
complicate the discussion regarding questions of “economic and political significance.”450 As we
saw above, the Court applied the Chevron framework but denied giving Chevron deference
because the agency’s statutory interpretation does not pass Chevron Step One (there was no
implicit delegation.) That is, the Supreme Court cases—MCI Telecommunications Corp., Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., and King—are not the major question exception but the Court’s
attempt to establish or restore Step One. Under this attempt, the Court encouraged scrutinizing
whether there is an ambiguity in an effort to reduce an agency’s interpretive power, on the
assumption that agencies would not receive implicit authority from Congress to make sweeping
reforms to industries they oversee or statutory schemes they administer.451 Therefore, it is in this
context that this study will now examine a series of cases (so-called major question exceptions or
the major question doctrine cases)—King, Williamson Tobacco Corp., and even MCI
Telecommunications Corp.—from the perspective of Chevron Step One, rather than from the
standpoint of exceptions.452
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PART II.
Alternative Perspectives to The Legitimacy Concern of Excess Flexibility
Using its two-part inquiry, Chevron attempts to bring some clarity and certainty to judicial
review when the courts confront questions of law and policy, replacing statute-by-statute
evaluation with board presumptions about statutory ambiguity and agency discretion.453 In these
contexts, there can be inconsistency or differences related to the methodologies some courts use
for resolving some ambiguities; some criticize the application of the Chevron doctrine as highly
unpredictable, and it becomes a flashpoint of conflict to increase deference to agencies under such
circumstances.454
However, the contemporary critique voiced by some conservative Justices seems to prepare for
an even larger battle not just over the scope of Chevron or its uncertainty but for the very legitimacy
of the modern administrative law due to statutory ambiguity. While some contemporary critics of
the power and the legitimacy of the modern administrative state mainly focus on Chevron’s effects,
others focus on the legal fictions that lie behind Chevron. This can result in revolutionary effects
on the legitimacy of the agency policymaking power.
First of all, one can argue that Chevron established an alternative standard of legitimacy—i.e.,
this study argues that legitimacy may flow from general statutory principles as well as from precise
statutory rules. That is, Chevron creates an arena in which the legitimacy of agency policy
judgment flows in many forms, or disintegrates the standard from that authorized by legislative
directives. Moreover, Chevron changes the relationship between agency and courts; thus, it results
in the superiority of vague delegation, conceding authority and greater accountability of
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administrative agencies than of the courts.455 As a result, under Chevron, the role of judicial review
is to assist the legislature by requiring reasoned agency action enabling it to carry out the goals of
the statute while staying within its jurisdiction.456
Considering these effects, the main negative charge against the Chevron doctrine is that
Chevron’s reasoning for endorsing statutory ambiguities confers interpretive power to agencies
that violates the separation of powers. Contemporary critics are divided into two camps: 1)
deregulation or abolition of flexibility and 2) enforcement of a narrow nondelegation doctrine of
agency interpretative power.
A. Abolishing the Expertise-Based Model
The objection against Chevron begins with a very different understanding of statutory
ambiguity than the norm. In the Chevron critics’ view, statutory ambiguity cannot be a meaningful
standard that secures the legitimacy of agency discretion. In the critics’ view, ambiguity is not
unlimited credit from Congress to an agency that might justify some broad delegation. Rather, the
existence of statutory ambiguity is a token of legislative error or legislative failure. Thus, this
alternative perspective raises a question of whether legislative failure can be justified based on a
mere legal fiction, specifically, that of delegation—i.e., when Congress delegates legislative power
to the executive—as a necessary evolution in response to the sociological complexities of modern
life.457
The most provocative answer to that question might be that the modern administrative state’s
flexibility disregards most of the constitutional order. 458 Stated differently, it questions the
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legitimacy of the expertise-based model itself if it is based on unconstitutionality. In his book, Is
Administrative Law Lawful?, Phillip Hamburger argues that the modern administrative state’s
flexibility is unconstitutional because it causes broad delegations from Congress. It makes people
tolerate unconstitutional situations—agency law is, in effect, above the law. Also, Hamburger
criticizes modern administrative law as only playing a role to sugarcoat ever-growing agency
discretion, especially agency interpretative authority, in the name of practical necessity.
Among the de-legitimation critics, Hamburger provides a two-part thesis of standing: 1) in the
constitutional context, legitimacy must flow from authoritativeness; 2) in a regulatory context, non
or deregulation is better for everyone.
One strand of Hamburger’s argument is that discretionary agency power violates the separation
of powers principle, which is an important rule to maintain the government’s system established
by the Constitution.459 The reason is that under the rule of law, the legitimacy of agency authority
must flow from the authoritativeness of Congress. However, in his view, Congress does not have
any vested power to transfer its legislative authority under the separation of powers principle.460
Article I, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides, as Hamburger states, that “All legislative
powers [] shall be vested in Congress . . . .”461 Then, he advocated a very narrow approach to the
legislature’s ability to delegate any kind of legislative power not exercised by the legislature itself.
That is, under the originalist’s view, Hamburger insists that the only possible understanding of
Article I, section 1 is that the Constitution emphasizes that all legislative powers granted to the
United States shall be in Congress.462 It thereby expressly bars the delegation of such powers.463
459
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By the same token, he points out that modern administrative law is standing on the inadequacy of
the principal-agency paradigm to recognize the constitutionality of delegation. Defenders of
delegated administrative power concede that the Constitution does not expressly forbid the
congressional delegation of its legislative authority.464 In this context, defenders justify the broad
delegation by Congress, saying that as a principal, Congress used its legislative power to delegate
the discretionary power to the agencies. Also, the Constitution allows delegation by making laws
necessary and proper “for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer
thereof.”465
Regarding this, Hamburger rebuts that the common defense of administrative law misstates the
delegation problem, and it should be taken as a real-world problem of whether Congress has vested
power to transfer its legislative authority in the first place.466 Then, he points out legislative power
comes from the people. The legislature, therefore, could not subdelegate its power to others. In
other words, he does not describe the relationship between Congress and agencies as based on
principal-agent. Instead, he contends the underlying principle of delegation by Congress should be
understood as a matter of subdelegation. That is, when a principal (people) delegated power to an
agent (Congress), the agency (Congress) cannot subdelegate the power to a sub-agent (agencies)
because this apparently is opposed to the principal’s intent. In this context, subdelegation cannot
be legitimate as long as a principal expressly authorizes subdelegation.467 Stated differently, the
Constitution does not allow for Congress to assign its duties and responsibilities.
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Moreover, as for the necessary and proper clause, Hamburger argues that even if that clause
allows Congress to relocate these powers, 468 it cannot be the ground to justify delegating the
legislative power vested in the legislature.469 Congress is authorized to do what is necessary and
proper for executing the legislative powers specifically vested in Congress, not just legislative
powers in general.470 Therefore, according to Hamburger, discretionary agency power must be
prevented and is above the law by its lack of authoritativeness, thereby violating the separation of
powers.
In this context, he argues that the common delegation defense of administrative law is
delegitimizing the modern administrative state. Through a historical approach, Hamburger argues
that modern administrative law is unlawful because it runs contrary to Anglo-American
constitutional law as a significant means of defending against the absolute prerogative. 471
Basically, Hamburger equates ‘administrative’ with ‘prerogative’ since administration originated
from the prerogative power of the king. 472 Historically, to defend the prerogative power, the
monarch claimed extralegal power (judicial deference), a prerogative right to interpret laws or
proclamations that bound its subjects. Hamburger believes that the modern administrative state
has features similar to the prerogative powers of the king—executive agencies have the power to
interpret laws and issue rules and are then given judicial deference. 473 That is, the legislature
provides meaningful standards, including agency jurisdiction and purpose. Also, it empowers
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specific authorities to imply policy choices in the legislative process. In Hamburger’s view, that
might be called the legitimating standard for agency decision-making under the rule of law.474
Then, what approach does Hamburger take if flexibility is the root cause of his legitimacy
concerns? Since flexibility is the root cause of Hamburger’s legitimacy concern, his ideal model
of an administrative state is not to give the agency a foothold for flexibilty. Specifically, from the
perspective of de-legitimation critics such as Hamburger, statutes can be as complex and subtle as
administrative rules, confronting the genuine problems that exist with specific solutions at that
stage. Hamburger notes, “Both types of enactment can be highly detailed, and both can be drafted
by experts—the only difference being that statutes are adopted by Congress rather than by heads
of agencies.”475 Practically or impractically speaking, this could require that Congress pass eight
hundred pages of legislation in one year, and federal agencies then enact about eighty thousand
pages as a response to the congressional legislation. 476 This shows that, as a usual matter,
congressional legislation routinely pursues to solve a genuine problem. But it does not provide
specific solutions.477 Instead, Congress delegates to unelected bureaucrats of the executive branch
the authority to issue binding rules or “regulations,” and it these regulations that will actually
determine the impact of a statute on one’s everyday life.478 And in a de-legitimation critic’s view,
Congress can and should enact over 8,800 pages of legislation. If not, Congress should not enact
any legislation that is otherwise so vague.

474

Id. at 418.
Id. at 430.
476
MIKE LEE OUR LOST CONSTITUTION: THE WILLFUL SUBVERSION
(2015).
477
Id.
478
Id.
475

130

OF

AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT 7

By then, why do we need to admit the fundamentalistic understanding proposed by Hamburger?
In a regulatory context, the de-legitimation critics imply that what should or could happen more
often than not is that markets would otherwise govern. First of all, the Framer’s dedication to
separation of powers centered around individual liberty, but administrative discretion leaves
Americans insecure in their freedom.479 That is, the flexibility of administrative regulation puts
individual liberty in peril because no one can predict what an administrative agency might do.
Specifically, such power imposes binding constraints without the full benefit of direct
representation coming through the political process. It imposes judicial decisions without due
process of law and other basic procedural rights. More generally, it leaves Americans subject to
consolidated or combined power—the dangerous combination of legislative, executive, and
judicial power.480 While the Constitution preserves the specialization of government powers by
placing them in their own specialized parts of government, the delegation argument, in fact, allows
that those specialized government powers are consolidated based on purely pragmatic reasons.481
In this context, Hamburger argues that:
“Discretionary administrative power thus deprives Americans of security in their
freedom, and it thereby reduces investment, wealth, innovation, experimentation, and
personal happiness. Accordingly, it is difficult to believe that such discretion is a
necessary response to modernized society. In fact, what seems necessary in such a
society is freedom under law.”482
As an example, Hamburger uses FDA regulations. He analyzes that the FDA does not get much
credit for lives saved by drugs but does get blame for lives lost. Indeed, it inhibits the development
of entire fields of new medicines—most worrisomely, new antibiotics.483 And the result of the
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particularized control by agency regulation is, in his view, to block the entire development of new
innovation in medicine. Therefore, Hamburger argues that “administrative law is not so clearly
necessary.” 484 The reason is that because the particularized control by experts is not always
necessary, and more often, results in harm. That is, while unregulated markets may hold various
imperfections and may inhibit an efficient allocation of resources or values, Hamburger points out,
administrative agencies might be even more imperfect when their exercise of regulatory controls
stifle competition, create barriers to entry, and, as a result, limit consumer choice.485
B. Reinvigorating Nondelegation Doctrine, Restoring the Role of the Court
A second response to the legitimacy concern is to reduce the effective range of administrative
discretion, using the nondelegation doctrine. In other words, the contemporary critics of Chevron
argue that the problem of administrative discretion could be cured if the delegation clause
contained a more precise legislative formulation of directives to agencies, telling agencies more
specifically what they can and cannot do.
The nondelegation doctrine is the most traditional charge against congressional delegation. But,
in practice, the nondelegation doctrine has not been a major tool leading to increased scrutiny for
agency policymaking when courts review most congressional statutes. Only two cases explicitly
ruled that congressional legislation was unconstitutional, using the nondelegation doctrine. 486
Instead, the Court adopts the nondelegation doctrine as a form of the intelligible principle: a grant
of rulemaking authority is proper if Congress sets forth some principle that the agency employs
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when making rules. 487 Applying the intelligible principle to congressional delegations, the
delegation shall be constitutionally sufficient if Congress explicitly suggests the outer boundaries
of the delegated authority that justifies the general policy the agency enacts and applies.488 The
intelligible principle is a practical form of nondelegation that reflects the necessity of agency
discretion, justifying the agency’s quasi-legislation power.
However, the contemporary arguments used by some justices reject the inherent difficulty of
line-drawing and that such an issue alone cannot be a proper excuse for failing to enforce the
Constitution. 489 Rather, the “Court does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine with more
vigilance” because “the other branches of government [also] have vested powers that can be used
in ways that resemble lawmaking” and can be used to limit agency discretion appropriately.490 The
issue, as pointed out by Justice Alito, is that the other branches of government do not exercise
these powers, leaving agency discretion unchecked.491 In this light, the renewed skepticism of an
agency’s extended regulatory powers has thus lead to what appears to be a revival of the
nondelegation doctrine as a major tool or interpretive device. This tool recovers a more narrow
constitutional status from the modern administrative state in contravention of the separation of
powers principles carefully designed by the Framers. That is, the recent scholarly argument and
conservative justice’s opinion increasingly share the skepticism of the de-legitimation critics,
which is based on two themes—unconstitutional delegation and individual liberty.
Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch focus their main concerns with Chevron from the
perspective of the nondelegation doctrine, focusing on what they consider to be possible violations
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of the separation of powers principle. That is, Chevron and Brand X have both created the
Leviathan of the administrative state in that federal agencies can now usurp the powers of any
branch of the government with what they claim to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute
involved. 492 In the process, as Justice Gorsuch notes, modern administrative law and federal
agencies
“swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal
power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of
the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”493
With this in mind, Justice Gorsuch has opined that Article I, section 1 should be replete with the
following statement: “The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative
power to another branch of Government.”494
Based on this understanding, he points out that under the Chevron framework, the modern
administrative law too easily permits and justifies legislative power without the approval of both
Houses of Congress. 495 But this broad delegation does not have any historical or theoretical
grounds to justify the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous statute at issue. Rather, in Justice
Gorsuch’s view, contrary to the Framers’ intent, use of the federal government’s legislative power
in this way undermines democratic accountability. Under the separation of powers principles, the
Framers warned that the federal government’s most dangerous power existed when it enacted laws
restricting the people’s liberty.496 That is, the Framers sophisticatedly and specifically designed
the government in such a way that only congressional legislation can limit the people’s liberty.
However, broad delegations that confer agency legislative power do not involve any elected
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representatives or the demands of bicameralism and presentment to the president. And
consequently, this legislative power always contains the significant risk of becoming nothing more
than a form of presidential preference.497
The other theme is that affording agency deference vests the agency with judicial power in
contravention of Article III. Article III requires that the “judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”498 Regarding this, Justice Thomas notes that under Article III, “judicial
power requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon
the laws.”499 And this value is a core principle necessary that secures “separation of powers” and
“the constitutional system of checks and balances,” thereby protecting individual liberty. 500
Therefore, in Justice Thomas’s view, Article III stands for the following statement: “[I]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”501
However, under the current deferential review standard as expressed and commonly used with
the authority of Chevron, courts cannot meaningfully review agency determinations but must
rubber-stamp agency decisions. Justice Thomas thus describes that the legal fiction
behind Chevron precludes judges from exercising their proper judicial powers, requiring
abdication of their reasoned reading of an ambiguous station and blind deference to the agency’s
view.502 Even further, the current judicial deference doctrine has developed up in such a way that
a court’s resolution of statutory ambiguity is not authoritative in many circumstances.503 Chevron
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can require courts to give deference to agency interpretations regardless of the statute’s original
meaning that Congress endorsed around the time of the statute’s enactment. Also, under the
Chevron framework, courts are required to defer to an agency’s policy judgment regardless of
whether an agency has changed its position. As a result, simply assuming, as Chevron allows, that
Congress has delegated the necessary interpretive power to an agency rather than allowed a court
to decide on the constitutionality of the delegation in the first place results in an abdication of the
judicial power, ignoring Article III’s requirement.
In the same vein, Judge Gorsuch agrees. He also argues that the duty—to say what the law is—
is to resolve statutory ambiguity independently, criticizing the Chevron framework:
“At Chevron step one, judges decide whether the statute is ‘ambiguous,’ and at step
two they decide whether the agency’s view is ‘reasonable.’ But where in all this does
a court interpret the law and say what it is? When does a court independently decide
what the statute means and whether it has or has not vested a legal right in a person?
Where Chevron applies that job seems to have gone extinct.”504
What is the goal of renewed nondelegation doctrine? Is the contemporary argument—enforcing
nondelegation doctrine—pursuing a goal to remove all agency discretion as the de-legitimation
critics insist? The answer might be “no.” The fundamental reason is that the nondelegation doctrine
itself admits the possibility of delegation within the U.S. Constitution. Justice Rehnquist, in
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institution, acknowledged that the
naïve view and application for separation of powers is unrealistic. Specifically, he mentioned that
the Framers did not anticipate requiring the maximum degree of separation as essential to a free
government, and can never be realized in practice, quoting Madison’s statement in Federalist Paper
No. 48. 505 And this approach to separation of powers was also long recognized by Justice
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Blackmun as he noted in Mistretta v. United States, “Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”506
Rather, the fundamental purpose of reinvigorating nondelegation doctrine is restoring the role
of judicial review to control administrative agency power, not necessarily simply making it
absolute. In this context, the main idea is that the nondelegation doctrine comes into play as a wall
or borderline that distinguishes core parts of what Congress must determine from less or minor
questions that are constitutionally delegated. Thus, under the nondelegation doctrine, courts should
determine whether the statute is flawed by reviewing the existence of Congress’s answer to the
above question involving the values that underlie the statute. In other words, the renewed
nondelegation critics emphasize that there is a need for constitutional delegation under the
separation of powers. That is, Congress is required to answer fundamental questions that intertwine
with a specific value that the statute pursues.507 If a particular value is fundamentally a political
one, however, that question can be answered only by elected representatives—namely, the
Congress. 508 As a result, Justice Kavanaugh describes the goal of a renewed nondelegation
doctrine as one that does not allow Congress to delegate legislative authority to an agency if that
delegation involves major policy questions, even if Congress expressly and specifically gives its
instruction. That is, under this approach, Congress only delegates to agencies the authority to
decide less-major or fill-in-the-details decisions.509
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In short, the nondelegation doctrine serves as the guardian of legitimacy that comes into play
as one of the principal battlegrounds where the growth of federal regulatory authority is tested.510
The reason is that nondelegation analysis has evolved to keep up with the changed understanding
of what ideal agency legitimacy requires in terms of separation of powers principles.511 That is,
the vision of separation of powers embodied in the new nondelegation doctrine is an approach that
fundamentally asks whether agency power was being adequately checked.512
C. Manifesting Nondelegation Doctrine to Diminish the Federal Administrative Power
However, the key here is how to draw a bright line between an adequate check on agency power
and the flexibility agencies require to react effectively to new situations related to but not
necessarily fully anticipated by the statutes that create them.
The Court oftentimes limits congressional delegation of legislative power by different names.
Sometimes the Supreme Court controls an agency’s interpretation, operating a canon of
constitutional avoidance. Or the Court draws the outer limits of Congress’s power [of delegation]
in the context of an administrative interpretation, requiring a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.513 Or it may overturn the agency’s statutory interpretation on the ground that
the reasonable legislator should not anticipate that a bureaucratic body to settle significant
economic and politically sensitive policy questions that the congressional legislation left
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unanswered. 514 The two main exceptions to the usual application of a traditionally broad
nondelegation doctrine to congressional language are constitutional avoidance and the major
question doctrine. We shall examine them in turn.
In general, “constitutional avoidance” refers to a canon of statutory interpretation that directs a
court when faced with (a) more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute and (b) one
interpretation that raises serious constitutional problems and one that does not, a court’s plain duty
is to adopt the interpretation that does not raise the constitutional issue and save the Act. 515
Congress, in other words, must not have meant to raise or cause a constitutional impasse, so an
alternative interpretation must be what they contemplated. Courts often use the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance as an interpretive tool to lighten the full weight of agencies’ deference to
certain statutory interpretations. They thereby abrogate the scope of their own jurisdiction, saying
that the courts must reject the request for deference of such agency interpretations and application
of their regulation when they unnecessarily raise significant constitutional concerns. 516 Stated
differently, under the modern doctrine of constitutional avoidance, courts must construe an
ambiguous statute so as to avoid unconstitutional agency action. An agency cannot always have
its way with statutory interpretation if its interpretation raises a serious question under a
constitutional provision, such as the First Amendment.517
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For example, suppose that a construction company building a department store paid substandard
wages and fringe benefits.518 In response to this, a union peacefully handed out handbills at the
entrances of the mall, announcing the labor disputes and urging customers to boycott the mall’s
stores until the company promises to pay fair wages. The National Labor Relation Board interprets
that that handbill activity violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, which
prohibits a union from “threaten[ing], coerc[ing], or restrain[ing]” others to stop doing business
with another.519 That statutory interpretation by the Board would typically be entitled to deference
under the Chevron framework as long as that interpretation is permissible within congressional
intent.520 However, the Court refused to give the Chevron deference. Instead, the Court said that
even if this construction of the Act were permissible, courts must make a de novo determination
of whether an alternate interpretation exists that does not raise severe constitutional concerns.521
In other words, the ambiguity will trigger constitutional avoidance and rely on Chevron as
interpretive canon when Congress invites agencies to fill the gap of ambiguous statutory provisions
once a court determines that a statute is ambiguous at Chevron Step One.522 Then, if the agency’s
attempt to remove the ambiguity raises constitutional questions, constitutional avoidance comes
into play to give a court the authority to set aside the agency’s interpretation in favor of one the
court thinks better avoids constitutional questions.
On the other hand, the Court oftentimes operates another canon of constitutional avoidance in
the shadow of nondelegation—major question doctrine. The major question doctrine is also deeply
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rooted to the nondelegation doctrine. The major question doctrine is a departure from the general
rule of Chevron that courts will give some degree of deference to an agency’s statutory
interpretations. 523 Rather, the doctrine assumes that administrative agencies are required to
complete certain technical tasks to perform the general policy objectives, and should not answer
questions of significant political value.524 At the same time, the doctrine assumes that courts are
better equipped to identify the important policy judgment Congress should itself make because,
under the circumstances, only it has the power to make them.525 In other words, the major question
doctrine puts courts, rather than agencies, in the position of the front-line agency for Congress,
calls them to determine how to make statutory schemes workable.526 In these cases, the courts
resolve statutory ambiguities instead of deferring to the agency’s interpretation.527 They usually
do this by sending it back to Congress, noting that the issues involved are too big for an agency to
resolve on its own and must be done by Congress.
One of the frequently referenced cases as an example of the major question doctrine is the
Supreme Court opinion in Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.528 Here the Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter “FDA”) pursued its authority to
regulate tobacco products as one of the types of drugs and combination products of devices that
deliver nicotine. Moreover, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) explicitly grants broad
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authority to regulate materials like a “drug” or “device” 529 that will affect the structure or any
function of the body. 530 Considering the rational connection between the profound impact or
problem on public health caused by tobacco and the facts suggested,531 the FDA’s decision532
might be a permissible or reasonable policy choice. Here, the Supreme Court also recognized that
the FDA is the agency with a greater familiarity with the subjects under the statute it administers;
therefore, under Chevron, courts would give deference to the FDA’s policy choice.
However, the Supreme Court determined that, by common sense, Congress was unlikely to
delegate the amount of power that would be exercised if the agency decided to respond to the
major questions that have “economic and political significance” without Congress’s clear
instruction.533 That is, agencies can exercise their discretion regarding the major questions only
when it is clear that Congress intended to include the questions within the agencies’ jurisdiction.534
In this context, the major question doctrine is not limited as an interpretive tool to narrow the
scope of the agency’s statutory interpretation or jurisdiction. Instead, it plays a role to enlarge the
judiciary’s policymaking power by protecting the legislature’s jurisdiction and by remanding the
issue not to the agency but to Congress itself. When the issue is best resolved or resolvable only
by Congress, the Court says so. Application of the major question doctrine requires that the Court
recognize these cases that have “economic and political significance” beyond what any
interpretation of the statute at hand might embody. In such circumstances, the Court acts as the
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interpretive agent of Congress; however, it will insist that removing the statutory ambiguity is a
task for Congress and not just a court.
At the same time, the fundamental goal of the major question doctrine is to recover the courts’
authority as the primary interpreters of statutory values. The major question doctrine provides a
way for the judicial branch to assert its institutional supremacy over administrative agencies in
resolving legal questions that must be answered by the elected representatives.535 In this light, the
significance of the major question doctrine is that the Court will determine what the respective
powers are. In other words, at a glance, the Court is ruling that the agency’s policy judgment is not
legitimate because of the lack of authoritativeness. But that ruling, in effect, remands the case back
to Congress. That is, the Court will tell the agency that the issue is too big for it to decide and that
a new statute is necessary, not a new interpretation.
PART III.
Do the Chevron Critics Supply a Sufficient Solution for Securing Legitimacy?
The contemporary concern over flexibility has a common thread that the expertise-based model
is based on an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and Chevron, therefore, violates the
separation of powers. It gives too much power to executive agencies. How does this affect
legitimacy? What is a viable new alternative to the alternatives of the legitimacy critics?
A. Ambiguity is Inevitable Whether or Not That Status Is Desirable or Ideal
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Should we remove all ambiguity? Could we truly avoid statutory ambiguity? Regarding this,
we need to return to two important themes raised throughout this thesis: the concept of legitimacy
and the need for flexibility.
The de-legitimation critics, Philip Hamburger or another prominent critic, Gary Lawson,
conceptualize that legitimacy can be ensured only from constitutional (congressional)
authoritativeness. Therefore, a very narrow nondelegation doctrine is one of the significant legal
lenses to secure the rule of law from the perspective of separation of powers.
However, as mentioned in Chapter I, the legitimacy of administrative law is not only for its
authoritativeness and its role in maintaining liberty but equally and significantly for a contradictory
demand for justice in individual cases.

536

That is, legitimacy is not subsumed in

authoritativeness.537 And that is why the APA relies on open-ended standards—the arbitrary and
capricious standard, substantive evidence, reasonableness—for judicial review, preserving its
flexibility. That is, when the standards of judicial review empower judges to examine agency
actions broadly, legitimacy can be reserved.538
Ambiguity is not a failure of legality and justice and does not violate the rule of law. Instead,
the generality will introduce flexibility into the government; thus, it makes administration vital,
securing individual justice. The ambiguity comes from the necessity to overcome the obstacle that
legislators will never agree on all subjects for which they are required to enact legislation. And
even if it occurred, the agency cannot realize the goal under the thick legislative standard. It is too
obvious that legislators cannot anticipate every changing circumstance and foresee realistic
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variations. In other words, ambiguity is inevitable for institutional results whether or not that status
is desirable or ideal. That is, vague or ambiguous statutes are not a matter of logic but a matter of
real-world problems. In particular, in an expertise-based model of agency law, delegation from
Congress is not a unique or an exceptional phenomenon anymore. As Professor Aman notes,
agency discretion is inherent in the very nature of administrative agencies since the modern
administrative state must adapt its expertise-based model of decision making to the issues at hand;
agency discretion is intrinsic to their fundamental value as legitimate creations of the legislature.539
The flexibility necessary for institutional efficiency to exist is a means to resolve significant
issues of policy, as well as differentiate the relative ability of courts and Congress to decide such
questions. As a general rule, agencies play a major role because they are best equipped to make
the technical decisions that underlie such issues—the courts generally are not equipped to decide
such economic and political matters; Congress is not willing and surely does not have the time to
resolve the myriad of technical issues that may arise. 540 In the modern administrative state,
agencies have a wide range of discretion to establish their policy related to significant issues, which
Congress intentionally left open and still charges them with considering in light of changing
realities.541
From a practical point of view, institutions must act with flexibility to carry out their legally
required tasks. That is, delegation is a “necessary and proper” means for Congress to carry out its
Article 1 legislative functions. It cannot be read so narrowly as to render this part of the
Constitution irrelevant. With this in mind, the originalist understanding of separation of powers
and necessary and proper cannot be admitted. Considering the necessity of flexibility in the modern
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administrative state, American constitutional law will become obsolete if we adapt and apply the
Constitution in a straightforward way, because nobody can keep the constitutional order,
contradicting the plain language of the Constitution more frequently than one might imagine.542
The role to be performed by the executive power in a modern state has been greatly expanded,
compared to the state at the dawn of the Anglo-American Constitution. In this modern era, the
legal relationship in administrative law has become complex and diverse, as in environmental
issues or financial regulation. This means that Congress has been facing the limitation of its ability
to enact proper statutes to address actual needs of society.
To impose unrealistic delegation restrictions as proposed by Hamburger are not constitutionally
required and ultimately would, as a likely consequence, result in decisions that leave such issues
exclusively to the private sector. This should be a democratically based decision, not one that
occurs simply by default.
B. Justice Thomas’ Self-Reflection Is Misguided
Justice Thomas, in Baldwin v. United States, as a dissent to a petition denying certiorari, says,
“Chevron compels judges to abdicate the judicial power without constitutional
sanction . . . The judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise
its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws. The Framers
anticipated that legal texts would sometimes be ambiguous, and they understood the
judicial power ‘to include the power to resolve these ambiguities over time’ in judicial
proceedings. The Court’s decision in Chevron, however, ‘precludes judges from
exercising that judgment.’”543
In short, as Judge Gorsuch also commonly advocates,544 the inference is that it is the role of the
judiciary to interpret statutes independently; interpreting statutes inevitably involves resolving
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statutory ambiguity. Therefore, statutory ambiguity must be resolved by independent judicial
judgment. However, the judicial deference doctrine forces judges to avoid this important duty
based on the legal fiction of implicit delegation. Thus, deferring to an agency’s resolution of
statutory ambiguity is, in Justice Thomas’ view, an abdication of the judicial role.
However, as one wag put it: “The more you explain it, the more I don’t understand.”545 Suppose
a statute contains unclear terms that can be construed in different ways. A judge employs all of the
“traditional tools of statutory construction.”546 Then, the judge is able to ascertain legislative ends
or intent; then she says what the law means.547 At this point, in Justice Thomas’ view, Chevron
deference, regardless of the judge’s independent valuable effort, forces courts to follow the
agency’s view on the statute.
Now, in his past interpretations of the Constitution, Justice Thomas required that a court must
resolve ambiguity, and for this to occur, it requires that the court declare the best reading of the
statute. Consequently, Justice Thomas’s view seems to have the same standing with Justice
Rehnquist as he noted in American Petroleum that
“We ought not to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional
delegations of legislative authority solely out of concern that we should thereby
reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New Deal era.”548

545

I quoted this saying from Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in SEC v. Chenery Corp., saying,
“I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, ‘The more you explain it, the more
I don’t understand it.’
....
[A]dministrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this point—it is a persuasive reason
for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary powers under and within the law. It
cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law . . . law must be determined by courts, when
authorized to review, no matter how much deference is due to the agency's fact finding.” See Chenery,
332 U.S. at 214-15 (1947).
546
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
547
Id.
548
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 686.

147

In so doing, Justice Thomas renounces his views in the majority opinion that he authored in Brand
X. There, he held an agency could change its policy by interpretation of a statute if the enabling
act was, in fact, ambiguous and a court had to defer to that new agency interpretation even though
it had in the past confirmed the previous decision. But now, Justice Thomas is of the view that this
is an abdication of judicial power and violative of the delegation doctrine.549
This renunciation of his previous view goes too far and should not be followed by a majority of
the Court. First of all, from the perspective of the rationale behind Chevron, Justice Thomas’s
formulation only makes sense if the term of the statute at issue could be interpreted in different
ways in light of textual meaning as he did in Brand X. In other words, in Brand X, referring to a
statutory term as ambiguous is to claim that the term in that statute has various possible
interpretations; thus, it is non-obvious.550 And in this case, Chevron would require that the judge
admit the agency’s different view only because the agency’s view is also reasonable, even if it is
not necessarily the best, in the judge’s view.
However, as mentioned above, in many other cases we have seen, 551 the Supreme Court
emphasizes and suggests the alternative approach, saying that the existence of statutory ambiguity
under Chevron Step One cannot be determined only based on the various possible interpretations.
Even Justice Scalia, who advocates for a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, said that
Chevron would be virtually meaningless if the matter of statutory ambiguity is only about the
arguments for the non-obvious or difficult-to-know textual meanings and possible
interpretations.552 That is, Justice Scalia’s critique means that, as Professor Doerfler also notes in
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The Ambiguity Fally, that the ambiguity under Chevron is to claim that that term is “unknowable,”
not just difficult to clear up as an ambiguity.553 Then, the Chevron doctrine comes into play on the
ground of the legal fictions, requiring courts to listen to the agency’s view because the agency is a
front-line agency for Congress, and there might be implicit delegation to deal with the issue of
political judgment.
At this point, one who takes Thomas’s view might raise a question, Why should courts listen to
the agency’s view? But this question is established on the misunderstanding of the role of
administrative law. During the pre-New Deal era, the primary function of administrative law was
to be a “red light”—i.e., a limit on the role of government.554 That is, the goal of administrative
law was often to protect only the values of laissez-faire from unlawful government intervention.555
Under the U.S. Constitution, the courts were responsible for ensuring that the fundamental
individual freedoms of property and contract were protected. 556 The initial goal of traditional
administrative law was to protect the autonomy of private entities from the unlawful or arbitrary
exercise of administrative power.557
During the New Deal era, however, administrative law adapted and developed along with the
political, regulatory goals and circumstances of these times. Specifically, administrative law came
to focus more on protecting an individual from market failures like monopolies, as opposed to
government oppression.558 In other words, the New Deal Era introduced a new relationship of the
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individual to the state in which the government regulated markets for the sake of protecting both
businesses and consumers from the consequences of market failure. Today, the deregulation of
markets has in some displaced government to the private sector, and the vertical relationship forged
in the New Deal now involves a deregulatory state—the deregulated private sector and individuals.
The paradigm now in effect is one in which the agencies, through a delegation of public interest
powers from Congress, now have the authority to govern the field of various public service roles.
Under these circumstances, courts needed to accept the reality that agencies may often be more
technically competent than courts.559 That is, the courts, which had traditionally been responsible
for protecting individual freedom and equality, deferred to agencies’ authority. The courts,
upholding agency decisions as long as they were not arbitrary or capricious, under the rationale
that Congress intended robust agency authorities to implement a significant policy against market
failure, flexibly assumed that the government was acting per its expertise.560 Furthermore, this was
likely to be more democratically accountable and thus more in accord with concepts of
legitimacy.561 Indeed, given Congress’s decision to delegate these powers to agencies and given
the agencies’ expertise, the role of courts was to give a “green light” of deference to agency
expertise, allowing agencies to carry out the tasks delegated by Congress.562
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Of course, the incremental change explanation—red light theory and green light theory—does
not mean that the administrative law does not also retain some of its original roles. There are times
when an agency may be going beyond what Congress wanted and entering an area still thought to
be governed by markets alone. But in most instances, agencies are operating within the broad
boundaries of their enabling statutes and this is where Chevron has force. As discussed above, it
is still very relevant to consider the role of modern administrative law and the meaning of
ambiguity under the Chevron framework. Indeed, the wisdom of Chevron is very clear: If a court
cannot identify what a statutory term clearly means, and the law is not clear, the court must respect
the status quo as defined by the agency and give deference to the agency’s interpretation. For
example, whenever the courts review rulemaking, it is evident that the role of courts is to uphold
the policymaking values based on the statute involved and the expertise of the agency as applied
to that statute, based on the scientific facts and rationale that underlie the rulemaking.563 Agencies
are not making up the outcomes they reach—they are contained within the broad contours of their
statutes and are the result of the expertise they have developed, applying those statutes to the
sometimes thousands of cases it will have encountered over time.
C. Distorting Congressional Intent in Line With Justices’ View on Political Value
The Constitution cannot be a shield to prevent the flexibility of the administrative state.
Furthermore, Chevron is not a legal doctrine that abdicates the role of the courts that the
Constitution bestows only to the judicial branch. Some questions are too basic legally for agencies
to decide, such as constitutional issues. Does this apply to delegation issues too? Is this issue solely
for the courts, however they choose to review it?
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We cannot say, of course, that the nondelegation doctrine is dead or has become empty. Rather,
it still exists here and there as a legal principle against unlawful governmental intervention. But
today, the conservative Justices are making a serious attempt to resurrect it in a very strong form
and apply it with increasing frequency, rather than being sparing in its use and application. And
some scholars anticipate that under the direction of a new Supreme Court, these conservative
Justices will elevate the nondelegation doctrine as a remedy for unconstitutional delegations to
such an extent that it overtakes Chevron.564
The problem is that, even with a penchant to use the doctrine more frequently, we cannot truly
anticipate what will happen under the nondelegation doctrine. Only one thing is clear: As vague
as the doctrine is, its potential impact is also huge. No one can confidently suggest precisely what
the standard should or will be. Because of this, even Justice Scalia was willing to renounce its
continued use by the courts. In a dissenting opinion he wrote in Mistretta, he agreed that all
delegations must be accompanied by intelligible principles, but also added
“While the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental
element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the
courts. Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and
that some judgments, even some concerning policy considerations, must be left to the
officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over
unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree.”565
These issues also arose recently in Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court’s most recent direct
discussion of delegation. The Court did not hold that a vague statute violated the nondelegation
doctrine. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Kagan pointed out in Gundy, that if courts, in
fact, stringently applied the nondelegation doctrine, most of the government would be
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unconstitutional. 566 The Supreme Court has not made the decision to invalidate congressional
legislation on the ground of the nondelegation doctrine since A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v,
United States in the 1930s. 567 Though some courts resist its application or represent serious
attempts to bolster the doctrine, they also do not suggest significant methods on how best to clarify
that doctrine and apply it to achieve the result they advocate—encouraging Congress to take more
responsibility in the law-making process. This means that we do not have enough experience to
anticipate the legal outcomes that might emerge from A. L. A. Schechter Poultry and Panama
Refining that continue to be alive, like “pulsating amoebas” in the sea of the law.568
In this context, setting aside the theoretical imperfection, the forgoing argument here will
examine the question, Does the alternative perspective response—enforcing nondelegation
doctrine over Chevron—appropriately control agency discretion? And should that principle be
converted into a general principle in favor of limiting flexibility of agency policy judgment? Or
would it be better to allow these matters to be considered on a case-by-case basis, adjusting the
doctrine of ultra vires, not a constitutional formula?
This thesis strongly supports the latter approach as a general matter. This is because overreliance
on nondelegation is overkill and more importantly would greatly eliminate the flexibility that
agencies provide to our governance structures. Even Justice Scalia, an advocate of Congressional
restraint, in his dissenting words above recognizes the limited role that Courts must necessarily
play here. Moreover, the nondelegation doctrine is, at best, vague; thus, it is difficult to enunciate
a clear line on how much delegation is unconstitutional. Yet, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s attempt in
his concurring opinion in American Petroleum (so-called Benzene case) may be the best example
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we have when it comes to figuring out what underlies the argument of enforcing the nondelegation
doctrine. And based on his attempt to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine in his concurring
opinion, we can seek answers to the questions above.569
I believe that the nondelegation doctrine cannot and should not be a rule of thumb to control the
flexibility of the modern administrative state. The reason is that the application of the
nondelegation will too easily permit a court “to distort a statute’s meaning” in line with “the
Justices’ own views of sound social policy.”570 In short, the application of nondelegation doctrine
will create two problems: 1) opening the gate to the political nature of value in line with judges’
own views of social policy; 2) distorting congressional intent consistent with what is likely to be
only a negative concept of liberty, not the one embodied in the statute itself. Let us examine these
two problems through Justice Rehnquist’s application of the nondelegation doctrine.
First of all, the application of the nondelegation doctrine can easily open the gate of unidentified
political values while a judge reviews the matter of unconstitutional delegation. If they are troubled
by the regulation Congress has authorized, they cannot reject it in favor of what might be their
default position—the free market. That is why Justice Rehnquist argues in the case for Congress
to be clearer on how it decides certain policy issues. And that is why the majority in this case was
willing to send this case back to the agency to ask them to articulate their reasons for how they
view Congress’s goals. To apply the nondelegation doctrine, judges will be required to examine
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textual and historical guidance, as well as pay attention to the reasons agencies themselves adopt
before they seek to intervene with their own views.571
The fundamental goals of the application of the nondelegation doctrine are to be sure that
Congress itself has made the fundamental value decisions necessary to apply the statute in
contention. The nondelegation doctrine implies that the political nature of the value choices in
play, and the important choices of social policy involved, should be guided and suggested if not
made, by Congress. It is the most responsive branch of government to the popular will, not courts
or not even the executive branch whose job is to faithfully execute the laws and not create new
ones. And under the nondelegation doctrine, a judge is required to avoid a construction of the
statute that grants open-ended authority to the agency.572 If a particular value is fundamentally a
political one, that question can be answered only by elected representatives—namely, Congress.573
That is, the nondelegation doctrine comes into play only when such matters genuinely cannot be
discerned.
In this context, Justice Rehnquist reviewed the value choices that Congress conferred to the
agency to decide whether the Secretary’s mandate was to create an essentially risk-free work
environment, 574 how much risk or safety should be permitted or prohibited, 575 and more
fundamentally, how or whether to balance the statistical possibility of future deaths with the
economic costs of preventing those deaths.576 Then, he concluded that Congress failed to do these
things. That is, the unconstitutional delegation doctrine inevitably gives courts in such situations a
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very large role.577 And then, as Justice Rehnquist concluded, courts should determine whether the
statute is flawed by reviewing the existence of Congress’s answer to the political values that should
underlie the statute. This is because silence means the legislature did not do its job.578
The problem is that the application of the nondelegation doctrine emphasizes the political nature
of the value choices involved. Some of the value choices must be made by Congress, but most of
them are usually are made by agencies—a situation that challenges the idea that agency expertise
is what legitimizes agency action. However, agency expertise is all about implementing
congressional values as statutes are interpreted. That is why expertise is so important. It is not
detached from the political compromises in the statute. The agency needs to point to those as
Justice Stevens directed the agency to do on remand. In other words, in my view, he appropriately
decided to ask the agency for better reasons and not turn this into a constitutional decision. Both
flexibility and legitimacy are preserved by such an approach.
Certainly, one goal in using unconstitutional delegation as a remedy is to invalidate the
congressional delegation. And it suggests that Congress must now write a clearer and specific
legislation. Under this form of judicial activism, it is a court that determines the core content of
legislation, not what Congress wanted or how it would otherwise make practical sense of the statute
at issue. As a result, the nondelegation doctrine plays a role in delegating legislative authority not
to the agency but to the courts themselves. In other words, under the nondelegation doctrine, the
one who ends up doing the legislator’s work is the court.579 The court will decide how extensively
compromise is required in a specific field by judicial rationality, not by political control and
accountability. This easily can result in a form of aggrandizing the power of courts, raising a set
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of new separation of powers issue. This is why the nondelegation doctrine should be used only as
a last resort.
Second, and possibly even worse, the application of the nondelegation doctrine could allow a
court to distort a statute’s intent when it comes to deregulation as opposed to regulation. Professor
Aman, author of Administrative Law in a Global Era, describes that in light of pursuing formalism
in the separation of powers, the nondelegation doctrine inherently derived from that interpretive
approach to the Constitution has a tendency to be consistent with liberty—but only a negative
concept of liberty.580 Therefore, a vigorous application of the nondelegation doctrine would have
a strong bias for repeal and deregulatory or antiregulatory outcomes. Justice Burger, in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, noted exactly this feature of the nondelegation
doctrine, saying that “we have not yet found a better way to preserve the freedom than by making
the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.”581
In short, the nondelegation doctrine accords with the belief in a small-government or “a minimalist
conception of the role of the federal government,”582 but this needs to come from bills written by
both Houses of Congress and signed by the president, not from what amounts to a judicial veto in
a nondelegation case.
There is another problem with too active a nondelegation doctrinal approach as advocated now
by a few justices, and that is the judiciary’s view will distort the initial congressional intent
embedded in a statute. For the initial ends of the statute that Congress enacts might be and usually
always are very different from a negative concept of liberty. Recall the net neutrality regulation by
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the FCC in Chapter II. Congress enacts the Communication Acts with a statutory term, ‘common
carrier’, that has the responsibility not to discriminate individuals based on race, region, etc., and
allow them to access the communication service. That is, Congress sets out positive liberty. And
then, the FCC promulgates a specific regulation—so-called net neutrality—to impose common
carrier responsibility on BIAS to pursue the goal of positive liberty, in which the individual has a
right to access the Internet without any discrimination openly. Here, one might criticize that
regulation is interfering with BIAS’s freedom to run its business.583 It may be true. But we cannot
say that the Act and regulation are invalid because they violate the goal of separation of powers—
a concept of negative liberty. It seems to be what the statute wanted or contemplated. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act in the Benzene case also shows the opposite intended by
Congress to a concept of pure negative liberty. In the Act, Congress purported to achieve a specific
goal: ensure safe and healthy working conditions so as to protect American workers from risk by
regulating occupational exposure. And Congress delegates the authority to OSHA. Congress has
that power because it represents the voters and is the essence of a democratic approach to lawmaking that can and often does temper pure market outcomes.
In this light, the negative concept of liberty is not the only one that exists. Congress has other
ideas when it comes to protecting liberty through specific legislative actions and regulations.
Courts need to defer to that. If Congress itself sets out another approach dealing with social or
political issues, at that moment, the scope of the value of liberty important to it has been identified.
The fundamental reason is that what liberty the statute pursues is solely within Congress’s power
and is their choice. Therefore, when Congress acts, it is their conception of liberty that rules and

583

See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 417 (Kavanaugh J., dissenting) (rejecting the application of Chevron
deference).

158

courts have to readily give them the benefit of the doubt. This enhances democracy—it does not
diminish it.
On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist’s nondelegation opinion approaches the congressional
intent with skepticism because he believes that a legislature must make such fundamental political
choices very explicitly. But this may ignore the political bargaining process involved and, in any
event, may yield an approach that limits an agency in areas that demand flexibility and
experimentation. Especially when issues are new, a fluid dynamic approach is better than a narrow
legal approach.
One who takes the side of the application of the nondelegation doctrine in the Benzene case will
explain that OSHA’s decision is so strict that it practically deprives the manufacturer’s freedom to
run its business. But a decision can be determined by the agency with appropriate reasons and
review—it need not be constitutionalized. Even if Rehnquist were right, that approach ignores the
initial meaning of statues—they stand for, as here, positive liberty. The fundamental reason is that
courts cannot ignore those congressional values and need to be very open to what they might be
and how they may evolve. The application of the nondelegation doctrine makes the courts
supervise congressional legislation and agency regulation whether or not the legislation contains
fundamental political compromises, or whether or not the delegation involved was to ensure the
legislation could pass in the first place. However, it is not for the courts alone to decide such
questions.584 Congressional political values are justified and necessary in light of the statutory
interpretation anticipated and those values and goals come from the statute itself—that is, from
Congress itself, not just from an exercise of judicial rationality that can occur in a vacuum.
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CHAPTER IV.
LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS
This study that I have presented argues for the proposition that legitimacy requires flexibility.
Fundamentally, we too easily and quickly succumb to fear—the idea of giving agencies flexibility
evokes the image of an executive unbounded as the legendary Leviathan. Moreover, we shun the
Leviathan because it will restrict individual liberty. Per that principle, critics of the administrative
state argue that congressional delegation should not be overused because agency authority in the
face of statutory ambiguity is very discretionary and too flexible.
The proceeding parts explained both why that fear is overblown and why that fear is dangerous.
So far, in Chapter I, this study showed that the concept of legitimacy is connected to agency
flexibility and agency discretion. Without sufficient flexibility, agencies will not implement
congressional statutes, freezing the federal regulatory apparatus. Chapter II presented a case study
of these issues focusing on the Internet regulatory regimes issued by the FCC related to the net
neutrality principle. This chapter demonstrated what it looks like for agency flexibility to
(arguably) go too far, as the FCC adopted a deregulatory regime (arguably) undoing congressional
intent. Chapter III, in turn, reviewed alternative perspective responses mainly suggested by those
Supreme Court Justices who advocate overruling the Chevron doctrine, instituting a narrow
approach to the nondelegation doctrine. The lessons learned confirm, however, that none of these
views is appropriate.
Lesson #1. Flexibility is not the cause of agency illegitimacy.
Instead, in fact, flexibility will increase the legitimacy of the administrative state. The flexibility
of agency power comes from statutory ambiguity. By enacting statutes that necessarily contain
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ambiguities, Congress allows those ambiguities to be resolved in real-time by federal employees
who actually see those laws implemented in everyday life. The flexibility keeps the statutes and
the congressional values it embodies alive by allowing agencies to use their expertise to adapt the
legislation responsively to an ever-evolving world.
Flexibility, of course, is not the only standard to secure the legitimacy of administrative law.
The bottom line is that the agencies must carry out congressional values efficiently and effectively.
But that line can be achieved not only when agency action is standing on authoritativeness but also
when it can be justified ‘necessary and proper’ for Congress to carry out its goals. Agency authority
is enabled only if it is within the scope of statutes under which the agency works to keep it alive
and function appropriately especially when the times and circumstances that triggered
congressional action are evolving and changing. That is why we call it filling the gap between
congressional values and the real world.
Moreover, the need for flexibility is not motivated by practical reasons alone. The agencies’
ability to respond quickly, but within the context of congressional values, to new situations and to
new problems, is a crucial part of making our democracy functional. Agencies can and often are
the heart of our ability to successfully make democracy viable. In other words, Congress cannot
realistically amend or pass new legislation every time something new occurs that was not
specifically covered in the statute that applies. We know that it will not happen in the real world,
and it also would not be practical even if it were possible.
Lesson #2. Deregulation teaches us that the traditional perception of administrative law does
not give a proper legal lens for controlling the flexibility of modern administrative law.
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Chapter I reviewed two significant administrative law models—the transmission belt model and
the expertise-based model of agency power and discretion. They have been applied when agencies
sometimes are given the green light to expand their powers to meet the problems at hand and also
when agencies are given a red light if their expansion is too great or runs contrary to the statute
involved. In this context, agency deregulation and the cases that flow from it are prime examples,
teaching us both the possibility and the limits of administrative law. The fundamental reason is
that agency deregulation is not necessarily a matter of incremental change within the process of
administrative law. It can, in some instances, be so transformative that the statute involved is
effectively repealed.
Deregulation is not nonregulation but re-regulation based on a different form of controlling
market principles. Deregulation can usually be a deeply premarket example of the kind of change
that an agency makes. While it avoids governmental intervention, the agency still engages with
private individuals—albeit through the invisible hand of the market. In other words, agency
deregulation produces some ironical or even paradoxical results in the context of flexibility: To
actually reduce flexibility, the deregulatory regime requires even further departures from
congressional statutes, values, and flexibility that they authorize. Many of them are changes that
come from a strong wave of political laissez-faire instincts counter to the agency’s congressionalbased statute. When an administration advocates the free market, that administration can actually
diminish agency discretion by deregulating. That is, the deregulatory strategy pursued by some
presidential administrations highlights the importance of the interpretative role the executive
branch can play. But it may seem that doing less is not a big change when in fact it can radically
end up with the executive branch rewriting the law.585 Through this kind of interpretative role—
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one that diminishes greatly the statute involved and seems at times to go back to a time when only
the market prevailed—the administration can ramrod its goal even if that goal is at odds with the
regulatory framework that Congress built into its legislation.586 In short, in the name of some
deregulation, the executive branch may utilize flexibility, not to advance congressional goals but
to neutralize or undermine them by ignoring congressional intent.
Of course, not all agency deregulation goes this far and is, in effect, illegitimate and unlawful.
Agency deregulation might be a proper response when it is time for a well-needed change in an
agency’s policy. Suppose an agency believes that the regulatory regime should be relaxed because
of a significant change in circumstance—e.g., a new technology that increases competitiveness
and lessens the monopoly power of a single seller of some goods. If the agency sufficiently
reviewed the changes, forming good and logical reasons to carry out the goal of congressional
legislation, but concludes a more marketized approach is possible to achieve it, the agency’s policy
judgment is definitely lawful and such deregulation is certainly legitimate.
However, agency deregulation starts becoming illegitimate and it raises red flags or sets off
warning signs, when it seems to be repealing the statute that governs, not merely making it more
efficient. Sometimes, however, the executive branch too easily crosses the line from refinement to
repeal. Some kinds of deregulation are designed to wipe congressional statutes from the book. In
other words, agency deregulation seemingly ignores the congressional statute. We saw this
exemplified in Massachusetts v. EPA. The EPA effectively elected not to regulate carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases as pollutants even though the CAA required the agency to regulate
“any air pollutants.”587 The agency did not repeal its regulation under the APA. Rather, using its
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statutory interpretive power to conclude that greenhouse gases were not covered by the CAA, the
agency sought to deny or reject the need for carrying out the regulatory framework as originally
designated by Congress.
Where to draw the line between a valid interpretation and judgment call and an invalid one can
be difficult. It is very hard, for example, to determine an accurate qualitative assessment of an
agency policy judgment (is it good or bad?) in some cases. That is, agency interpretive power
aggressively pursued to produce a deregulatory policy could be very close to the line of legitimacy.
Recall our discussion of the Internet’s regulatory regime issued by the FCC in Chapter II. The
Communication Acts provide for a market-oriented approach in the name of the public interest. It
also delegates general authority to the FCC. Therefore, literally, the FCC legitimately used its
authority to induce marketization into the Internet industry; however, that policy judgment deeply
asserts an idea of flexibility that goes too far, crossing the line of legitimacy even though the policy
is one that Congress’s broad delegation of power to the FCC arguably bestows. The fundamental
reason legitimacy is called into question is that such a significant change in Internet regulation led
to an illegitimate revision of the initial intent that Congress built into the statute.
Lesson #3. Chevron does not fail.
Many scholars who oppose Chevron argue that the two-step inquiry under the Chevron
framework is a rubber stamp enabling courts to almost always give deference to agency decisions.
They argue that Chevron is not primarily concerned with policy decisions, but underlies legal
questions and such questions ever since Marbury v. Madison always have been left to the Courts.
Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch most strongly advance these views.
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However, those arguments are misguided588 because Chevron has evolved to the point where it
legitimately recognizes the importance of agency decisions based on expertise but also the
assumption that Congress meant to delegate them to the agency. But the legal question of
delegation very much remains within the Court’s power to decide. “Chevron applies” means that
courts examine the legitimacy issue of an agency’s decision under the Chevron framework
beginning with the fundamental question, Would Congress be likely to delegate authority to the
agency to make the policy judgments it now makes?589 Therefore, if the agency does not have the
legal authority to make the legal decision, that is a question of law, and the Court usually does not
defer—the agency decides.
Lesson #4. Courts should review the legality of agency decisions, but courts should not
constitutionalize those reviews by invoking the nondelegation doctrine unless absolutely
necessary.
The nondelegation doctrine should not become a common tool to secure democratic
accountability. It should be used sparingly, giving Congress the benefit of the doubt whenever
possible. A stringent unconstitutional delegation approach sweeps out all of the procedures
designed to protect us from unconstitutional discretion—rulemaking procedures and legislative
procedure in favor of a linguistic approach that seeks to demand a kind of congressional specificity
that is unrealistic. The fundamental goal of administrative law is to provide a proper procedure to
secure democratic accountability through the rulemaking and formal and informal adjudicatory
processes. Under the administrative process, presidential will or political influence and expertise,
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along with Congressional intent, cooperate and coordinate thereby fulfilling the flexibility and
separation of powers approaches that treat each government branch with respect and equality.
Furthermore, in Chapter III, we saw that the application of nondelegation doctrine does not only
mean that courts end up making congressional legislation. It also opens the door for a court to
bring in certain political values to what the court believes are the core issues in that legislation. In
such a circumstance, courts can end up sweeping out the congressional legislation, and imposing
the courts’ view on the political values in question.
There is nothing wrong with political values if they are grounded in a valid congressional statute
interpreted adequately. One of the lessons learned is that substituting judicial values or political
values for congressional values is inappropriate. And if done through the nondelegation doctrine,
its constitutional basis wipes out the entire statute. To ensure against such preemption of
congressional values, we must also reject narrow formalistic approaches to separation of powers
questions.
Lesson #5. The major question doctrine does not provide a proper legal lens on major issues.
This study defines the major question doctrine as one that is rooted in the Constitution’s
nondelegation doctrine. And as we saw in Chapter III, it is a prerequisite (so-called Chevron Step
Zero)590 that plays a role in denying the agency’s interpreting power and rejecting its application
of the Chevron framework when the agency policy judgment deals with the major issues of the
control by agency discretion.
Setting aside the problem related to the nondelegation doctrine and focusing on the major
question, the lessons learned teach us two things: 1) the new doctrine will be used even when it
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would not or should not be applied; 2) already, the existing legal framework—Chevron—has
achieved the goal of judicial control over the broad delegation from Congress under the ultra vires
principle.
One of the main lessons learned is that the major question doctrine obfuscates the scope of
Chevron Step One. And it complicates the discussion regarding the questions of “economic and
political significance.”591 In particular, the puzzlement misguides some commentaries, leading
them to analyze the major question doctrine as creating a significant exception to the norms
guiding agencies and courts when the Court examines issues under the Chevron framework.592
Regarding this, Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that the Court has already established the
major question doctrine as precedent—e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,593 Brown & Williams, and
Justice Breyer’s article, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy. He describes these cases
as closely related to the major question doctrine that the Supreme Court has consistently
maintained. 594 However, those cases do not refuse to apply the Chevron framework. The
precedents mentioned above do not follow the nondelegation doctrine at all. Breyer’s approach,
for example, is rooted in an agency’s own regulatory history and involves questions of consistency
and reasoning, not just separation of powers.595 Also, as another example, in Utility Air Regulatory
Group, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that at issue was whether the EPA’s interpretation is
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permissible, saying, “We review EPA’s interpretations of the Clean Air Act using the standard set
forth in Chevron.”596
To be sure, some of the major issues can be turned into delegation questions. Therefore, in those
cases, the agency’s discretion can raise issues of constitutionality—especially unconstitutional
delegation. However, even if the issues are too big for an agency to decide, that does not mean that
courts must have judicial power not to overkill the flexibility. Put differently, the major question
doctrine gives courts redundant power to sweep out not only agency’s policy judgment but also,
indirectly, to reverse congressional legislature.
Furthermore, if the goal of the major question doctrine is to control broad delegation and set a
significant legal lens to restrict agency discretion, Courts already use the Chevron framework to
determine the legitimacy of congressional delegation in relation to an agency’s interpretations, not
eliminating the statue Congress made. That is, it is clearly ultra vires for an agency to interpret a
statute beyond the regulatory framework Congress builds into the statute. The ultra vires says their
controlling statutes cannot be stretched so far, that they cover things never intended to be covered,
and there are times that that can lead to illegitimacy. Still, it is better to deal with such concerns
through the statute and not the constitution.
Keeping these lessons learned in mind, this study brings the lessons to the issue—how to control
flexibility in the context of agency deregulation. This study suggests leaving it to agencies.
Because under the Chevron framework, the court still can control the agency policy judgment and
certainly questions of law and suggesting proper latitude for agency discretion. Specific
suggestions are as follows.
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1. Do not overrule Chevron. Agencies need discretion.
Chevron’s fundamental wisdom is to provide a bridge between flexibility and durability in terms
of agency laws. Here, two simple inquiries of the Chevron framework leave the decision of how
much flexibility should be allowed to Congress. Accordingly, courts may play a role in checking
and balancing agency discretion based on a reasonableness standard. The conservative Justices’
solution of instituting a narrow delegation doctrine in difficult discretion cases will worsen the
problems it seeks to fix, burning the bridges to deliberation and reasoning as the best ways of
resolving difficult cases. Their approach would over constitutionalize agency discretion.
2. Do not institute nondelegation doctrine.
The fundamental gauge to evaluate the legitimacy of agency decisions must be agency
expertise. In particular, under the expertise-based model in modern administrative law, the
statutory ambiguity evidences congressional intent that agencies must use their expertise to fulfill
the congressional intent embodied in the statute. That is, an agency is tasked explicitly with
exercising its judgment—perhaps even political judgment—when executing a statute. In this
context, agencies’ expertise is not just for more practical regulatory results. Instead, expertise is a
significant standard for determining whether there is congressional delegation. And under this
presumption, even though it is merely a legal fiction, agency expertise plays a role in retaining
agency flexibility as much as possible because it enables congressional values to remain and grow.
Expertise is only a tool; thus, it has to be anchored in a statute that gives general goals. Even though
an agency has space to regulate, deregulate, or re-regulate using its expertise, it must be within the
boundary of the statute that Congress intends. Thus, agency expertise is all about implementing
congressional values as statutes are interpreted. That is why expertise is so important. It is not
detached from the political compromises in the statute; rather, it is integral to them.
169

However, instituting a narrow delegation approach will add different legitimacy concerns. One
of the concerns might be redundant judicial power. One of the lessons learned is that applying the
narrow delegation doctrine is likely to introduce political values into judicial review. Political
values underlying the statute are acceptable. And it is the key direction the agency should pursue.
In other words, political values are justified and necessary for statutory interpretation purposes
when they come from the statute—that is, from Congress itself. But unlike the ideal, when the
political values are the majority Justices’ impulse for a certain kind of judicial rationality, it often
facilitates, almost as a default position, a market approach as opposed to a legislative approach.
The statute is ignored and, worse, declared unconstitutional. The market values likely to be left are
not relevant and not connected to Congress and the statute. Furthermore, as we saw, that kind of
imposition of market values, judicially imposed, can easily result in less democracy, not more.
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